Space and time do not eat independent principles of being, existing along with matter and independently of it.
Space - the order of mutual arrangement of many individual bodies that exist outside of each other.
Time - the order of successive phenomena or states of bodies.
Leibniz distinguishes two types of truth: truth of reason and truth of fact.
The truth of the mind is obtained by analyzing until we reach the root cause.
The truth of a fact is a fact without an explanation of the cause, since the finite human mind is not capable of seeing cause-and-effect relationships. The analysis goes on forever. Their first cause is God.
^ Kant “What does it mean to be oriented in thinking”
If traditional philosophy created a hierarchy of types of knowledge (theoretical (science): practical (ethics) and poetic (aesthetics)), then Kant considered them autonomous. They are connected, but there is no main thing. Kant himself believes that the most significant is practice (ethics).
In his work “What does it mean to be oriented in thinking,” Kant criticizes dogmatism and calls it a source of error. Dogmatic thinking is that which has not tested its premises. Kant calls most of the previous philosophers dogmatists. Some philosophers, in his opinion, felt that their judgments were dogmatic in nature, and fell into the other extreme - skepticism.
Kant's own teaching is Criticism.
When we try to apply reason to supersensible objects (noumena), this is a speculative application of reason. Such speculations include, for example, theology.
All our knowledge begins with sensory experience. We receive impressions, combine them and can obtain an abstraction. Empiricists and skeptics believed that this is how we know. But Kant believed that knowledge has not one root, but two: sensory experience (material) and reason.
The “speculative interest” of the mind (difference from reason) is the need of the mind to think when there are no more objects for thought. These are, for example, thoughts about God, infinity, and the uniqueness of people. Is speculative interest bad?
Most things in themselves are “idle interest” - appearances are quite enough for us. But there are things in ourselves that we cannot help but want to comprehend - the three ideas of reason.
Reason appeals with concepts that must be proportionate to certain objects, i.e. focused on sensuality.
Kant: “Sensibility without reason is blind, but reason without sensuality is empty.”
In sensory perception we cannot fully recognize an object. There is a chair in sensory perception (phenomenon), and the chair itself is beyond the senses. Kant called the entire thing “The Thing in itself,” or, more precisely, “the thing in itself.”
Phenomenon (what is given to us through the senses) + some X = “thing in itself”
But in most cases we don’t even want to know “things in themselves.” But there are exceptions - for example, we want to know ourselves for ourselves, and this is a speculative interest.
^ Kant's "Three Fundamental Critics"
The purpose of criticism is to set the limits of one's capabilities. If the mind sets these boundaries, then it will know which things we can know and which we cannot.
To what extent are we able to understand nature? Is a scientific picture of the world possible?
To do this, you must first understand what science is based on. The elementary operation of science - judgment. What kinds of judgments are there? By form: analytical, synthetic; a priori, a posteriori.
^ Analytical judgment - this is a judgment in which we do not express a point of view about something, but do not go beyond the framework of an already existing concept. - this is a judgment in which we do not receive any new knowledge, but simply clarify, concretize the old.
^ Synthetic judgment – this is when we enrich our knowledge and add new information to a concept. According to Kant, genuine knowledge is always synthetic. Since man is a finite being, his knowledge is a synthesis.
^ A priori judgment - a judgment that does not require experience to make.
A posteriori judgment- a judgment that we obtain through experience.
All analytical judgments are a priori in nature.
According to Kant, in order to prove the validity of science, one must prove the existence of synthetic a priori judgments. After all, synthetic judgments, due to the finitude of the mind, carry the truth, because these are judgments in which knowledge is incremented. But if this increment occurs a posteriori (experimentally), then it is not guaranteed to be true, because the number of experiments is also finite and does not give us the right to construct laws. This means that laws can only be constructed on the basis of a priori synthetic judgments - those that increase knowledge, but do not require experience.
In other words, real scientific judgments must be synthetic, because This is new knowledge, and a priori, experimental, because otherwise it is not truth, but habit.
How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?
Kant calls his theory critical idealism, or transcendental idealism (going beyond, otherworldly). His picture of the world: “a thing in itself” = a phenomenon + a certain X that we cannot comprehend. “Things in themselves” are beyond our consciousness.
“Things in themselves” are not just transcendental - they have a transcendental function: they limit our consciousness, give it form.
The structure of the cognitive ability according to Kant: 1) sensuality, 2) reason.
Sensuality is the ability to contemplate, the ability to receive an object in general.
A priori matter. For example, the matter of vision is a visible object. The matter of smell is smell.
A priori form is something common to all senses (“ pure contemplation»):
Space
Time
Wherein space does not fill all feelings, but only external ones. Inner feelings (emotions) do not fill space, although they are objects.
And here time– an absolutely universal contemplation. Not only external, but also internal feelings exist in time.
Feelings only know the object itself, but this is only potential knowledge, it still needs to be realized. And this requires reason.
Reason - brings an object recognized by the senses under some concept or category.
Kant names 12 basic a priori concepts:
A) Quality: reality\denial\limitation
Thesis antithesis their synthesis
Thesis (reality): This rose is really red.
Antithesis (negation): This rose is not red.
Synthesis (limitation): this quality is real, but up to a certain limit, beyond that it is unreal.
B) Quantity: Unity \ plurality \ totality
Thesis (Unity): There is one rose.
Antithesis (Plurality): there are many roses
Synthesis (Totality): a regiment of soldiers (a certain multitude is taken as unity)
C) Relationships: independence and lack of independence (substance and accident) \ cause and effect \ interaction (communication)
Independence and lack of independence: master and slave (accident and substance)
Cause and effect: Accident cannot exist without substance, that is, a slave cannot exist without a master, an effect cannot exist without a cause.
Interaction: two substances relate to each other as a cause. Two masters have equal rights and are the cause of each other - they interact.
D) Modality: (impossibility \ reality \ necessity
Possibility: When we are not, we may be born.
Reality: When we exist, we are truly born.
Necessity: a thing that has become valid only by virtue of possibility. Those. if a thing has a possibility, then it will necessarily become actual.
For example, when we are not there, we may be born. But it does not follow from this that we will definitely be born - we may not be born. We are not necessary, but contingent.
God is necessary. There can be no accident in it. But we cannot know it, since we were not only born by chance, but we also know it by chance.
How are reason and feelings connected? Kant called it ability to imagine.
In order not to confuse images of the imagination with empirical images (obtained experimentally), Kant called them schemes.
Imagination is divided into reproductive (read images) and productive (schemes).
At the same time, we can only cognize and schematize what is in time; everything timeless is outside our consciousness.
Thus, our reason is finite; it can only cognize phenomena, but not “things in themselves.” But we strive to know “things in themselves”, we strive beyond the limits of reason - and this is what Reason does. This is the tragedy of man - he thinks more than he can know. We can only cognize phenomena, but with our minds we understand that there are not only phenomena, but also “things in themselves.”
Reason is the ability to cognize something unconditional, infinite, “a thing in itself.”
But in most cases, to know the “thing in itself” is idle and not necessary for a person interest. The appearance of a chair is enough for a person; he has no need for a chair in itself. But there are three topics in which the desire to go beyond reason can be explained - this is "speculative interest."
We ourselves – I am the soul.
The structure of the world as a whole
God is the absolute cause of the world.
Ideas of the mind are of a regulatory (orienting) nature; they direct consciousness.
When we try to reason about the structure of the world, we willy-nilly rush between contradictions.
The world has a beginning in time. The world has no beginning in time. Neither one nor the other works, there is no scheme.
There are (no) boundaries in space
Everything in the world is subject to cause-and-effect dependence. There is freedom. Reason, cognizing the world, will always see reasons. But reason can never say that there are reasons for everything, since it never knows everything. Thus, the concept of freedom does not contradict reason, it simply relates to it.
