Losses of the armed forces of Russia and the USSR in armed conflicts in the North Caucasus (1920-2000)
(The entire section "Armed conflicts in the North Caucasus (1920-2000" was published in the book: Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century. Losses of the armed forces. Statistical study / Under the general editorship of G.F. Krivosheev. -M.: "Olma- Press" 2001).
Address: http://www.soldat.ru/doc/casualties/book/chapter7_2.html#7_2_2
The socio-political situation that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the North Caucasus, as in other individual regions of the former USSR, caused a sharp aggravation of interethnic, inter-territorial relations, which led to armed clashes and conflicts. The bloodiest of them were the events in North Ossetia, Chechnya and Dagestan.
Ossetian-Ingush conflict (October-November 1992)
North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (North Ossetia) is a subject of the Russian Federation. Located in the foothills and northern slopes of the Greater Caucasus Range in the Terek River basin. Formed on December 5, 1936.
The socio-political situation in the republic worsened at the end of 1991. The main reasons for its destabilization were the consequences of the deportation policy of 1944, which gave rise to Ingushetia’s territorial claims to North Ossetia. The Ingush demanded the return of the lands of the Prigorodny district and the right bank of Vladikavkaz that were transferred (after their eviction in 1944) to North Ossetia.
Immediately after the proclamation of the Ingush Republic as part of the Russian Federation (June 4, 1992), ethnic cleansing began in Chechnya - thousands of Ingush were “pushed” by the Chechens into their “own” republic. Many of them moved to the more developed Prigorodny region of North Ossetia and Vladikavkaz. At the same time, tens of thousands of Ossetian refugees from South Ossetia (Georgia) also rushed to the named area and to the North Ossetian capital. The influx of thousands of refugees sharply aggravated not only relations with the indigenous population as a result of the decline in the latter’s living standards, but also the crime situation.
The Ingush were subjected to open discrimination - they were limited in registration, had difficult access to obtaining land, were illegally detained by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, etc. Georgian Ossetians, on the contrary, enjoyed a number of benefits and privileges.
In Ingushetia itself, a campaign was launched in support of “its own citizens” in North Ossetia. The struggle for the return of the Prigorodny district to Ingushetia and the transfer of the Ingush capital from Nazran to Vladikavkaz has intensified.
All this provoked terrorist acts of sabotage on both sides, hostage-taking and ethnic cleansing with the use of weapons, as a result of which people died.
Cases of seizure of weapons, ammunition and materiel from military units stationed on the territory of North Ossetia by opposing groups have become more frequent.
The decisive actions of the Ingush, who tried to forcibly annex the disputed territories to their republic, caused general anger and indignation of the Ossetian people and further inflamed the situation in the region.
In order to stabilize the situation, the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation, by its resolution No. 2990-1 of June 12, 1992, approved the proposal of North Ossetia to introduce a “state of emergency” in the city of Vladikavkaz, Alagirsky, Mozdoksky, Pravoberezhny and Prigorodny districts and obliged the government of the Russian Federation to attract military contingents necessary to protect public order and ensure other measures provided for by the Law of the RSFSR “On the State of Emergency”. In pursuance of this decree, 12,460 military personnel, 97 units of armored vehicles and 59 units of wheeled vehicles of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation were transferred to the republic.
As a result of the conflict, more than 8 thousand people were injured, including 583 people killed (407 Ingush, 105 Ossetians, 27 military personnel and 44 civilians of other nationalities), more than 650 people were injured. 3 thousand residential buildings were destroyed or damaged. Material damage amounted to over 50 billion rubles.
During mass unrest in North Ossetia and Ingushetia, as a result of shelling of military contingents, as well as during armed clashes with militants, units and units of the Russian army and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs lost 27 people killed, dead or missing, including military personnel Ministry of Defense - 22 people, Ministry of Internal Affairs - 5 people (see table 222).
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Types of losses |
Officers |
Ensigns |
Sergeants |
Soldiers |
Total |
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Irreversible |
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Died from wounds in hospitals |
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Missing |
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Armed conflicts and anti-terrorist operations in Chechnya and Dagestan (1920-2000)
The Chechen Republic is a subject of the Russian Federation. It is located in the eastern part of the Greater Caucasus on its northern slopes and adjacent steppe regions. How the Chechen Autonomous Region was formed in 1922. On January 15, 1934, it was united with Ingushetia and transformed into the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.
Contradictions in Russian-Chechen relations have existed for a long time and their roots go back to the past centuries. The first known armed clash between Russian troops and Chechens dates back to 1732, when a Russian detachment traveling from the territory of modern Dagestan through Chechnya was suddenly attacked by local residents.
At the end of the 18th century, with the beginning of the conquest of the Caucasus by Russia during the first attempts of the tsarist government to annex the people of Chechnya to Russia, a popular movement arose in the North Caucasus under the leadership of the Chechen Ushurma, which lasted for six years (1785-1791) with the aim of defending the independence of Chechnya.
At the beginning of the 19th century, after the annexation of Eastern Georgia to Russia and the voluntary acceptance of Russian citizenship by the Ingush in 1810, the offensive of Russian troops in the Caucasus intensified.
The longest and most intense Caucasian War that followed (1817-1864) was generated by Russia's struggle with Turkish and Iranian expansion to strengthen its strategic positions in this direction. It was also carried out to facilitate Russia’s connection with Georgia and Azerbaijan, which found themselves in the position of enclaves due to the hostile attitude of the mountain peoples towards Russia. At the same time, the Russian government sought to eradicate the “raiding system” of the highlanders, to stop robbery, robbery and trade in “human goods”, i.e. slaves into whom Transcaucasian Christians and the Slavic population of the North Caucasus captured by the Chechens turned.
Military operations from October 1817 to the end of the 20s of the 19th century were conducted under the leadership of the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, General A.P. Ermolova.
The period from the late 20s of the 19th century to 1859 is characterized by an expansion in the scale of armed struggle on the part of the mountaineers. The greatest scale of armed clashes between the highlanders and Russian troops has been noted since 1834 under Imam Shamil<…>.
The expedition to Dargo, the “capital” of Shamil, undertaken at the request of Nicholas I in order to “encourage the spirit of our army with brilliant victories and bring fear to the enemy,” was very expensive: 3 generals, 141 officers and 2821 lower ranks were killed; in addition, 3 mountain guns and many horses were lost.
The total combat losses of the Russian army in the Caucasus for 64 years (1801-1864) were:
- killed - 804 officers and 24,143 lower ranks;
- wounded - 3154 officers and 61971 lower ranks;
- prisoners - 92 officers and 5915 lower ranks.
Among the dead were 13 generals and 21 unit commanders.
If the indicated number of irretrievable losses includes military personnel who died in captivity from cruel treatment, who died from wounds and diseases (of which there were three times more than those killed in battle), as well as the losses of Russian civilians engaged in the economic development of new lands of the Russian empire and providing for the troops killed during the raids of the mountaineers on the populated areas of the North Caucasus and the Black Sea coast, it can be assumed that during the Caucasian wars all irretrievable losses of military personnel and civilians will be equal to 77 thousand people.
The Russian army has not seen such a number of casualties since the Patriotic War of 1812. During the entire military conflict, Russia was forced to maintain a large military group in the Caucasus, the number of which at the final stage of the war reached more than 200 thousand people.
For many decades in the North Caucasus, only minor periods of time were relatively calm and were not accompanied by armed clashes.
After the October Revolution of 1917 and the establishment of Soviet power in the Caucasus, throughout the entire pre-war period (1920-1938), an intense struggle was waged in Chechnya and Dagestan against anti-Soviet armed groups of nationalist forces and criminal political banditry.
The economy of the Caucasian region, which had significantly deteriorated as a result of the revolution and civil war, placed the weak national formations of the North Caucasus in particularly difficult conditions, and the Soviet power that had formed in them turned out to be very weak. Therefore, already in 1920, an intensified struggle for power arose in Chechnya and Dagestan with slogans of national liberation, autonomy and the salvation of religion. To this end, several large armed uprisings are rising in some regions of the Mountain Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.