Man belongs to two worlds - the world of natural necessity (reason) and the world of freedom (will)
Practical reason (critique of practical knowledge) is a solution to the problem of freedom that arises in theoretical reason.
It is in the practical sphere that reason legislates, but in the theoretical sphere reason only advises, and reason legislates.
Practical reason also gives an answer to the first idea - “What are we, what is the true essence of our Self?”
Answer: the essence of man is freedom.
Freedom cannot be cognized, since for this it is necessary to separate freedom as an object of knowledge from us as a subject. Freedom can only be exercised.
In freedom there must be a law, but not imposed from the outside (heteronomous), but on its own, within us (autonomous).
But the law is not individual, it must be for everyone. This is a law that everyone sets for themselves, but sets it the way it should be for everyone.
The law of practical reason is the law of freedom, not nature, that is, the moral law
^ The moral law has the form of an imperative, the same cannot be said about natural law.
But not every imperative is a moral law.
There are two types of imperatives: hypothetical imperative and categorical imperative.
A hypothetical imperative has the form of an “if, then” condition. In this case, there is a dependence on circumstances, which means that these are not laws of good will.
The moral imperative is a categorical imperative. It consists of a pure statement and is not affected by any conditions. Kant: “You must, therefore you can.”
The meaning of the categorical imperative:
Do what you think anyone should do in this situation.
Act in such a way that every rational being, including yourself, is always considered as an end and never as a means.
From morality comes God.
In theoretical reason there is the idea of God (theological), but the idea is something that does not presuppose the proof of existence, therefore, on a theoretical level, Kant refutes the proof of the existence of God. In the theoretical sphere, God is the ideal of absolute knowledge, which moves away like a horizon.
In practical reason, God is not an idea, but a postulate. Here we have no ideas at all, we only postulate: “this should be.” Why? Because such proper being is a necessary condition for our very practical reason. The moral law tells us to behave in a certain way, to be virtuous. But so that our desire to be virtuous is not something absurd (yes, we should be, but perhaps the world is designed in such a way that this will lead to nothing. I wish well, but with my mind I understand that this only makes it worse - this absurd). This means that we must postulate a situation as if our world were controlled by a higher mind, that is, by God. The point is not that when we act we think about God, we simply do good and assume that there will be a result, we assume that the world is arranged intelligently. If there were no God, it would be the case that no intention would be justified.When we act morally, we act as if the world were designed by God.
For Descartes, God guaranteed the truth of our knowledge in the theoretical sphere, but for Kant, God is needed only for practice, for morality.
In morality, God is the condition of the rationality of the world at any given moment.
Aesthetics.
Pleasant\beautiful.
Pleasant things are always interesting.
The beautiful is interesting to us without material gain. There is always something sensual about beauty; we need to see it for ourselves.
Beauty claims to be universal; we cannot admit that beauty is beautiful only for us. Therefore, when we encounter this, we blame either ourselves or our opponent for lack of taste.
Wonderful:
what we like without interest
what everyone likes
something that is expedient, but it is not clear for what purpose. When contemplating, everything seems expedient to us, everything is for our pleasure, but we cannot consider our pleasure to be the goal of nature, otherwise beauty will turn out to be a fake.
That which is known without the medium of a concept as an object of necessary pleasure. The pleasure of beauty is not accidental or real, but necessary.
Sublime is something we want but cannot imagine. The sublime is divided into mathematical(an endless series of numbers, starry sky) and dynamic(a confrontation with a force that overwhelms us with its power, for example, a raging ocean, an erupting volcano, a mountain range, etc.). The sublime is always destructive, it upsets the senses, destroys the imagination.
The pleasure of beauty is harmony.
Pleasure from the sublime is destructive, negative. The sublime in nature symbolizes the sublime in ourselves, and this is where pleasure lies.
^ Concept of Locke and Hume
The most famous dogmatist of Kant's time was David Hume. He said that, of course, we have some concepts, for example, cause and effect, but we also have direct sensory experience. Suppose we are watching someone play billiards. You see someone hit the ball with a cue and it rolls. You say you see addiction. But no, you only see facts. Science is trying to build a law under the sign of universality and necessity: “Whenever bodies come into contact...”. On what basis? Experience? No matter how you personally set up the experiment, it is still only a finite number, which means it is not enough to derive the law.
There are no scientific laws - there are only habits. We are used to things being repeated and passing them off as laws.
English philosophers take the opposite position to Descartes' rationalism - empiricism ("experience"). In fact, true knowledge is in this world itself, which we comprehend through experience.
John Locke: “Descartes says that all truth is within man, but at least three categories of people do not have them: idiots, children and savages. Reason does not sit in a person, but is accumulated through experience.”
Locke believed that truth is found in the very things of this world. But how did he know this?
David Hume: let's apply the postulate that all knowledge is obtained by experience, i.e. We obtain any law of nature as a result of observations and generalizations, but will this knowledge have the character of a law? No, because the number of observations is finite. Out of a million successful experiences, success does not follow in the Nth case. It is impossible to obtain the truth this way.
Radical empiricism leads to radical skepticism.
If experience does not give laws, but it gives habits. The picture of the world that we consider true is such only because we are accustomed to it. But unusual conditions may arise.
^ Hegel "phenomenology of spirit. Dialectics of slave and master"
Hegel's very first famous work is “Phenomenology of Spirit”. In this work, Hegel wants to present in a systematic form all the experiences that nature and humanity have made in their historical development.
According to Hegel, the basis of history is Spirit.
Spirit is a force whose specificity is to be present even in its opposite (“otherness”). Spirit is a process, a logical and historical movement.
History and logic are equal according to Hegel. Their equality is a “speculative dialectic.”
Any subject sometimes finds himself in a situation of otherness, in its opposite, and spirit is the ability, even in otherness, to preserve oneself, to remain oneself.
According to Hegel, truth is in movement from thesis to antithesis and back, in the process of which synthesis occurs. This movement occurs in order to achieve a state where there will be no antithesis, “otherness.”
For example: thesis - spirit, antithesis - matter, synthesis - spiritualized matter.
In this case, each synthesis finds a new antithesis, a merger occurs again, a second synthesis appears, and so on ad infinitum. If this process ever stops, progress will stop, it will be “the end of history.”
Usually we understand truth as a substance - a stable set of laws. According to Hegel, truth is an active process, it is both a law and how these laws are established.
Levels of knowledge of truth according to Hegel:
Sensory authenticity
Perception is the generalization of sensory certainty into things
Reason is the generalization of things into laws. The search for the “law of all laws” - the “thinking self” - all laws are united by the fact that it is I who thinks them.
But we will never know ourselves completely, since we will not be able to separate the object of knowledge from the subject of knowledge.
The question of who I am must be answered by self-awareness.
Consciousness (sensibility, perception, reason) + subjective consciousness = self-awareness
^ Lust (desire). Our self is our desire. Not to be confused with need - desire is something excessive.
Desire is not directed at an object, it is with the help of an object that we desire. Desire is directed at oneself, but not as a thing, but as a subject, as freedom.
Since desire is infinite, the finite object of desire (thing) will not satisfy it. You need to find a commensurate object, for example, the desire of another. That is, in order to want something, you need someone else to want it.
When two desires collide, they enter into a struggle for life and death. Three outcomes:
Both sides die and the story ends.
Both sides scatter - the person does not come to self-awareness and remains at the animal level.
One of the subjects goes to the end, and the other retreats in fear. Here a slave (fears for his life) and a master (not afraid) arise. Each of us is a slave to the extent that he is ready to give up his desire in fear for his life.
The master is a dead-end branch of development, the slave is progressive.
The slave begins to produce teachings in order to make his slavery reasonable.
The first such picture of the world - stoicism. Whatever happens cannot affect the inner self.