One of the first such uprisings was an armed uprising that broke out in September 1920 in the mountainous regions of Chechnya and Northern Dagestan, which was led by Nazhmutdin Gotsinsky and the grandson of Imam Shamil, Said Bey.
The weakness of Soviet power allowed the rebels to establish control over many areas within a few weeks, destroying or disarming the Red Army units located there.
By November 1920, 2,800 infantrymen and 600 horsemen, armed with 4 guns and up to two dozen machine guns, operated as part of Islamic formations in Dagestan and some regions of Chechnya.
The Soviet command attracted units of the 14th Infantry Division and the Exemplary Revolutionary Discipline Regiment to defeat the rebels. In total, about 8 thousand infantry and 1 thousand cavalrymen took part in the operation, armed with 18 guns and more than 40 machine guns. Units of the 14th Infantry Division, advancing in several directions at once, were blocked by the highlanders in various settlements and suffered heavy losses. One of the detachments in the area of the village of Moksokh lost 98 Red Army soldiers killed in battle, the losses of another detachment in the battle for Khajal-Makhi amounted to 324 people killed, wounded and missing.
The offensive from Chechnya by the Exemplary Revolutionary Discipline Regiment ended even more tragically. Having set out from Vedeno on December 9, this regiment a week later, having withstood several skirmishes with rebels along the way, arrived in Botlikh. The advance detachment of this regiment as part of the battalion, sent downstream of the Andean Koisu on the night of December 20, was completely destroyed in the Orata-Kolo area by sudden attacks by the rebels from different sides. After 4 days, significant rebel forces also suddenly attacked the main forces of the regiment in Botlikh at night. Having accepted the battle, the regiment found itself surrounded. Seeing the inequality of forces, the regiment's command was forced to enter into negotiations with the leaders of the highlanders and negotiated the right to withdraw the regiment back to Vedeno. When the conditions for the disarmament of the regiment were fulfilled, the rebels destroyed all the commanders and Red Army soldiers with swords and daggers. On this day alone, more than 700 people were massacred in Botlikh, and 645 rifles, 9 machine guns and a large amount of ammunition were captured by the rebels as trophies.
Units of the 14th Division and the Exemplary Revolutionary Discipline Regiment lost 1,372 people killed or died from wounds in this operation alone.
Thus, the 1920 campaign in Dagestan and Chechnya ended in the defeat of Soviet troops in all directions. This increased the morale of the highlanders and brought thousands of new volunteers under their banner. By the beginning of 1921, the bandit formations in the rebellious areas already numbered 7,200 foot and 2,490 mounted militants, armed with 40 machine guns and 2 guns. Taking into account the support of their local population, the rebel reserves reached 50 thousand people, ready to join the ranks at the call of the leaders or clergy.
The Soviet command, having assessed the scale of the uprising and realizing the impossibility of suppressing it with small forces, took the necessary measures to strengthen the group. By the decision of the commander of the Caucasian Front in 1921, a special Terek-Dagestan group of troops was formed to “establish order in Chechnya and Dagestan.” It included three rifle (14th, 32nd and 33rd) and one (18th) cavalry divisions, a separate Moscow brigade of cadets, two armored vehicles and a reconnaissance aviation detachment. The group's strength was about 20 thousand infantry, 3.4 thousand cavalry, it was armed with 67 guns, 8 armored vehicles and 6 aircraft.
Units of the 32nd Infantry Division were the first to go on the offensive and captured the village of Khajal-Makhi. During the defense of this village, the rebels lost 100 people killed and 140 prisoners. The losses of the Red Army units amounted to 24 people killed and 71 wounded.
One of the groups of the 32nd SD, carried away by the pursuit of the highlanders, entered the gorge, where it was counterattacked. Having lost the commander and commissar of the regiment, 2 battalion commanders, 5 company commanders and 283 Red Army soldiers in a short-lived battle, the group retreated to the south.
The offensive of the troops of the 32nd Division resumed on January 22 and was immediately stalled due to weather conditions. The strength of the sudden snowstorm was such that it became impossible for people to stay at the bare heights. After a short firefight, both the Red Army soldiers and the rebels dispersed to their shelters. The advancing units that day lost 12 people killed, 10 frozen, 39 wounded, 42 severely frostbitten and more than 100 with mild frostbite.
One of the battalions, pursuing a detachment of rebels, was completely defeated in the village of Rugudzha by the rebels and local residents on February 19. Having attacked the sleeping people, the Dagestanis destroyed 125 Red Army soldiers without firing a single shot with daggers.
During the fighting during January - February 1921 alone, units of the 32nd Infantry Division lost 1,387 people, including 650 killed, 10 frozen, 468 wounded, 259 severely and slightly frostbitten.
In other sectors of the Dagestan front, the situation was also very tense. Units of the 14th Infantry Division, with heavy losses, drove out the remnants of the rebels from the settlements they occupied.
During March 1921, all fortresses and many large villages were occupied by troops, and the situation in the main area of operations of the gangs was normalized. The remnants of the rebel detachments, numbering up to 1,000 people with four machine guns, went to hard-to-reach areas upstream of the Avar Koisu. All the gang leaders and murid leaders gathered there.
The last hotbed of armed nationalist uprising in Dagestan was eliminated only after ten months of stubborn struggle. It led to great casualties on both sides. The losses of the Red Army troops in 1920-1921 in killed and maimed exceeded 5 thousand people. At the same time, irretrievable losses (killed, frozen and died) amounted to 3,500 people, and sanitary losses (wounded, shell-shocked, frostbite) - 1,500 people.
Losses among the mountaineers were somewhat smaller, which was explained by the tactics of guerrilla warfare, good knowledge of the area and connections with the local population. The fates of the leaders of the uprising turned out differently. Said Bey fled to Turkey. Nazhmutdin Gotsinsky hid in the mountains and for a long time fought against Soviet power through robbery.
The strengthening of Soviet power with its harsh repressive apparatus, directed primarily against personal freedom, did not cause delight among the peoples of the Caucasus, especially the Chechens, Ingush and Dagestanis.
All this was a source of social protest, ready at any moment to result in the form of an armed uprising. Thus, in 1923, the movement of Sheikh Ali-Mitaev arose, fully supported by the reactionary clergy and with the goal of establishing a Sharia republic. This movement created a significant organized force throughout Chechnya, numbering 12 thousand armed murids, adherents of Ali-Mitaev.
Political banditry aimed at disrupting the socio-political activities of the Soviet government was also quite traditional in the North Caucasus in 1924-1932. In order to stop these actions, it was decided by the NKVD forces to carry out, as in previous years, a series of special operations, during which they simultaneously confiscated weapons from the entire population.
The first such operation took place in the spring of 1924. Its goal was to suppress mass protests by Chechens and Ingush, directed against the desire of the central authorities to impose their representatives on them in elections to local Soviets. Then the mountaineers, at the call of their leaders, mainly mullahs, boycotted the elections, and in some places they destroyed polling stations. The uprising spread to regions of Chechnya and Ingushetia. An NKVD division, reinforced by detachments of local activists, was sent to suppress it. The Soviet command, under pain of arrest and physical destruction, demanded the surrender of military weapons. As a result, 2,900 rifles, 384 revolvers and ammunition were seized.
This action did little to normalize the situation; it only led to an increase in anti-Soviet sentiment in Chechnya, a further increase in the number of gangs and the intensification of their activities.
In addition to counter-revolutionary banditry, inter-regional banditry was highly developed in Chechnya, which consisted of continuous attacks on the border areas of Terek, Sunzha, Dagestan and Georgia for the purpose of robbery, cattle theft, accompanied by numerous attacks on GPU detachments, murders of policemen and Red Army soldiers, taking people hostage, shelling of the Shatoy fortress.
In August-September 1925, in order to restore order, another larger-scale counter-insurgency operation was carried out under the leadership of the district commander I. Uborevich, and through the OGPU - Evdokimov. The total number of field troops of the North Caucasus Military District that took part in the operation was: infantry fighters - 4840 people, cavalry - 2017 people with 137 heavy and 102 light machine guns, 14 mountain and 10 light guns. Aviation and one armored train were also involved. In addition, the OGPU detachments included 341 people allocated from the Caucasian Red Banner Army and 307 people from the field troops and the NKVD.
The operation to disarm the population in the Chechen Autonomous Region lasted 23 days - from August 22 to September 13, 1925. During this period, 25,299 rifles, 1 machine gun, 4,319 revolvers, 73,556 rifle and 1,678 revolver cartridges, telegraph and telephone sets were seized. During the operation, 309 bandits were arrested, of which 11 were the most prominent authorities, including the spiritual leader of the North Caucasus Gotsinsky. Of the total number of arrested people, 105 were shot.
The military units that took part in the operation lost 5 Red Army soldiers killed and 8 wounded. During the shelling of populated areas, 6 civilians were killed and 30 wounded.
In 1929, sections of the Chechen population hostile to Soviet power, incited by bandits and kulaks, refused to supply grain to the state. The kulak bandit leaders, having armed groups of local residents, demanded the immediate overthrow of Soviet power, the cessation of grain procurements, the disarmament and removal of all grain procurement workers from the territory of Chechnya. Local authorities were unable to resolve the conflict on their own.
Taking into account the aggravated situation, an operational group of troops and OGPU units, formed by order of the commander of the North Caucasus Military District, carried out an armed operation from December 8 to December 28, 1929, as a result of which bandit groups in the villages of Goyty, Shali, Sambi, Benoy, Tsontoroy and others. At the same time, a small part of small arms (25 units) was confiscated and 296 people - participants in anti-Soviet protests - were arrested. During the fighting, 36 bandits were killed. The operational group of troops of the North Caucasus Military District and the OGPU units lost 11 people killed, 7 people died from wounds, including 1 policeman, and 29 people were wounded, including 1 policeman.
However, the December (1929) Chekist-military operation did not completely improve the situation in Chechnya. The central figures - the organizers of counter-revolutionary actions - managed not only to escape attack, but also to maintain their authority. Using the specific features of the mountain village (tribal relations, religious fanaticism, the presence of a large number of spiritual and other authorities), they intensified the terror against the party-Soviet activists and launched the anti-Soviet movement on a wider scale. The situation in Chechnya has again become more complicated.
In March 1930, the North Caucasus Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) recognized the need to carry out another security and military operation to eliminate political banditry in Chechnya and Ingushetia.
At the direction of the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, strike groups consisting of 4 infantry, 3 cavalry, 2 partisan detachments and 2 rifle battalions were created to eliminate existing armed gangs and assist the OGPU “in removing counter-revolutionary elements.” The command of the combined group had at its disposal an air unit (3 aircraft), a sapper company and a communications company. The total number of troops was 3,700 men, 19 guns and 28 machine guns.
The operation lasted 30 days (from March 14 to April 12). During it, 1,500 units were seized. firearms and 280 units. cold steel, 122 participants in anti-Soviet protests were arrested, including 9 gang leaders. 19 bandits were killed in the shootout.
The combined group of district troops and OGPU operational groups lost 14 people killed, including 7 OGPU employees and 22 people wounded.
The measures taken somewhat weakened the activity of bandit actions, but not for long.
The coming 1932 did not bring calm to the military-political situation in the North Caucasus. Systematic excesses and distortions in the country's agricultural policy, rough administration in the practice of the grassroots party-Soviet apparatus led to extreme embitterment of the population. The rebel gang leadership (religious authorities, gang leaders, wealthy peasants, fugitive criminals and counter-revolutionary activists of the villages), hoping for the support of all of Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia and neighboring Cossack regions, organized a wide armed uprising. In the villages, the rebels destroyed cooperatives and village councils (aul councils). Hoping that the end of Soviet power had come, they began to destroy Soviet money here. Gang formations, numbering up to 500-800 people. tried to besiege military garrisons. In most areas, the performances were distinguished by high organization, massive participation of the population, the exceptional ferocity of the rebels in battle (continuous attacks, despite heavy losses, during attacks - religious songs, during the battle - fanatical slogans of the leaders, the participation of women in attacks).
Operations to eliminate the counter-revolutionary underground carried out on March 15-20, 1932 in the regions of Dagestan adjacent to Chechnya, promptly taken measures to isolate potentially dangerous areas, the subsequent deployment of military units and the defeat of local gangs prevented the possibility of a wider insurgency. The widespread seizure of firearms and the arrests of all active members of gangs led to the collapse of the plans of the rebel leadership. Rebel casualties were 333 killed and 150 wounded. The military units that took part in the suppression of the uprising lost 27 people killed and 30 wounded.
In January 1934, the Chechen and Ingush Autonomous Regions were united into one, which on December 5, 1936 was transformed into the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the RSFSR. Stabilization came only in 1936, but separate groups of gangs in Checheno-Ingushetia existed until September 1938.
In total, from the moment of the establishment of Soviet power in the North Caucasus until 1941 inclusive, 12 armed uprisings and uprisings involving from 500 to 5,000 militants took place on the territory of Checheno-Ingushetia alone.
During the period from 1920 to 1939, in security and military operations, military units of the North Caucasian Military District and NKVD formations lost 3,564 people killed and 1,589 people wounded.
Despite the numerous operations carried out, the authorities have not been able to solve the North Caucasus problem of stabilizing the situation in the region. The mountaineers continued to be hostile to the policy of “general collectivization and industrialization.” Thus, only in the year of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, more than 70 bandit rebel actions were registered on the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (from January 1 to June 22, 1941 - 31 cases, from June 22 to September 3 - 40).
In general, during the war years, citizens of the multinational Chechen-Ingushetia heroically fought in the active army against the fascist invaders, and the working people of the republic actively helped the front. Several thousand people were awarded orders and medals, 36 of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the behavior of another, anti-Russian part of the population of the North Caucasus was treacherous. The Chechens played the main role in this. They massively evaded conscription into the active army, went to the mountains, from where they carried out predatory raids on trains, villages, military units, warehouses with weapons and food, and committed murders of Soviet military personnel. There were numerous cases when Chechens and Ingush, already drafted into the army, went to the mountains with weapons in their hands and joined the gangs created there. From July 1941 to April 1942 alone, more than 1,500 people deserted from those drafted into the Red Army and labor battalions, and there were over 2,200 people who evaded military service. 850 people deserted from the national cavalry division alone.
Bandit formations led by the “Special Party of Caucasian Brothers” had their own detachments in almost all the republics of the North Caucasus. In 20 villages of Chechnya alone, the number of these units in February 1943 was 6,540 people. The most active of them were united into 54 groups. In addition, by 1942 there were more than 240 “lone bandits” operating in the republic.
In July of the same year, the separatists adopted an appeal to the Chechen and Ingush nations, which stated that the Caucasian peoples expected the Germans as guests and would show them hospitality in return for recognition of independence.
During the offensive of the German troops, the “Caucasian brothers” maintained contacts with Abwehr reconnaissance and sabotage groups, which had two main tasks: the destruction of the operational rear of the Red Army and the deployment of a powerful anti-Soviet armed uprising in the North Caucasus. In total, during the war, various German intelligence agencies sent 8 parachute groups with a total of 77 people to the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Republic.
With the help of rebel formations, the military command of Nazi Germany hoped to speed up the seizure of the oil fields of Chechnya, Dagestan and Azerbaijan, but the successful actions of the Red Army and NKVD troops against the gangs, undertaken in 1942-1943, made it possible to destroy their main forces, including 19 rebel detachments and 4 reconnaissance groups of German paratroopers. By the end of 1944, all major gangs in the North Caucasus were liquidated or dispersed. The fight against small groups of bandits continued.
To suppress the activities of gangs, the Soviet leadership resorted to drastic measures. “For aiding the fascist occupiers”, on the basis of Decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR No. 5073 of January 31, 1944, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was abolished on February 23, 1944. From its composition, 4 districts were transferred completely and 3 partially to the Dagestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. 459 thousand Avars and Dargins from the highlands of Dagestan were resettled to these areas. The Grozny region was formed within the boundaries of the rest of its territory.