Skepticism– the next step after stoicism. The Stoic says, “Though the world is terrible, inside I am free.” The skeptic says that there is no world at all. But complete skepticism cannot be achieved. If we say that everything can be denied, then it is not clear what to do with this statement itself.
"Unhappy consciousness" - Christian religion. The world declares skepticism to be nothing. Christianity says that there is an ideal world. Here I am a slave, but this is an illusion. And everyone is equal before God: both master and slave. The skeptic and the stoic turn a blind eye to the master, and therefore do not change anything. Christians take an active position.
The last thing left to do is to bring heaven down to earth. Here to make a world where slaves become masters. This is the French Revolution in which Hegel lived.
^ Marx's concept (basic concepts of commodity, labor and capital)
Value is the ability of one thing to be exchanged for another in a certain proportion.
There are two sides to value: consumer (use) and exchange (equivalence).
The basis of value is labor: concrete (result) and abstract (effort expended).
“The problem of the form of value” - how is value constituted?
X products A = Y products B
20 arshins of canvas = 1 frock coat
As a person, we are always on one side of the equation - the “participant observer method”.
A fetish is something we have made that we treat as if it dictates to us what we should do.
Fetishism as such is money. Unlike an equivalent product, everyone always needs money, even when you yourself don’t know what you want.
Capital is value that brings surplus value.
D – T – D’
At the same time, only one product can bring surplus value - this is labor, labor. It is unique as a commodity in that it is not specific labor that is sold, but the ability to work.
The cost of labor is wages. Its size also has a fetishistic character - commensurate with the consciousness of the worker. Therefore, culture has always imposed on workers how much they should want.
It is always the worker's duty to produce more than he received—to produce surplus value that does not belong to him.
^ Existentialism (Heideger's concept)
Existentials are situations, the primary understanding of existence.
Existentials must be distinguished from categories. According to Heidegger, categories are secondary.
A category is a set of features. For example, the categories “citizen”, “Taurus”, “student”. This is always a given framework, a pattern of behavior. A category is a ready-made solution, a way of existence; by choosing a category, we make improper choice.
Do own choice It’s very difficult, we constantly fence ourselves off from it with different categories. But the more we repress our own choice, the more problematic it becomes.
Existential, where design is faced with its own choice, is a terrifying anxiety.
Not to be confused with fear, which has a localization, a reason. Horror captures not something in us, but us entirely. This horror can overtake the design at any moment.
In a moment of horror, Dasein awakens and again faces a choice. You can quickly go back (not your own choice of some category), or you can understand what it means to exist, to be your own image.
One’s own existence is always an act of choice that can be carried out at any moment. This is what you need to do:
With a full and clear understanding that the basis of our choice is Nothingness
Without understanding "why", just choosing to be this
At some point in time. “in the blink of an eye”, immediately and without hesitation, with a jerk
We choose ourselves completely - from the moment of choice until death. We choose ourselves the way we want to die. Re-election is not possible.
We choose one existence, but do not choose another, that is, we choose our fate and our guilt.
Conscience tests the choice. She does not say “this is good and this is bad,” but calls us to ourselves and withdraws us from people.
Sartre
Traditional philosophy also applied to man: God created man, having some concept of man. Then each concrete existing person is a special case of the concept of man.
The atheistic philosophy of modern times has not gotten rid of the principle “essence precedes existence” - there is still a certain “human nature”, that is, the essence of man, which is then realized in man.
Existentialists argue that there is one being that exists before it can be defined by any concept, a being in which existence precedes essence - and this is a man.
There is no “human nature” - he is first born, realized, and only then makes himself a man. A person makes himself and is responsible for his work.
But this responsibility is not just for one’s individuality - it is responsibility for all humanity. After all, when we choose something, we thereby recognize the value of our choice; we always choose the good. And goodness is universal; it applies to everyone. Thus, by choosing myself, I create a certain image of the person I choose, and this image extends to all of humanity.
Every person wonders (or tries to avoid it) what would happen if everyone did what I did. This feeling of deep responsibility gives rise to the feeling anxiety. If there is no anxiety, it means that the person is deceiving himself and moving away from it.
The second feeling that arises in a person in connection with making himself is the feeling abandonment. If there is no God, there is no morality, no eternal values, nothing to rely on inside or outside oneself, no excuses. The man is abandoned. A person has no responsibilities, reasons, determinism, conditioning - a person is free, a person is freedom.
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) German (Prussian) philosopher, founder of German classical idealism.
Main works: “Prolegomena to any future metaphysics”, “Critique of pure reason”, “Critique of the faculty of judgment”, “Critique of practical reason”. Written during the period of creativity called “critical” (from 1780).
Kant's main task is to know the boundaries of intellectual activity. Answer the question: what are the boundaries and limits? scientific knowledge? According to Kant, “any science is scientific to the extent that there are mathematicians in it.”
After Kant, the problem of dualism is removed - the opposition of the world perceived by the senses (body, being) and the intelligible world (soul, thinking). Thinking, according to Kant, itself constructs reality. What before him was considered “objective reality” possessing essence becomes only the result of the constructive activity of thinking (noumena) of the cognizing person and humanity. Those. the subject of knowledge deals only with appearances (“phenomena”), and the things themselves are inaccessible to him and remain for him “things in themselves.” This methodological position is called “ agnosticism" Historically it was preceded by " skepticism" V ancient philosophy(Pyrrho).
The process of cognition occurs as follows:
Stage 1: experience, which includes 2 components
a) a priori form of space or form of external contemplation (length, figure, hardness); b) a priori form of time, i.e. a form corresponding to a person’s inner life or inner contemplation (mathematics, logic, metaphysics, etc.). Before Kant, experience was represented as a blank sheet of paper.
Stage 2: knowledge development - stage sanity. The main task of rational activity is to translate experimental material into concepts (words); this stage corresponds to knowledge as a spiritual ability of the worldview (everyday knowledge and scientific knowledge).
At the 3rd stage, it is formed intelligence, he is responsible for the direction of the mind, i.e. reason literally directs the activity of the mind, setting certain goals for it. Where the question arises, there is reason, corresponding to faith and morality as spiritual abilities. Thus, Kant for the first time speaks not about thinking, but about fundamentally different spiritual abilities - reason and reason.
Reason cannot answer the questions: whether the world is limited in space and time or not, whether man is free or not free, whether God exists or not (unlike reason, which does not ask such questions). Each person decides this for himself. Kant thus tries to smooth out the contradictions between the Stoics and Epicureans. For him, a person cannot be a means to achieve any goals; he is an end for himself, because self-sufficient.
From a lecture on ethics by I. Kant: “The most terrible vices” are ingratitude, envy, gloating. “Morality - no person should destroy the beauty of nature, because if he himself cannot use it, then still other people can find use for it.”
The moral law, which has a supreme and unconditional character, Kant called categorical imperative:“Act in such a way that the maxim of your action can be a principle of universal behavior.”
The Kantian approach was developed, in their opinion, by J. Fichte (1762-1814) and F. Schelling (1775-1854). The first one was criticized by I. Kant himself, accusing him of subjective idealism. According to I. Fichte, it turned out that the only and main reality for a person is himself, his consciousness (“I am a concept”).
The concept of self-orientation, expanded and refined, will allow us to more clearly imagine the maxims of common reason in their application to the knowledge of supersensible objects.