In pursuance of this resolution, the wholesale deportation of Chechens, Ingush, Karachais, and Balkars from their places of permanent residence was also carried out. In February - March 1944, the NKVD forces resettled 602,193 people from the North Caucasus for permanent residence in the Kazakh and Kyrgyz SSR, of which 496,460 were Chechens and Ingush, 68,327 Karachais, 37,406 Balkars.
Despite its scale, the deportation did not solve the problem of eliminating banditry in the North Caucasus. The Chechens and Ingush who evaded eviction went underground, went to the mountains and became a natural addition to the existing gangs. On January 1, 1945 alone, over 80 gangster groups operated on the territory of Checheno-Ingushetia.
(With the restoration of Checheno-Ingushetia as an ASSR within the RSFSR on January 9, 1957, the republic was additionally given three districts: Kargalinsky, Naursky and Shelkovsky, which were previously part of the Stavropol Territory.)
The 12-year period of deportation of the population of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic showed that the overwhelming majority of special settlers adapted to the new conditions and began to live in places of settlement no worse than in the North Caucasus. They were employed, had their own housing, personal farming. However, many Chechens and Ingush urgently asked to be allowed to travel to the North Caucasus. On January 9, 1957, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued a resolution on the restoration of Checheno-Ingushetia as an ASSR within the RSFSR.
After the return of Chechens and Ingush from exile in the late 50s of the 20th century, numerous conflicts arose over houses and property, which inflamed ethnic hatred and laid the foundation for further aggravation of Russian-Caucasian relations.
The events of 1991 associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union again led to a sharp change in the political situation in Chechnya. The National Congress of the Chechen People (OCCHN), held in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, proclaimed the independence of the Chechen Republic and its secession from the RSFSR and the USSR. The only legal authority in this non-existent republic was declared to be the Executive Committee (Executive Committee) of the OKCHN.
At the beginning of September 1991, the Executive Committee of the OKCHN announced the overthrow of the Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, after which armed detachments of the OKCHN forcibly seized the buildings of the Council of Ministers, the radio and television center.
On September 15, 1991, after the dissolution of the Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the resignation of its chairman, elections to a new parliament were announced. The Chechen-Ingush Republic was divided into the Chechen and Ingush republics. As a result of the elections held on October 27, 1991, D. Dudayev was declared president of the Chechen Republic. In connection with the dispersal of legitimate authorities and the declaration of the sovereignty of Chechnya, a critical situation has been created on its territory. The economy was destroyed, Russian legislative acts ceased to operate, and the rights of citizens were grossly violated. The illegal armed groups created in the republic began to threaten not only the neighboring constituent entities of the Russian Federation, but also stability on its territory.
The OKChN Executive Committee announced a general mobilization of the republic's men aged 15 to 55 years and brought its national guard to full combat readiness. All opponents of the “independent” Chechen Republic were declared enemies of the people by the leaders of the Executive Committee of the OKCHN. All these actions were accompanied by the violent death of officials disliked by the new government, the seizure of the buildings of the Supreme Council of the Republic and its law enforcement agencies, the expulsion of Russian military units and the seizure of army arsenals. Almost since October 9, 1991, the laws of the Russian Federation on the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Republic have been abolished.
President D. Dudayev was extremely reactionary towards the Russian leadership; he also had a sharply negative attitude towards the governments of the North Caucasus republics, which maintained normal relations with the Russian government. A brutal military-political dictatorship was established in the republic. The regime of D. Dudayev actually began to implement a criminal-terrorist policy both on the territory of Chechnya and beyond its borders. In order to blackmail the Russian federal authorities, threats were repeatedly made from Grozny to use nuclear weapons and commit acts of “nuclear terrorism.” In 1991, more than 250 criminals were released, including about 200 especially dangerous repeat offenders. They were given weapons. Subsequently, criminals who committed crimes in Russia and other CIS countries constantly found refuge on the territory of the Chechen Republic. At the same time, the number of refugees from the republic increased sharply, amounting to 200 thousand people (up to 20% of the population).
Having actually turned the Chechen Republic into a kind of center of terrorism in Russia, D. Dudayev’s regime used for its own purposes hundreds of mercenaries armed with modern weapons from the Baltic countries, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Turkey and other states.
On the territory of Chechnya, with the knowledge of Dudayev, counterfeit Russian money was issued in strict secrecy, which was exported outside the republic to be exchanged for real money. Enormous damage to Russia, estimated at about 400 billion rubles (in cash! at the exchange rate of that time - more than a third of a billion dollars), was caused by the use of false advice notes by D. Dudayev's emissaries. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, at the beginning of 1995, more than 500 persons of Chechen nationality were brought to criminal responsibility for operations with false advice notes, and another 250 Chechens were on the federal wanted list.
With the consent of the leadership of the Chechen Republic, under the slogan of returning to the republic “previously looted by Russia,” attacks were carried out on railway transport in the region. In 1993 alone, 559 trains were attacked, with the complete or partial looting of about 4,000 wagons and containers worth 11.5 billion rubles. Over 8 months of 1994, 120 armed attacks were carried out, as a result of which 1,156 wagons and 527 containers were looted. Losses amounted to more than 11 billion rubles. In 1992-1994, 26 railway workers died during train robberies.
By provoking the Russian state authorities to use force, D. Dudayev pursued the goal of not only creating an independent Chechen state, but also, by uniting all the republics of the North Caucasus on an anti-Russian basis, achieving their subsequent separation from Russia and ultimately becoming the leader of the Islamic revolution in the region.
In 1992, D. Dudayev, trying to obtain weapons and equipment for his formations, demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya within 24 hours without weapons and military equipment.
The open plunder of parts of the Russian army began. Only from February 6 to 9, 1992 in Grozny, the 566th regiment of internal troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs was defeated, the locations of 4 military units were captured, and attacks began on the military camps of the 173rd district training center. As a result, over 4 thousand small arms, about 3 million pieces of ammunition, 186 pieces of automotive equipment, etc. were stolen.
In the first three months of 1992, more than 60 attacks were carried out on military personnel, as a result of which 6 people were seriously injured, 25 apartments of officers were robbed, and, in addition to small arms, 5 armored infantry vehicles, 2 armored personnel carriers and other weapons were captured.
Despite the measures taken, the robbery of weapons and military equipment by D. Dudayev’s militants continued. By May 1992, they captured 80% of the equipment and 75% of the food items. small arms from the number available to the troops on the territory of Chechnya. The seizure of military camps, warehouses with weapons and material resources, as a rule, was carried out according to the scheme: women and children in front, followed by militants with weapons. Subsequently, the transfer of weapons and military equipment to the Chechen Republic was carried out on the instructions of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation P.S. Gracheva.
A lot of weapons ended up in the hands of the illegal military formations of Chechnya (see Table 223), from which thousands of Russian soldiers sent by the federal authorities to eliminate the criminal activities of the illegal state formation were subsequently killed and maimed by the Dudayevites and nationalists.
Having received weapons, D. Dudayev began building a regular Chechen army. The armed forces of the republic included the national guard, border and customs service, internal troops, special forces, labor service and reserve defense forces. Irregular armed formations included self-defense units created on a territorial basis in each locality, as well as uncontrolled bandit formations.
In November 1994, a regiment of "suicide volunteers", a women's battalion and air defense units were formed. At the same time, volunteers from other republics of the North Caucasus arrived on Chechen territory.
The Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of Chechnya was the President of the Republic Dudayev. On November 10, 1991, under his chairmanship, the Chechen Defense Council was created.
According to the Defense Law of December 24, 1991, compulsory military service was introduced in the Chechen Republic for all male citizens. Young men aged 19 to 26 were called up for military service. During 1991-1994, D. Dudayev carried out 6 mobilizations of those liable for military service and conscription of youth for active military service.
As of December 11, 1994, the group of illegal armed groups, including volunteers and mercenaries, numbered about 13 thousand people, 40 tanks, 50 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, up to 100 field artillery pieces and mortars, 600 units of anti-tank weapons, up to 200 units of air defense weapons .
Everything was ready for open war against Russia.
Attempts made by the Russian federal authorities to resolve the crisis through political means have not yielded positive results. In the current situation, the President and the government of the Russian Federation were forced to take appropriate measures to restore the constitutional order in the Chechen Republic and law and order on its territory.
Table 223. Main weapons, military equipment, ammunition and other military property captured by the Dudayevites on the territory of the Chechen Republic (as of August 10, 1992)
|
Name |
In total there were in the Russian troops on the territory of the Chechen Republic as of 01/01/92. |
Captured by illegal formations of Chechnya |
|
Weapons and military equipment |
||
|
PU RK SV (launchers of missile systems of the ground forces) |
||
|
Aircraft (L-39, L-29) |
||
|
BMP (infantry fighting vehicles) |
||
|
armored personnel carriers (armored personnel carriers) |
||
|
MT-LB (small tractor, lightly armored) |
||
|
Cars |
||
|
Art systems |
||
|
Anti-tank weapons |
||
|
SAM air defense system SV (anti-aircraft missile system air defense) |
||
|
SAM system of the air defense forces (anti-aircraft missile system of the air defense forces) |
||
|
Anti-aircraft guns |
||
|
Anti-aircraft installations |
||
|
MANPADS (launching anti-aircraft missile systems) |
||
|
Small arms (total) |
||
|
Ammunition and other military equipment |
||
|
Aircraft missiles |
||
|
Aviation projectiles (GS-23) |
||
|
Ammunition |
27 cars |
27 cars |
|
Anti-aircraft guided missiles (S-75) |
||
|
Projectiles with ready-made (arrow-shaped) striking elements (ZVSh-1, ZVSh-2) |
||
|
Fuel (tons) |
||
|
Clothing property (sets) |
||
|
Food (tons) |
||
|
Medical property (tons) |
||
November 30, 1994 in connection with the ongoing gross violation of the Constitution of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic, D. Dudayev’s refusal to resolve the crisis by peaceful means, a sharp aggravation of the crime situation, violation of the rights and freedoms of citizens, the taking and holding of hostages, an increase in the number of cases of violent death of civilians , in accordance with Article 88 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 2137c “On measures to restore constitutional legality and order in the territory of the Chechen Republic” was issued. In pursuance of this Decree, it was envisaged that a special operation would be carried out by formations and units of the Armed Forces together with the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and units of the FSB of the Russian Federation.
By the beginning of the operation, the United Group of Forces consisted of: battalions - 34 (including from the MVD-20 Internal Troops), divisions - 9, batteries - 7, helicopters - 90 units, including combat - 47 units, personnel - 23.8 thousand people (including: Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - 19 thousand people, Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 4.7 thousand people), tanks 80 units, armored fighting vehicles - 208 units, guns and mortars - 182 units.
On December 11, 1994, a special operation began with the use of the Armed Forces, troops of other ministries and departments of Russia to disarm the armed formations illegally created in Chechnya and ensure the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. The troops began to carry out the assigned task and began moving along the designated routes.
Already on the first day, the advancing troops in Dagestan and Ingushetia lost dozens of servicemen. Thus, on December 12, at 14.20, the column of the combined regiment of the 106th airborne division was struck by rocket artillery from Chechen militants, as a result of which 6 servicemen were killed and 13 wounded. The column of the 19th motorized rifle division in the city of Nazran encountered opposition from local residents, as well as open resistance from employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ingushetia, which led to losses in personnel and equipment. In total, about 60 federal troops vehicles were disabled on the territory of Ingushetia. Several cars with food and property were looted by the riotous crowd. This armed resistance actually marked the beginning of hostilities.
Illegal armed groups, despite repeated appeals to them to stop resistance, continued to actively increase it. Dudayev’s supporters paid special attention to the defense of Grozny, where the main part of their group was located (9-10 thousand people excluding the people’s militia, 25 tanks, 35 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, up to 80 ground artillery guns). The main stocks of weapons and ammunition were also stored here . Dudayev threw his best forces into the defense of Grozny: - “Abkhaz” and “Muslim” battalions, a special-purpose brigade.
For this purpose, a group of troops was created, attacking in four directions: “North”, “North-East”, “East” and “West”.
In general, by December 30, taking into account the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the United Group had: 37,972 personnel, tanks - 230 units, armored fighting vehicles - 454 units, guns and mortars - 388 units.
The militants offered the most fierce resistance during the defense of the presidential palace, all republican administrative buildings, as well as high-rise residential buildings. Despite the heavy losses, the command of the Chechen armed formations took maximum measures to disrupt the successful completion of the operation of the Russian troops. The militant formations were strengthened by the transfer of new detachments from nearby settlements.
Units and subunits of the combined group of federal troops, wedged into the city center, suffered heavy losses and switched to all-round defense, began to create strong points and assault groups. After regrouping and strengthening with fresh forces, they began to methodically tighten the encirclement. On January 19, the presidential palace in Grozny was taken. Over the following weeks, troops expanded their zones of control. To complete the operation to defeat illegal armed groups, additional troop regroupings and reinforcements were carried out during the second half of January and early February.
By February 1, 1995, the strength of the United Group of Russian Forces was increased to 70,509 people (including 58,739 people from the RF Armed Forces), tanks - 322 units, infantry fighting vehicles and infantry fighting vehicles - 1,203 units, armored personnel carriers and BRDM - 901 units, guns and mortars - 627 units.
The final stage of the operation to eliminate illegal armed groups began on the morning of February 3. In the following days, assault troops blocked and destroyed the main centers of militant resistance, and on February 22, operations in Grozny were completed. However, over the following months the situation in the city remained tense.
Having exhausted all possibilities to stop the armed confrontation peacefully, the command of the joint group of troops decided to resume hostilities. During March-June, federal troops cleared almost all major settlements of Chechnya from Dudayev’s army: Assinovskaya, Argun, Mesker-Yurt, Gudermes, Shali, Samashki, Orekhovskaya and others. Subsequently, the tasks of disarming illegal groups were carried out by special units of the police and internal troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs.
During the hostilities, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and bodies that took part in hostilities on the territory of the Chechen Republic lost 5,042 people killed and killed, 510 people were missing and captured, including:
Table 224. Number of killed, deceased, missing and captured
|
Troop affiliation |
Officers |
Ensigns |
Sergeants |
Privates |
Civilian personnel |
Total |
|
RF Armed Forces (total) |
||||||
|
incl. missing |
||||||
|
Internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs |
||||||
|
Employees of the internal affairs bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs |
||||||
|
incl. missing |
||||||
|
FSB (total) |
||||||
|
incl. went missing and was captured |
||||||
|
FPS (total) |
||||||
|
FSZHV (total) |
||||||
|
FAPSI (total) |
||||||
|
incl. went missing and was captured |
* These include the remains of 279 unidentified military personnel who, as of June 1, 1999, were in the 124th Central Medical Laboratory for Identification Research of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation to establish the identity of the deceased.
All personnel losses of units and subunits that were part of the combined group of forces, by type of loss and category of military personnel, are presented in Table 225.
Table 225. Losses of personnel of the joint group of forces
|
Types of losses |
Officers |
Ensigns |
Sergeants |
Privates |
Civilian personnel |
Total |
|
Irreversible |
||||||
|
Killed in action and died of wounds during the medical evacuation stages |
||||||
|
Died from wounds in hospitals |
||||||
|
Died from disease, died in disasters and as a result of accidents (non-combat losses) |
||||||
|
Missing |
||||||
|
Captured |
||||||
|
Sanitary |
||||||
|
Got sick |
||||||
Sanitary losses made up 51387 person, including: wounded, shell-shocked, injured 16098 Human ( 31,3% ); got sick 35289 Human ( 68,7% ).
Of the total number of sanitary losses (51,387 people), military medical institutions of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation received 22288 Human. The outcomes of their treatment are presented in Table 226.
As for the irretrievable losses of personnel of the illegal armed groups of Chechnya, they are estimated at 2500-2700 people.