Orientation means, in the proper sense of the word, the following: from a given part of the world (into four of which we divide the horizon) to find the rest, for example, the east. If I see the sun in the sky and know that it is noon, then I can find south, west, north and east. For this, however, the feeling of difference in myself as a subject, namely the difference between left and right hands, is quite enough for me. I call this feeling because these two sides do not have any noticeable external difference in contemplation. Without this ability to describe a circle, without resorting to any objective differences on it, nevertheless correctly distinguish the direction of movement from left to right from the opposite, and thereby determine a priori the difference in the position of objects, I would not know whether I should look for west to the right or left of the southern point and thereby draw a full circle through the northern and eastern points to the southern. So, I orient myself geographically with all the objective data of the sky, yet only with the help of the subjective basis of distinction. And if in the course of one day all the constellations, thanks to a miracle, retaining the same shape and the same position relative to each other, changed their direction so that what was in the east would now be in the west, then to the nearest stellar night no human eye would notice the slightest change; even an astronomer, if he took into account only what he sees, and not what he simultaneously feels, would inevitably be disoriented. But the ability of sensory discrimination between the left and right hands, quite naturally inherent in nature and strengthened by long-term use, comes to his aid, and he, paying attention only to the North Star, will not only detect the change that has occurred, but will also be able to orient himself despite it.
I can now expand this geographical concept of the method of orientation and mean by it the following: orientation in a given space in general, i.e. purely mathematically. To navigate a familiar room in the dark, it is enough for me to touch at least one object with my hand, the location of which I remember. In this case, what helps me, obviously, is nothing less than the ability to determine the position of objects on a subjective basis of discrimination, since the objects whose location I need to find are not visible to me at all. And if someone were to jokingly rearrange all the objects, maintaining their previous order, so that what was previously on the right would appear on the left, then I would be completely unable to navigate the room, the walls of which would otherwise remain unchanged. However, soon I will find my way around just by feeling the difference between my two sides, left and right. The same thing will happen to me if I find myself at night on streets familiar to me, on which I now do not distinguish a single house, and have to walk along them and make the appropriate turns.
You can avoid error, first of all, when you do not undertake to judge where as much is unknown as is necessary for a definitive judgment. Thus, ignorance in itself is the reason only for the limitations, but not for the error of our knowledge. But where the decision of the question of whether or not to judge something with certainty is not so arbitrary, where the need for judgment is dictated by a real need and, moreover, one that is inherent in reason itself as such, where a lack of knowledge sets us limits in everything that is necessary to obtain a judgment, there is a need for a maxim by which we make the judgment, for the mind must once be satisfied. It was already stated above that in this case there cannot be any object in contemplation and even nothing somewhat similar to it, i.e. something with the help of which we could represent an object corresponding to our expanded concepts, and thereby provide them with their real possibility. And we have no choice but to first thoroughly check the concept with the help of which we intend to go beyond the limits of all possible experience, whether it is free from contradictions. To do this, we must at least bring the relation of the object to the objects of experience under the pure concepts of the understanding, thanks to which we, however, do not yet make it sensible, but still think of something supersensible, which is suitable, at least, for its use in experimental use of our mind. Without such precautions, we are completely unable to find an application for this concept, but would be dreaming instead of thinking.
However, this one, namely one bare concept, has not yet achieved anything regarding the existence of this object and its actual connection with the world (the totality of all objects of possible experience). But here the right of the need of reason, as a subjective basis, to presuppose or presuppose what it is not allowed to know, based on objective grounds, comes into force; therefore, the right to navigate in thinking, in this immeasurable space of the supersensible, covered for us with complete darkness, only by virtue of its own needs.
It is possible to think of various supersensible things (after all, the objects of the senses do not completely fill the entire sphere of the possible), where the mind, however, does not feel the need to extend to it and least of all assumes its existence. The mind finds in the causes of the world that are revealed to the senses (or similar to those that are revealed to them), and without that there is enough food to still need the influence on it of pure spiritual natural entities, the acceptance of which would most likely have a negative impact on its use. And since we know nothing about the laws by which such entities can act, but we know a lot about the laws of objects of sense, or at least we can hope that we will learn more, then such an assumption will most likely cause damage to the use of reason. Consequently, playing with such chimeras or exploring them is not at all a need of reason, but rather simple, fraught with fantasy, idle curiosity. The situation is completely different with the concept of the first being as the highest intelligence and at the same time as the highest good. For not only does our mind already feel the need to put the concept of the unlimited at the basis of everything limited and at the same time of all other things; he goes further to the assumption of its existence, without which reason is not able to give a satisfactory explanation of the random existence of things in the world, and least of all of the purposefulness and order, which are found to an admirable degree everywhere (to a small extent, because it is closer to us, but still in more to a large extent). Without the assumption of an intelligent creator, it is impossible to give a clear explanation for this without falling into sheer absurdity. And although we cannot prove the impossibility of such expediency without the first reasonable reason (after all, in this case we would have sufficient objective grounds for this statement and would not need to refer to subjective ones), yet there is enough to accept this point of view, with all its shortcomings The subjective basis is that the mind needs to presuppose what it understands in order to explain a given phenomenon from it, since everything else with which it can connect any concept does not satisfy this need.
The need for reason, however, should be considered in two ways: firstly, in its theoretical and, secondly, in its practical significance. The first one was given above. However, it is quite clear that all this should be understood conditionally, i.e. we are forced to accept the existence of God if we want to judge the primary causes of everything random and, above all, the ordering of the goals actually inherent in the world. But even more important is the need of reason for its practical application, for it is unconditional, and we resort to the thought of the existence of God not only when we want to judge, but because we must judge. Therefore the purely practical use of reason consists in the prescription of moral laws. But they all lead to the idea of the highest good that is possible in the world, as far as it is possible only with the help of freedom - to morality.
Any faith, including historical faith, although it must be reasonable (after all, the last touchstone of truth is always reason), but only the faith of reason is not based on any other data except those contained in pure reason itself. Any faith here is subjectively sufficient, but objectively in consciousness an insufficient authority of truth. Therefore, it is opposed to knowledge. On the other hand, if something is believed to be true from objective, although in the consciousness of insufficient grounds, i.e. it just seems that this opinion, by gradually supplementing it with reasons of the same order, can ultimately turn into knowledge.
On the contrary, pure faith of reason, even in the presence of all natural data and experience, can never turn into knowledge, because the basis for positing truth in this case is only subjective, namely, it is only a necessary need of reason (and will be such as long as we we remain human), the need only to assume the existence of a higher being, and not to demonstrate it. This need of reason for a theoretical use that satisfies it cannot be anything other than a pure hypothesis of reason, i.e. an opinion sufficient to comprehend the truth from subjective grounds, since no other reason than this can be expected to explain these consequences. But the mind seeks reasons for explanation. And, on the contrary, the faith of reason, resting on the need for its practical application, could be called a postulate of reason: not because it would be a conclusion that satisfies all the logical requirements of reliability, but because this instance of truth (if only a person has everything in order with morality) in its degree is not inferior to knowledge, although in its appearance it is completely different from it.
So, pure faith of reason is a guide or compass with the help of which a speculative thinker, following the paths of reason, can navigate in the sphere of supersensible objects, and a person with an ordinary, but (morally) healthy mind can chart his path both in theoretical and practical respect, in full accordance with its purpose. And it is precisely this faith of reason that should be the basis of any other faith, and even moreover, of any revelation.
The concept of God and the very certainty of his existence can exist exclusively only in the mind, emanate only from it and enter into us not with the help of inspiration or with the help of a message from the lips of a person, no matter how high the authority he may have. If I happen to contemplate something similar, for example, God, which, as far as I know, nature cannot give me, then in this case the concept of God should serve as a criterion for whether this phenomenon coincides with everything that is characteristic of a deity. Although I absolutely cannot imagine how it is possible that some phenomenon could at least qualitatively depict something that can always only be thought, but never contemplated, it is still clear to me, at least, that I will have to verify this very phenomenon with the concept of reason about God and through this judge not so much about its adequacy to the latter, but rather about whether it contradicts it so that I can determine whether what appears to me, what affects my feeling from the outside, represents God or from the inside.
You, men of spirit and broad-mindedness! I bow to your talents and respect your human feeling. But are you aware of what you are doing and where your attacks on reason may lead? You, no doubt, want freedom of thought to remain intact, since without it the free flight of even your genius would come to an end. Let us see what will inevitably become of this freedom of thought if what you undertake takes over.