Table 226. Treatment outcomes in military medical institutions of the Ministry of Defense
|
Types of sanitary losses and treatment outcomes |
Number of hospitalized |
||||
|
Total |
Including |
||||
|
Quantity |
Officers and warrant officers |
Sergeants and soldiers |
Civilian personnel |
||
|
Wounded, shell-shocked, burned, injured |
|||||
|
Of these: - returned to service |
|||||
|
Outcomes undecided |
|||||
|
Got sick |
|||||
|
Of these - returned to service |
|||||
|
Dismissed due to health reasons |
|||||
|
Outcomes undecided |
|||||
|
Total hospitalized |
|||||
|
Of these: -returned to service |
|||||
|
Dismissed due to health reasons |
|||||
|
Outcomes undecided |
|||||
According to expert assessments of law enforcement agencies and human rights organizations among the civilian population in Chechnya, in the first year of hostilities alone (December 1994 - December 1995), from 20 to 30 thousand civilians died as a result of intense shelling, artillery and air bombing. In 1996, human losses amounted to about 6.0 thousand people, including 700-900 Chechen militants, the rest (5100 people) civilians. Consequently, the total number of civilian casualties will be 30-35 thousand people, including those killed in Budyonnovsk, Kizlyar, Pervomaisk, and Ingushetia.
The tragedy of the Chechen war lies in the senselessness of the numerous victims suffered in it, since as a result of the agreements signed in Khasavyurt (August 1996) and the peace treaty with the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (May 1997), Russian troops, without fully completing their task, left Chechnya. This allowed the leadership of the self-proclaimed republic to continue to pursue policies that contribute to the weakening of Russian statehood and undermining the territorial integrity of Russia. In Chechnya, despite the election of a president, power structures capable of establishing and constantly maintaining constitutional order in the republic were never formed. Instability continued. Russians were annually hit with new portions of bitterness - attacks, captures, hijackings, murders, sabotage explosions<...>
The self-proclaimed independent Ichkeria (Chechnya) has essentially turned into an international criminal cesspool, overrun by terrorists and criminals fugitives from justice. By the summer of 1999, about 160 armed gangs, including those of foreign origin, were operating on its territory, terrorizing the population.
Trying to destabilize the situation in the North Caucasus and throughout the country, terrorists committed particularly daring and cruel crimes: in June 1995 they seized a hospital in the city of Budennovsk, Stavropol Territory, in January 1996 - the Dagestan villages of Kizlyar and Pervomaiskoye, in November 1996 they blew up a residential building in Kaspiysk, in December 1996, in the Chechen village of Novye Atagi, six employees of the hospital of the International Committee of the Red Cross were shot, in April 1997, explosions were carried out at the railway stations of Armavir and Pyatigorsk, in December 1998, four employees of the British company Granger Telecom were brutally killed, in In 1999, an explosion occurred at the Central Market of Vladikavkaz, killing 50 people.
Drug trafficking flourished with impunity in the republic. Profits from drug sales amounted to about $0.8 billion annually. The slave trade also brought in a lot of money. In 1997-1998 alone, more than 60 Chechen groups kidnapped 1,094 people, in 1999 - 270. 500 people were held hostage for a long time, including Russian military personnel, police officers, journalists, ordinary citizens of Russia and other republics, as well as high-ranking government and military officials, representatives of foreign organizations.
Since Chechnya in that geopolitical territorial configuration was not provided with close ties either by sea or directly by common borders with the states of the Islamic world, local Chechen geopoliticians, under the leadership of their Western colleagues, developed a plan according to which, in order to maintain the sovereignty of Chechnya, it was absolutely necessary to reach the Caspian coast. This was possible only by undermining Dagestan, through the destruction of its fragile balance of ethnic and social forces, and first annexing at least not all of Dagestan, but a corridor to the Caspian Sea. Subsequently, it would be possible to build a stable independent zone in the North Caucasus with the presence in it of a new Muslim administrative entity, within which the operation of the legislative and legal system of Russia and its authorities should practically be suspended. Essentially, this action was aimed at destroying the Russian state.
15 - Kuzmin F.M. and Runov, V.A. History of military operations of Russian and Soviet troops in the Caucasus (XVII-XX centuries). - M., 1995, p. 183-184.16 - Determined by calculation, taking into account the ratio of killed (70%), wounded and frostbitten (30%) to the total number of losses suffered by the Red Army troops in real conditions of combat operations in the North Caucasus in 1920-1921. (mountainous terrain, the surprise of the attack of the mountaineers, their cruelty towards commanders and Red Army soldiers, especially those captured).
17 - State political management.
18 - Brief report on the disarmament operation of the Chechen Autonomous Region. 1925 - RGVA. F. 25896, op. 9, d. 285, 346, 349, 374, 376.
19 - RGVA. F. 25896, op. 9. d. 349, l. 2-5; According to district rear records, by March 25, the number of personnel, together with attached units and subunits, amounted to 5,052 people. and 1,927 horses. - Right there. L. 26 n/o.
20 - RGVA. F. 25896, op. 9. d. 349, l. 21.
32 - Population of Russia in the 20th century. Abstracts of reports. - M., 198, p. 65.
33 - Red Star, 1999, October 7.
Methodological support: The topic corresponds to the theme of the work program in history for grades 5-9 and the educational complex “History of Russia” edited by A.A. Danilova, L.G. Kosulina.
Form of delivery: lesson in the formation of new knowledge.
Lesson type: combined lesson.
Educational goal:
1.Introduce students to the main directions of Russian foreign policy in the 90s.
2. Bring students to an understanding of the peculiarities of Russia’s international position.
3. Continue to develop the skills to work with historical documents, analyze them, draw conclusions, and present “cross-cutting” issues of the topic.
1. Educational: working with resource materials, get acquainted with the international situation after the collapse of the USSR; to find out the reasons that led the world to a new round of misunderstanding and rejection of each other’s positions.
2. Developmental: develop students’ skills independently work with historical documents, sources, analyze historical facts.
3. Educational: cultivating interest in Russian history, in general, and in this period, as the period that served as the starting point for many political events of the late 20th and early 20thI century.
Methods: verbal and reproductive, visual, partially search, explanatory and illustrative.
Forms of student activity: frontal, in pairs, independent.
Equipment: computer, multimedia projector, screen.
Visual and didactic materials: map “Political Map”, an excerpt from the series of films “Namedni” (author L. Parfenov, series “1991”), covering the events of the collapse of the USSR, video “NATO is using the situation in Ukraine”; handout: text “How did the place and role of Russia in the world change after the collapse of the USSR? How did this influence the revision of its foreign policy?” (Appendix 1), “Russia and the West,” “Russia and the East,” Russia and the CIS” (Appendix 2), glossary (concepts)(Appendix 3)., “History of NATO expansion” (Appendix 4)
To successfully organize the lesson, students need to familiarize themselves with the text of the paragraph devoted to Russian foreign policy in the 90s. Houses.
During the classes.
I. Organizational moment.
Teacher. Hello guys. Have a seat. I hope that we will work fruitfully with you. During the lesson you will work individually and in pairs. I ask you to be attentive to each other, help each other, and work actively.
II. Motivation. Update basic knowledge about students previously learned material.
Teacher. The 90s were a difficult time for Russia in the international arena, when Russia had to fight with other countries for every decision to defend its interests. We also know the situation of our country during the existence of the USSR during the Cold War, when almost all decisions in world politics could not be decided without the participation of the USSR.
How could such a dramatic change in the situation occur in just a short period of time from 1991 to 2000?
Today in class we will try to answer this question.
Students are presented with an excerpt from the series of films “The Other Day” (author L. Parfenov, series “1991”), covering the events of the collapse of the USSR.
Questions for the class:
1) What historical fact does this film demonstrate?
2) Name the year in which this event occurred.
Preparation for the perception of the topic.
Teacher. End of the 20th century This is a special time in the history of our country and the whole world. This is a time of global uncertainty.
The collapse of the USSR gave rise to this global uncertainty. First of all, it was unclear whether everything would be limited to the exit of 15 former Soviet Union republics or the process of fragmentation of the Eurasian space would go further.