Firstly, freedom of thought is opposed to civil coercion. Although it is argued that the authorities can take away the freedom to speak or write, but not the freedom to think, but only how much and how correctly we would think if we did not think as if in common with those with whom we exchange our thoughts! So, we can say that the same external power that deprives people of the freedom to communicate their thoughts publicly, also deprives them of freedom to think - the only treasure that remains for us in the face of all civil hardships and with the help of which the only one can still be found way out of this disastrous state.
Secondly, freedom of thought is also taken in the sense that it is opposed to coercion in matters of conscience, namely when, without external violence in matters of religion, some citizens take on the role of guardians over others and, instead of arguments, with the help of prescribed ones and accompanied by fear of the danger of their own studies of the symbols of faith try to prohibit any examination of reason by influencing minds in advance.
Thirdly, freedom in thinking also means subordination of the mind only to those laws that it gives itself; the opposite of this is the maxim of the extralegal use of reason (in order, as a genius imagines himself, to see further than under conditions of limitation by law). And the consequence of this, naturally, will be the following: if the mind does not want to obey the laws that it gives to itself, then it will be forced to obey the laws that others give it, since without the law nothing, not even the greatest stupidity, can do its own thing for long. case. So, the inevitable consequence of the declared illegality of thinking (liberation from restrictions with the help of reason) will be the following: freedom to think will ultimately be damaged and, due not so much to misfortune, but to real arrogance, it will be literally lost.
GEORGE WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL.
“Wer denkt abstrakt?” - the article was first published in the posthumous collected works of Hegel (vol. 17). It was first published in Russian in the journal “Questions of Philosophy”, 1956, No. 6 (translated by E. V. Ilyenkov) and then in the two-volume book “Hegel. Works of different years”, vol. 1. M., “Thought”, 1970.
The article (rather, a feuilleton) is notable for the fact that it presents the philosopher as a remarkable writer, easily and not without sophistication managing the word and a set of common truths - to the surprise of everyone babbling about the turbidity of Hegel's texts and the indigestibility of their language.
WHO THINKS ABSTRACTLY?
Think? Abstractly? Sauve qui peut! - “Save yourself who can!” - some hired informant will probably scream here, warning the public against reading an article that talks about “metaphysics.” After all, “metaphysics” - like “abstract” (and, perhaps, like “thinking”) - is a word that evokes in everyone a more or less strong desire to run away, like from the plague.
I hasten to reassure you: I am not at all going to explain here what “abstract” is and what it means to “think.” Explanations are generally considered in decent society a sign of bad taste. I myself feel uneasy when someone starts to explain something - if necessary, I myself will be able to understand everything. And here any explanations about “thinking” and “abstract” are completely unnecessary; A decent society avoids communication with the “abstract” precisely because it is too familiar with it. What you know nothing about, you can neither love nor hate. Alien to me is the intention to reconcile society with “abstract” or “thinking” with the help of cunning - first by sneaking them there secretly, under the guise of small talk, in such a way that they would sneak into society without being recognized and without arousing displeasure, they would sneak in into it, as people say, and the author of the intrigue could then announce that the new guest, who is now being accepted under a false name as a good friend, is that same “abstract” that was not allowed on the threshold before. Such “scenes of recognition,” which teach the world against its wishes, have the unforgivable miscalculation that they simultaneously confuse the audience, while the theater engineer would like to gain fame for himself with his art. His vanity, combined with the embarrassment of everyone else, can spoil the whole effect and lead to the fact that the teaching, bought at such a price, will be rejected.
However, even such a plan would not have been possible to implement: for this purpose, in no case should the solution be disclosed in advance. And it is already given in the title. If you have already planned the trick described above, then you need to keep your mouth shut and act like that minister in the comedy who plays in a coat throughout the entire performance and only unbuttons it in the final scene, shining with the Order of Wisdom. But unbuttoning the metaphysical coat would not achieve the same effect that unbuttoning the ministerial coat produces - after all, the world did not recognize anything here except a few words - and the whole undertaking would, in fact, boil down to establishing only the fact that society had long ago lost this thing disposes; Thus, only the name of a thing would be acquired, while the order of a minister means something very real, a wallet with money.
We are in a decent society, where it is generally accepted that everyone present knows exactly what “thinking” is and what “abstract” is. Therefore, all that remains is to find out Who thinks abstractly. As we have already mentioned, it is not our intention to reconcile society with these things, nor to force them to bother with anything difficult, nor to reproach them for frivolously neglecting what it is fitting for every rational being, according to his rank and position, to value. On the contrary, our intention is to reconcile society with itself, since, on the one hand, it disdains abstract thinking without experiencing any remorse, and on the other hand, it still has a certain respect for it in its soul, like why - something sublime, and avoids it not because it despises, but because it exalts, not because it seems something vulgar, but because it is taken for something noble or, conversely, for something special, which the French called “espece”, which is indecent to stand out in society, and what does not so much stand out as separate from society or make it funny, like rags or overly luxurious clothing, decorated with precious stones and old-fashioned lace.
Who thinks abstractly? - An uneducated person, and not at all an enlightened one. In a decent society they don’t think abstractly because it is too simple, too ignoble (ignoble not in the sense of belonging to a lower class), and not at all out of a vain desire to turn up their noses at what they themselves do not know how to do, but due to the inner emptiness of this activity .
The reverence for abstract thinking, which has the force of prejudice, is so deeply rooted that those with a keen nose will sense satire or irony in advance, and since they read the morning newspapers and know that there is a prize for satire, they will decide that I am better off. try to earn this prize in competition with others, rather than laying out everything here bluntly.
To substantiate my thought, I will give only a few examples in which everyone can see that this is exactly the case. A murderer is being led to execution. For the crowd, he is a killer - and nothing more. Ladies may perhaps notice that he is a strong, handsome, interesting man. Such a remark will outrage the crowd: how can that be? Is the killer handsome? Is it possible to think so badly, is it possible to call a murderer beautiful? You yourself are probably no better! This testifies to the moral decay of the nobility, perhaps the priest, accustomed to looking into the depths of things and hearts, will add.
A connoisseur of the human soul will examine the course of events that shaped the criminal, will discover in his life, in his upbringing, the influence of bad relations between his father and mother, will see that this man was once punished for some minor offense with excessive severity, which embittered him against the civil order, which forced resistance, which led to the fact that the crime became for him the only way self-preservation. There will almost certainly be people in the crowd who, if they had a chance to hear such reasoning, will say: yes, he wants to acquit the murderer! I remember how a certain burgomaster complained in the days of my youth about writers who undermined the foundations of Christianity and law and order; one of them even dared to justify suicide - it’s scary to think about! From further explanations it turned out that the burgomaster meant “The Sorrows of Young Werther.”
This is what is called “thinking abstractly” - seeing only one abstract thing in a murderer - that he is a murderer, and by naming this quality, destroying everything else in him that makes up a human being.
The sophisticated and sentimental secular public of Leipzig is a different matter. This one, on the contrary, strewed the wheeled criminal with flowers and wove wreaths into the wheel. However, this is again an abstraction, albeit the opposite one. Christians are in the habit of arranging a cross with roses, or rather roses with a cross, combining roses and a cross. The cross is a gallows or wheel that was once turned into a shrine. It has lost its one-sided significance as an instrument of shameful execution and combines in one image the highest suffering and the deepest self-sacrifice with the most joyful bliss and divine honor. But the Leipzig cross, entwined with poppies and violets, is conciliation in the style of Kotzebue [Kotzebue, August, von (1761-1819) - German playwright and Russian diplomat, who was also involved in publishing and political activities, an opponent of liberal ideas], a kind of dissolute conciliation - sensitive and bad.
I once had a chance to hear how one naive old woman from an almshouse dealt with the abstraction of a “murderer” in a completely different way and justified him. The severed head lay on the scaffold, and at that time the sun began to shine. How wonderful it is, she said, for the sun of God’s mercy to shine on Binder’s head! You are not worth the sun shining on you - this is what they often say, wanting to express condemnation. And the woman saw that the killer’s head was illuminated by the sun and, therefore, deserved it. She lifted her from the scaffold into the bosom of the solar mercy of God and brought about pacification not with the help of violets and sentimental vanity, but by seeing the murderer joined to heavenly grace by a sunbeam.
Hey old woman, you're selling rotten eggs! - says the customer to the merchant. - What? - she screams. - Are my eggs rotten?! You yourself are rotten! You dare tell me that about my product! You! Wasn’t it your father who got lice in the ditch, wasn’t it your mother who was hanging out with the French, wasn’t it your grandmother who died in the poorhouse! Look, you used up a whole sheet for a handkerchief! We probably know where all these rags and hats come from! If it weren't for the officers, you wouldn't have to show off in finery! Decent people take care of their home, but such people belong in jail! I could mend the holes in my stockings! - In short, she doesn’t even notice a grain of good in the offender. She thinks abstractly and bases everything - from her hat to her stockings, from head to toe, along with her dad and the rest of her family - solely on the crime that she found her eggs rotten. Everything in her head is painted the color of these eggs, while those officers whom she mentioned - if, of course, they really have anything to do with this, which is very doubtful - probably noticed completely different details in this woman.
But let's leave the women alone; Let's take, for example, a servant - nowhere does he live worse than that of a person of low rank and low income; and, conversely, the more noble his master, the better. A simple man thinks abstractly here too, he puts on airs in front of a servant and treats him only as a servant; he clings tightly to this single predicate. The best life for a servant is with a Frenchman. An aristocrat is familiar with a servant, and a Frenchman is such a good friend to him. The servant, when they are alone, chatters all sorts of things—see “Jacques et son maitre” by Diderot—and the master smokes his pipe and glances at his watch, without bothering him in any way. The aristocrat, among other things, knows that the servant is not only a servant, that he knows all the city news and girls and that good ideas come into his head - he asks the servant about all this, and the servant can freely talk about what interests the owner. With a French master, a servant even dares to reason, have and defend his own opinion, and when the master needs something from him, an order will not be enough, but first he will have to explain his thought to the servant and also thank him for the fact that this opinion will prevail with him top.
The same difference exists among the military; among the Prussians [In the first publication of the article (1835), the word “Prussians” was obviously replaced by the publisher with “Austrians” for political reasons. This distortion is also contained in the Collected Works of Hegel, ed. Glockner, after which the translation was made. The correction was made on the basis of the publication of the article, verified with the manuscript] it is necessary to beat a soldier, and therefore the soldier is a scoundrel; indeed, the one who is obliged to passively endure beatings is the rascal. Therefore, an ordinary soldier looks in the eyes of an officer as a kind of abstraction of the subject of a beating, with whom a gentleman in a uniform with a sword belt is forced to tinker, although for him this activity is damn unpleasant.
[This is not quite Kant. This is my reading of Kant in connection with the problem of the evolution of thought. But not only Freethinking is also an interesting topic. - MIB.]
No matter how far we go in our concepts and no matter how much we abstract from sensibility, they are still always characterized by figurative representations, the immediate purpose of which is to make them, which are usually not deducible from experience, applicable to experience. And how else can we give them meaning and significance, if we do not base them on some kind of intuition (which will always ultimately be an example taken from possible experience)? If from this particular mental action now remove the figurative admixture, initially as random sensory perception, and then as pure sensory intuition in general, then remains a pure rational concept, the volume of which is now expanded and contains rule of thinking in general. In this way it arose itself general logic, and some heuristic thinking methods, apparently still hidden from us in the experimental use of our understanding and reason, which, if we could carefully extract them from it, could enrich philosophy with certain maxims useful even for abstract thinking.
...in reality only reason, not an imaginary mysterious sense of truth and not immeasurable contemplation under the name of faith, to which tradition or revelation can be grafted without the consent of reason, but<…>only one's own pure human mind will guide myself.... nothing more should be allowed than the work of purifying the ordinary concept of reason from contradictions and defending against attacks on the maxim of sound reason.
Concept self-orientation, expanded and refined, will allow us to more clearly imagine the maxims of common reason in their application to the knowledge of supersensible objects.
Orientation means, in the proper sense of the word, the following: from a given part of the world (into four of which we divide the horizon) to find the rest, for example, the east. If I see the sun in the sky and know that it is noon, then I can find south, west, north and east.
I can now expand this geographical concept of the method of orientation and mean by it the following: orientation in a given space in general, i.e. purely mathematically.
Finally, I can further expand this concept so that it will now consist of the ability to navigate not only in space, i.e. mathematically, but also about thinking in general, i.e. logically. One can easily guess by analogy that the task of pure reason will be to control its application in those cases when, starting from known objects (experience), it wants to step over all the boundaries of experience and will not find a single object in contemplation, but just space for them; in this case, when determining his own ability to judge, he is completely unable to bring his judgments under any maxim, based on the objective foundations of knowledge, but solely on the basis of subjective discrimination.
This subjective means, standing out as a remainder, is nothing more than a feeling of one’s own need inherent in the mind. You can avoid error, first of all, when you do not undertake to judge where as much is unknown as is necessary for a definitive judgment. Thus, ignorance in itself is the reason only for the limitations, but not for the error of our knowledge. But where the decision on whether or not to judge something with certainty is not so arbitrary, where need for judgment dictated by a real need and, moreover, one that is inherent in reason itself as such, where a lack of knowledge limits us to everything that is necessary to obtain a judgment, there is a need for a maxim, guided by which we make a judgment, for reason must once be satisfied. It has already been stated above that in this case there can be no object in contemplation and not even anything remotely similar to it, those. something with which we could represent an object that corresponds to our advanced concepts, and thereby provide them with their real opportunity. And we have no choice but to first thoroughly check the concept with the help of which we intend to go beyond the limits of all possible experience, whether it is free from contradictions. To do this, we must at least bring the relation of the object to the objects of experience under the pure concepts of the understanding, thanks to which we, however, do not yet make it sensible, but still think of something supersensible, which is suitable, at least, for its use in experimental use of our mind. Without such precautions, we are completely unable to find an application for this concept, but would be dreaming instead of thinking.
However, this one, namely one bare concept, has not yet achieved anything regarding the existence of this object and its actual connection with the world (the totality of all objects of possible experience). But here the right of the need of reason as a subjective basis to presuppose or assume that which it is not allowed to know, based on objective grounds, comes into force; therefore, the right navigate your thinking, in this immeasurable and covered for us continuous darkness in the space of the supersensible, only because of their own needs.
It is possible to think of various supersensible things (after all, the objects of the senses do not completely fill the entire sphere of the possible), where the mind, however, does not feel the need to extend to it and least of all assumes its existence. The mind finds in the causes of the world that are revealed to the senses (or similar to those that are revealed to them), and without that there is enough food to still need the influence on it of pure spiritual natural entities, the acceptance of which would most likely have a negative impact on its use. And since we know nothing about the laws by which such entities can act, but we know a lot about the laws of objects of sense, or at least we can hope that we will learn more, then such an assumption will most likely cause damage to the use of reason. Consequently, playing with such chimeras or exploring them is not at all a need of the mind, but rather a simple, fraught with fantasy, idle curiosity.