For several decades, relations between the USSR and the West did not go beyond the Cold War. With the collapse of the USSR, Russia's position and role in the world changed. First of all, the world has changed: the Cold War ended, the world system of socialism became a thing of the past, and the confrontation between two superpowers - the USSR and the USA - became history.
Questions for the class:
1. Define the concept of “Cold War”.
2.Name the two poles of confrontation during the Cold War?
3.Name the military blocs of the Cold War.
The teacher invites students to determine what questions will be studied in today's lesson.
Suggested answer: How did Russian foreign policy change in the 90s? How international relations changed in the 90s. and the role of Russia in the international arena?
During the lesson you will be able to:
– identify the main foreign policy problems that Russia had to solve after the collapse of the USSR and the formation of the Russian Federation;
Determine the main directions of Russian foreign policy and its tasks in the 90s;
The teacher announces the topic of the lesson. Lesson topic: “Geopolitical situation and foreign policy of Russia in the 90s.”
Announcement of the lesson topic and goal setting.
Students write down the topic of the lesson in a notebook.
The teacher draws attention to the concept of geopolitics.
Geopolitics is a concept that proclaims the dependence of a country’s foreign policy on its geographical factors (the position of the country, natural resources, climate, etc.)
III.Search and research stage.
1991 can be considered the starting point of a new time, a time in which, as it might have seemed then, there would be no confrontation between the two superpowers and, as a consequence, a decrease in the number of local conflicts. However, what picture can we observe in reality?!
Working with handouts.
Students are presented with a text and assignments for the text.
How did the place and role of Russia in the World change after the collapse of the USSR?
How did this influence the revision of its foreign policy? (Appendix No. 1)
Tasks and questions for the text:
1.What foreign policy problems did the Russian Federation face after the collapse of the USSR?
2.Formulate the main directions and tasks in the form of 3-4 theses.
What foreign policy problems did the Russian Federation face after the collapse of the USSR?
1.After the collapse of the USSR, interest in our country in the world decreases, Russia loses its status as a “great power”.
2.Russia became the legal successor of the USSR and inherited its place in international organizations. Among other things, she became a member of the UN Security Council.
However, Russia's international position could not be called favorable.
3. Our country remains the second largest world power in terms of nuclear missile potential. However, its military capabilities have declined. The unified missile defense system collapsed, the unified military-industrial complex ceased to exist, the navy lost bases in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. By the mid-90s. - 1:3, and after Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined NATO - 1:4 in favor of NATO. By the end of the 90s. Only the European NATO countries exceeded Russia in military spending by 20 times.
4.The situation was complicated by the growth of military conflicts near the borders with the CIS countries, which in the 90s. were actually open. Russia was faced with the task of maintaining territorial integrity and independence;
5. At the same time, foreign policy realities for Russia changed: Western countries were no longer enemies, and Eastern European countries were no longer friends.
Formulate the main directions and tasks in the form of 3-4 theses.
The main directions of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation currently remain quite traditional:
1. Relations with “near abroad” states; relations with the countries of the “former socialist camp”.
2. Relations with the states of Western Europe.
3. Relations with the United States of America.
4. Relations with the countries of the East and Asia.
The teacher complements the students' answers. The main tasks are written down in a notebook.
Teacher: Has Russia managed to achieve its most important foreign policy objectives?! This is what you and I will try to find out.
Students are offered one of the tasks, and learning pairs are formed.
Assignment to students:
Remembering the material you read in the textbook and using additional materials, determine:
1. Determine whether the task you chose in implementing Russia’s foreign policy course in the 90s was achieved? Formulate the information received in the form of a conclusion (judgment).
2. Justify your conclusion using historical facts (at least 3).
The following is subject to evaluation: The final product is a formulated conclusion about the implementation of the task. The conclusion must be formulated clearly, specifically and proven by historical facts. Their number is determined by the principle of sufficiency or the teacher.
Assessment in the group is differentiated.
Students can independently determine the criteria for grading in accordance with the contribution of each student to the work of the group (difficulty of the task and volume).
10 minutes are allotted for independent work in the group.
Students identify the speaker from the pair. Each pair is given 1 minute to perform.
All correctly named conclusions are recorded in a notebook.
General task performed by students during pair performances.
Assignment: Based on the information received, identify and write down the changes that occurred in Russian foreign policy in the 90s. XX century.
1 pair. Development and strengthening of relations with Western countries, and primarily with the United States. Appendix No. 2
2nd group. Activation of the eastern direction of foreign policy, which was secondary in the early 1990s.
3rd group. Establishing mutually beneficial and effective cooperation with CIS countries;
The teacher complements the students’ answers and draws their attention to the concept of multipolarity. The main conclusions are written down in a notebook.
IV. Summing up the lesson.
Teacher. The foreign policy of the Russian Federation in the 1990s was multifaceted, focused on maintaining global multipolarity, supporting relations with former Soviet republics and integrating democratic Russia into the world community.
The teacher, together with the students, sums up Russian foreign policy in the 90s. He draws attention to the fact that Russian policy in the 90s. was controversial.
On the one hand, the level of military confrontation with Western countries has decreased.
1. The threat of a global nuclear missile war has become less acute.
2. Russia, having overcome its previous isolation from Western countries, has joined the activities of leading international organizations.
3. In the second half of the 90s. The eastern direction of Russian foreign policy intensified.
4.Our country has taken a central place in the Commonwealth of Independent States.
On the other side:
1. New dangers and problems have emerged. Leading Western countries, declaring allied relations with Russia, took its position and interests into account to a lesser extent than in previous years.
2. Making a decision on the expansion of NATO to the East and including on the agenda the issue of admitting some former Soviet republics to this military organization.
3. Russia's lag behind Western countries and Japan in scientific and technological terms has increased.
Teacher. All this required constant adjustment of the foreign policy course, the development of a new concept that would define Russia’s place in the world and reflect its national interests.
Main question: Russia and NATO: partners or rivals?
What do you know about the NATO organization? What was the main contradiction in relations between Russia and NATO in the 1990s?
Video “NATO is taking advantage of the situation in Ukraine”
What are the contradictions between Russia and NATO today?
Teacher. The new world liberal order, established after the collapse of the USSR in 1991, is reaching its end and it is time for America to say goodbye to world domination.
Today, the Great Powers include the USA, China, Russia and the European Union. To prevent a possible war between them, great powers are obliged to recognize each other as equal players. Russia or China are pursuing independent policies, not submitting to US dictates. In his opinion, a new multipolar order has already been formed, but has not yet been comprehended by theorists and US authorities.
Conclusion: In general, Russian foreign policy is going through a stage of its formation and evolution, adaptation to new world and Russian realities, to an understanding of its historical role in the context of globalization. By virtue of its history, territory, geopolitical position and possession of the status of a nuclear power, Russia is called upon to be a great power. To understand what this means for the country at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries after all the historical cataclysms and transformations is the most important task of Russian foreign policy.
IV Reflection Sample questions for discussion:
What information was most helpful to you in understanding current events? Explain your point of view.
– What events became major in the international relations of world history at the end of the twentieth century?
Homework. 1) P. 55, questions for the paragraph. 2) Prepare reports on interregional conflicts in the period 1991 - 2000, paying attention to NATO’s participation in them
In the context of globalization, conflicts pose a serious threat to the world community due to the possibility of their expansion, the danger of economic and military disasters, and the high probability of mass migrations of the population that can destabilize the situation in neighboring states. International conflicts are one of the forms of interaction between states. These include civil unrest and wars, coups d'etat and military mutinies, uprisings, guerrilla actions, etc.
We characterize the causes of international conflicts. Geopolitical scientists say the reasons for these conflicts are competition between states and divergence of national interests; territorial claims, social injustice on a global scale, uneven distribution of natural resources in the world, negative perceptions of each other by the parties, personal incompatibility of leaders, etc.
Various terminology is used to characterize international conflicts: “hostility”, “struggle”, “crisis”, “armed confrontation”, etc. Generally accepted definition
There is no international conflict yet.
The positive and negative functions of international conflicts are studied.