The need for reason, however, should be considered in two ways: firstly, in its theoretical and, secondly, in its practical significance. …the purely practical use of reason consists in the prescription of moral laws. But they all lead to the idea of the highest good that is possible in the world, as far as it is possible only with the help of freedom,- to morality. On the other hand, they also lead to what comes not only from human freedom, but also from nature, namely, to the greatest bliss, if only it is given in the same proportion as the first. Thus, reason needs to accept such a dependent highest good and for this reason the highest reason as the highest independent good; not in order to deduce from this the binding authority of moral laws or the incentive reason for their observance (after all, the latter would have no moral significance if their motive were dictated by anything other than the law, which is already apodictic in itself), but for in order to give the concept of the highest good objective reality, i.e. not to allow it, together with all morality as a whole, to be taken only as an ideal, if something the idea of which is inextricably linked with morality did not exist anywhere.
This, therefore, is not knowledge, but the need felt by the mind for speculative thinking. But since this guiding means does not represent an objective principle of reason, a principle of knowledge, but is only a subjective principle (maxim) of its use, conditioned only by its limitations.
Any faith, including historical faith, although it must be reasonable (after all, the last touchstone of truth is always reason), but only the faith of reason is not based on any other data except those that are contained in the purest mind. Any faith here is subjectively sufficient, but objectively in consciousness an insufficient authority of truth. Therefore she opposed to knowledge. On the other hand, if something is believed to be true from objective, although in the consciousness of insufficient grounds, i.e. just seems to me, then this opinion, by gradually supplementing it with reasons of the same order, can ultimately turn into into knowledge. And, on the contrary, if the grounds for positing truth are not objectively legitimate in their own way, then faith can never become knowledge by any application of reason. Historical belief, for example, in the death of a great person, which is reported by written sources, can become knowledge if the local authorities report his burial, will, etc. Therefore, if what is historically accepted simply on the basis of evidence as true, i.e. what they believe, for example, that the city of Rome exists in the world, that nevertheless someone who has not been there can declare: “I know,” and not just: “I believe that Rome exists,” then this is completely compatible. On the contrary, pure faith of reason, even in the presence of all natural data and experience, can never turn into knowledge, because the basis for positing truth in this case is only subjective, namely, it is only a necessary need of reason (and will be such as long as we we remain human), the only need to assume the existence of a supreme being, rather than showing it off. This need of reason for a theoretical use that satisfies it cannot be anything other than pure hypothesis of reason, i.e. opinion, sufficient to comprehend the truth from subjective grounds, since no other reason than this can be expected to explain these consequences.
But the mind seeks reasons for explanation. And, on the contrary, the faith of reason, resting on the need for its practical application, could be called a postulate of reason: not because it would be a conclusion that satisfies all the logical requirements of reliability, but because this instance of truth (if only a person has everything in moral order) according to its degree is not inferior to knowledge, although in appearance it is completely different from it.
So, pure faith of reason is a guide or compass with the help of which a speculative thinker, following the paths of reason, can navigate in the sphere of supersensible objects, and a person with an ordinary, but (morally) healthy mind can chart his path both in theoretical and practical respect, in full accordance with its purpose. And it is precisely this faith of reason that should be the basis of any other faith, and even moreover, of any revelation.
You, men of spirit and broad-mindedness! I bow to your talents and respect your human feeling. But are you aware of what you are doing and where your attacks on the mind may lead? You no doubt want to freedom of thought remained intact, since without it the free flight of even your genius would come to an end. Let's get a look, what will inevitably happen to this freedom of thought, if what you set out to do takes over.
Firstly, freedom of thought is opposed to civil coercion. Although it is argued that the authorities can take away the freedom to speak or write, but not the freedom to think, but only how much and how correctly we would think if we did not think as if in common with those with whom we exchange our thoughts! So, we can say that the same external power that deprives people of the freedom to communicate their thoughts publicly, also deprives them of freedom to think - the only treasure that remains for us in the face of all civil hardships and with the help of which the only one can still be found way out of this disastrous state.
Secondly, freedom of thought is also taken in the sense that it is opposed to coercion in matters of conscience, namely when, without external violence in matters of religion, some citizens take on the role of guardians over others and, instead of arguments, with the help of prescribed ones and accompanied by fear of the danger of their own studies of the symbols of faith try to prohibit any examination of reason by influencing minds in advance.
Thirdly, freedom in thinking also means subordination of the mind only to those laws that it gives itself; the opposite of this is the maxim of the extralegal use of reason (in order, as a genius imagines himself, to see further than under conditions of limitation by law). And the consequence of this, naturally, will be the following: if the mind does not want to obey the laws that it gives to itself, then it will be forced to obey the laws that others give it, since without the law nothing, not even the greatest stupidity, can do its own thing for long. case.
So, the inevitable consequence of the declared illegality of thinking (liberation from restrictions with the help of reason) will be the following: freedom to think will ultimately be damaged and due not so much to misfortune, but to real arrogance. literally lost.
The course of things is approximately as follows. At first the genius will be very pleased with his daring flight, because he has gotten rid of the leash with which he usually controlled the mind. Soon he will charm others with his peremptory decisions and big promises, and it will seem as if he has installed himself on a throne that was poorly adorned by a slow and ponderous mind, although he still continues to speak on his behalf. We, mere mortals, then call the acceptance of the maxim of invalidity as the highest legislative force of the mind reverie (exaltation), and those darlings of favorable fate - insight. But since soon a confusion of opinions inevitably arises among them due to the fact that each will follow only his own inspiration - for only reason can prescribe the same laws to everyone - then in the end facts justified by external evidence will arise from internal inspirations, and then from traditions , established initially arbitrarily, are documents imposed by force, i.e., in a word, there will be a complete subordination of reason to facts, or superstition, since the latter still allows itself to give itself the form of law, and thereby call itself to calm.
But since the human mind still strives for freedom, then, if only he ever breaks his shackles, his first steps in the exercise of a long-unaccustomed freedom must degenerate into abuse and daring confidence, regardless of the dependence of his ability on any restrictions, into a conviction in the sole dominance of speculative reason, which decisively rejects everything that cannot be justified by objective grounds and dogmatic persuasiveness. The maxim of the independence of reason from its own needs (renunciation of the faith of reason) is called unbelief; not historical unbelief, since it cannot be completely thought of as intentional, capable, therefore, of being responsible for one’s actions (because everyone, whether he wants it or not, must believe a fact if it is only sufficiently confirmed, just like a mathematical proof), But lack of faith in reason- this is what it is pathetic state of the human spirit, which first deprives moral laws of the power to influence the soul, and over time, their authority and gives rise to a way of thinking called freethinking, i.e. principle not recognizing any debt. This is where the authorities step in to prevent disorder in the civil affairs themselves. And since the most efficient and convincing means for them is the best, they will generally eliminate freedom of thought and subject it, along with other activities, to state regulation. Thus, freedom in thinking, if she wants to act independently of the laws of reason , ultimately destroys itself.
You, friends of the human race and everything that is sacred to it! You can accept what seems to you after careful and conscientious examination the most probable, be it facts or reasonable grounds, but do not deprive reason of what makes it the highest good on earth, namely, the right to be the final criterion of truth! Otherwise, you yourself will find yourself unworthy of this freedom, you will certainly lose it and, moreover, you will plunge your other innocent compatriots into this misfortune, whose way of thinking is usually aimed at using their freedom according to the law, and thereby for the good of the whole world !
What does it mean to be guided in thinking?
No matter how far we go in our concepts and no matter how much we abstract from sensibility, they are still always characterized by figurative representations, the immediate purpose of which is to make them, which are usually not deducible from experience, applicable to experience. And how else can we give them meaning and significance, if we do not base them on some kind of intuition (which will always ultimately be an example taken from possible experience)? If from this concrete mental action we now remove the admixture of the figurative, initially as random sensory perception, and then as pure sensory intuition in general, then what remains is a pure rational concept, the scope of which is now expanded and contains the rule of thinking in general. In this way general logic itself arose, and certain heuristic methods of thinking are apparently still hidden from us in the experimental use of our reason and reason, which, if we could carefully extract them from it, could enrich philosophy with certain maxims useful even to abstract thinking.
Among these kinds of maxims is a principle which the late Mendelssohn stated definitely, as far as I know, only in his last writings (Morgenstunden, S.165 - 166, and Briefe an Lessings Freunde, S.3367), namely the maxim of the need to navigate the speculative the use of reason (which he usually considered capable of very much in relation to the knowledge of supersensible objects, up to the obviousness of demonstration) with the help of a certain guiding means, which he called sometimes the spirit of solidarity (Gemeinsinn) (“Morning hours”), sometimes sound reason, sometimes simple human reason (“Letters to Lessing’s Friends”). Who would have thought that this confession would not only be so detrimental to his favorable opinion of the power of the speculative use of reason in matters of theology (which, in fact, was inevitable), but also, because of the ambiguity of his opposition to the ability of ordinary sound reason, would put this same is the mind in a dangerous position to serve the justification of exaltation and its complete debunking? And yet this happened in the dispute between Mendelssohn and Jacobi, primarily thanks to the conclusions of the witty author of the Results, which cannot be called insignificant; however, I do not want to attribute to either of the two the intention to put into use such a destructive way of thinking, but rather consider the latter enterprise as an argumentum ad hominem, which has the right to serve self-defense in order to use weak sides the enemy to his detriment. At the same time, I will show that in reality only reason, not an imaginary mysterious sense of truth and not immeasurable contemplation under the name of faith, to which tradition or revelation can be grafted without the consent of reason, but, as Mendelssohn staunchly and with justified zeal asserted, only one’s own pure the human mind will orient itself. This he found necessary and praised, although at the same time the high claim of the speculative faculty of reason is abolished, first of all the discretion offered by it alone (through demonstration), and it, since it is speculative, should not be allowed anything more than the task of purifying the ordinary concept of reason from contradictions and a defense against her own sophistic attacks on the maxim of common reason.
The concept of self-orientation, expanded and refined, will allow us to more clearly imagine the maxims of common reason in their application to the knowledge of supersensible objects.
Orientation means, in the proper sense of the word, the following: from a given part of the world (into four of which we divide the horizon) to find the rest, for example, the east. If I see the sun in the sky and know that it is noon, then I can find south, west, north and east. For this, however, the feeling of difference in myself as a subject, namely the difference between left and right hands, is quite enough for me. I call this feeling because these two sides do not have any noticeable external difference in contemplation. Without this ability to describe a circle, without resorting to any objective differences on it, nevertheless correctly distinguish the direction of movement from left to right from the opposite, and thereby determine a priori the difference in the position of objects, I would not know whether I should look for west on the right or to the left of the southern point and thereby draw a full circle through the northern and eastern points to the southern one. So, I orient myself geographically with all the objective data of the sky, yet only with the help of the subjective basis of distinction. And if in the course of one day all the constellations, thanks to a miracle, retaining the same shape and the same position relative to each other, changed their direction so that what was in the east would now be in the west, then to the nearest stellar night no human eye would notice the slightest change; even an astronomer, if he took into account only what he sees, and not what he simultaneously feels, would inevitably be disoriented. But the ability of sensory discrimination between the left and right hands, quite naturally inherent in nature and strengthened by long-term use, comes to his aid, and he, paying attention only to the North Star, will not only detect the change that has occurred, but will also be able to orient himself despite it.
I can now expand this geographical concept of the method of orientation and mean by it the following: orientation in a given space in general, i.e. purely mathematically. To navigate a familiar room in the dark, it is enough for me to touch at least one object with my hand, the location of which I remember. In this case, what helps me, obviously, is nothing less than the ability to determine the position of objects on a subjective basis of discrimination, since the objects whose location I need to find are not visible to me at all. And if someone were to jokingly rearrange all the objects, maintaining their previous order, so that what was previously on the right would appear on the left, then I would be completely unable to navigate the room, the walls of which would otherwise remain unchanged. However, soon I will find my way around just by feeling the difference between my two sides, left and right. The same thing will happen to me if I find myself at night on streets familiar to me, on which I now do not distinguish a single house, and have to walk along them and make the appropriate turns.
Finally, I can further expand this concept so that it will now consist of the ability to navigate not only in space, i.e. mathematically, but also about thinking in general, i.e. logically. One can easily guess by analogy that the task of pure reason will be to control its application in those cases when, starting from known objects (experience), it wants to step over all the boundaries of experience and will not find a single object in contemplation, but only space for them; in this case, when determining his own ability to judge, he is completely unable to bring his judgments under any maxim, based on the objective foundations of knowledge, but solely on the basis of subjective discrimination. This subjective means, standing out as a remainder, is nothing more than a feeling of one’s own need inherent in the mind. You can avoid error, first of all, when you do not undertake to judge where as much is unknown as is necessary for a definitive judgment. Thus, ignorance in itself is the reason only for the limitations, but not for the error of our knowledge. But where the decision of the question of whether or not to judge something with certainty is not so arbitrary, where the need for judgment is dictated by a real need and, moreover, one that is inherent in reason itself as such, where a lack of knowledge sets us limits in everything that which is necessary to obtain a judgment, there is a need for a maxim by which we make the judgment, for the mind must once be satisfied. It was already stated above that in this case there cannot be any object in contemplation and even nothing somewhat similar to it, i.e. something with the help of which we could represent an object corresponding to our expanded concepts, and thereby provide them with their real possibility. And we have no choice but to first thoroughly check the concept with the help of which we intend to go beyond the limits of all possible experience, whether it is free from contradictions. To do this, we must at least bring the relation of the object to the objects of experience under the pure concepts of the understanding, thanks to which we, however, do not yet make it sensible, but still think of something supersensible, which is suitable, at least, for its use in experimental use of our mind. Without such precautions, we are completely unable to find an application for this concept, but would be dreaming instead of thinking.
However, this one, namely one bare concept, has not yet achieved anything regarding the existence of this object and its actual connection with the world (the totality of all objects of possible experience). But here the right of the need of reason, as a subjective basis, to presuppose or presuppose what it is not allowed to know, based on objective grounds, comes into force; therefore, the right to navigate in thinking, in this immeasurable space of the supersensible, covered for us with complete darkness, only by virtue of its own needs.
It is possible to think of various supersensible things (after all, the objects of the senses do not completely fill the entire sphere of the possible), where the mind, however, does not feel the need to extend to it and least of all assumes its existence. The mind finds in the causes of the world that are revealed to the senses (or similar to those that are revealed to them), and without that there is enough food to still need the influence on it of pure spiritual natural entities, the acceptance of which would most likely have a negative impact on its use. And since we know nothing about the laws by which such entities can act, but we know a lot about the laws of objects of sense, or at least we can hope that we will learn more, then such an assumption will most likely cause damage to the use of reason. Consequently, playing with such chimeras or exploring them is not at all a need of reason, but rather simple, fraught with fantasy, idle curiosity. The situation is completely different with the concept of the first being as the highest intelligence and at the same time as the highest good. For not only does our mind already feel the need to put the concept of the unlimited at the basis of everything limited and at the same time of all other things; he goes further to the assumption of its existence, without which reason is not able to give a satisfactory explanation of the random existence of things in the world, and least of all of the purposefulness and order, which are found to an admirable degree everywhere (to a small extent, because it is closer to us, but still in more to a large extent). Without the assumption of an intelligent creator, it is impossible to give a clear explanation for this without falling into sheer absurdity. And although we cannot prove the impossibility of such expediency without the first reasonable reason (after all, in this case we would have sufficient objective grounds for this statement and would not need to refer to subjective ones), still there is enough to accept this point of view, with all its shortcomings The subjective basis is that the mind needs to presuppose what it understands in order to explain a given phenomenon from it, since everything else with which it can connect any concept does not satisfy this need.