During the Cold War, the concepts of “conflict” and “crisis” were
practical tools for solving military-political problems of confrontation between the USSR and the USA, reducing the likelihood of a nuclear clash between them. There was an opportunity to combine conflict behavior with cooperation in vital areas,
find ways to de-escalate conflicts.
The positive functions of conflicts include:
1. Preventing stagnation in international relations.
2. Stimulating creativity in search of solutions in difficult situations.
3. Determining the degree of inconsistency between the interests and goals of states.
4. Preventing larger conflicts and ensuring stability through the institutionalization of small-scale conflicts
intensity.
The destructive functions of international conflicts are seen in the fact that they:
1. Cause disorder, instability and violence.
2. They increase the stressful state of the psyche of the population in countries -
participants.
3. They give rise to the possibility of ineffective political decisions.
Nowadays, international relations still remain a sphere of divergent interests, rivalry, unpredictability, conflicts and violence. It can be argued that an international conflict is a clash of multidirectional forces with the aim of realizing goals and interests in conditions of opposition.
Subjects of an international conflict can be states, interstate associations, international organizations, institutionalized socio-political forces within the state or in the international arena
Understanding the nature of international conflicts and finding ways to resolve them requires, in addition to explaining their causes, clarification of the depth and nature of the conflict itself, which is largely achieved through their classification, the traditional typology of conflicts widespread in the West, according to which they distinguish: international crisis; low-intensity conflicts terrorism; civil war and revolution acquiring an international character; war and world war.
An international crisis is a conflict situation in which: the vital goals of the current subjects of international politics are affected, the subjects have extremely limited time to make decisions, events usually develop unpredictably; the situation, however, does not escalate into an armed conflict.
So, a crisis is not yet a war, but rather an example of a “no peace, no war” situation. This is a type of relationship between subjects of international relations in which one of the parties does not want war or violence, but both two consider their goals sufficient significant enough to risk a possible solution to the war for their sake.
Conflicts of low intensity Relations between state and non-state actors are quite often overshadowed by minor skirmishes on the borders, individual or small group violence. The dangers of ECU have only begun to be understood today. It lies in the fact that, firstly, such a conflict can turn into a full-scale conflict. Secondly, with modern military weapons, even a conflict of low intensity can lead to great destruction. Thirdly, in the conditions of close interconnection of modern independent states, a violation of peaceful life in one region affects all others.
Terrorism.
Civil war and revolution are conflicts within the state itself between two or more parties due to differences of opinion regarding the future system of this state or clan contradictions; in civil wars, usually at least one of the warring parties receives support from foreign political forces, and external actors politicians often have a vital interest in a particular outcome.
Civil wars and revolutions occupy a specific place in any typology of wars and violence: they are very cruel and bloody. According to research, 10 of the 13 most deadly conflicts of the 19th and 20th centuries were civil wars.
War is a large-scale conflict between states that seek to achieve their political goals through organized armed struggle. World war occurs when groups of states pursuing global goals are involved in a military conflict, it leads to significant human and material losses.
The following phases of conflict development can be distinguished:
The first phase of the conflict is the formation of the attitude of the opposite parties towards each other, which is usually expressed in a more or less conflicting form
The second phase is the subjective determination by the conflicting parties of their interests, goals, strategies and forms of struggle to resolve contradictions
The third phase is associated with the involvement of economic, political, ideological, psychological, moral, legal, diplomatic means, as well as other states, in the conflict, through blocs or treaties
The fourth phase involves an increase in the struggle to the most acute political level - an international political crisis, which can cover the relations of direct participants, the state of a certain region, and other regions. In this phase, a transition to the use of military force is possible.
The fifth phase is an international armed conflict, which can develop to a high level of armed struggle with the use of modern weapons and the possible involvement of accomplices
At any of these phases, an alternative development process can begin, which can be embodied in the negotiation process and leads to the weakening and limitation of the conflict
Issues related to methods of conflict resolution are considered.
The most effective ways are:
1. Negotiation processes.
2. Mediation procedures.
3. Arbitration.
4. Reducing and stopping the supply of weapons to the parties to the conflict.
5. Organization of free elections.
The resolution of international conflicts today is also facilitated by some objective trends in global development. Firstly, the world, including those directly involved in conflicts, is beginning to understand the danger of military methods of resolving controversial issues. Therefore, the parties in conflict usually move on to political dialogue in negotiations. secondly, integration is strengthened, interstate and interregional barriers are destroyed, the level of confrontation is reduced and conditions are created for the formation of regional and international unions, associations, unions of states, such as the European Community, etc., with the goal of coordinating actions, combining forces and capabilities to ensure closer cooperation, which reduces the likelihood of conflict situations.
The most common methods of conflict resolution, known in international relations since ancient times, are negotiations, the use of third party services and mediation to help the parties reach an agreement. Although the last two possibilities of “outside” intervention are considered by international law as completely legal, the conflicting states themselves do not always agree to them voluntarily. Much more often they prefer to settle their disputes directly with each other.
In general, the impact on the conflict for its peaceful conclusion is carried out through:
¦ preventive diplomacy (English: preventive diplomacy) -,
Peacekeeping (English: peacekeeping)",
* peacekeeping (English: peacemaking) -,
¦ peacebuilding (English: peacebuilding).
Preventive diplomacy is used to prevent a conflict from developing into an armed stage. It includes activities related to “restoring trust” between conflicting parties; the work of civilian observer missions to establish violations of the peace; exchange of information, etc.
Maintaining peace involves measures aimed at bringing about a ceasefire. This could be the deployment of military observer missions, peacekeeping forces; creation of buffer zones, as well as no-fly zones, etc. The peacekeeping forces introduced may be called “emergency”, “temporary”, “protective”, “disengagement forces”, and have various mandates that define acceptable means of achieving the goal.
Peacekeeping activities are not focused on finding a peaceful solution to a problem, but only on reducing the severity of the conflict. It provides for the separation of warring parties and limiting contacts between them.
Maintaining peace involves procedures related to the organization of the negotiation process and the implementation of mediation efforts by a third party to find mutually acceptable solutions. It is important here that, in contrast to maintaining peace, activities to preserve peace are aimed not only at reducing the level of confrontation between the parties, but also at solving the problem peacefully that would satisfy the conflicting parties.
The result of efforts to preserve peace is not always the resolution of contradictions. The parties are sometimes only forced to sign agreements, realizing that the continuation of the conflict at this stage becomes impossible. At the same time, one side or another may not be very keen to fulfill them. In this case, guarantees for the implementation of agreements are often required. The third party participating in mediation often becomes such a guarantor.
Restoring peace refers to the active involvement of a third party in post-conflict resolution. This could be activities aimed at preparing elections, managing territories until peaceful life is completely restored, transferring power to local authorities, etc. As part of restoring peace, measures are also being taken to reconcile the conflicting parties. Economic development and the development of projects that involve cooperation between former opponents (as was the case, for example, at the end of the Second World War in Western Europe) are of great importance. In addition, restoring peace includes educational work, which is also aimed at reconciliation between participants and the formation of tolerant behavior.
In connection with the intensive development of the practice of influencing conflicts by the end of the 20th century, the term “second generation peacekeeping operations” appeared. They involve a wider range of use of various means in a conflict by a third party, including the use of naval forces and aviation. At the same time, military operations began to be carried out without the consent of the state in which the conflict arose, as was the case, for example, in the former Yugoslavia. This practice is called “peace enforcement” and is perceived rather ambiguously by various states, politicians, movements, etc.
The terms have also been established in the scientific literature: prevention of open armed forms of conflict accompanied by violent actions - wars, riots, etc. (English: conflict prevention); conflict resolution, aimed at reducing the level of hostility in the relations of the parties, which involves mediation procedures and negotiations (English: conflict management); conflict resolution, focused on eliminating their causes, forming a new level of relationships between participants
The objectives of peacekeeping are to help the conflicting parties understand what separates them, how much the object of the dispute deserves confrontation and whether there are ways to resolve it by peaceful means - negotiations, the services of mediators, appeals to the public and, finally, going to court. Peacekeeping efforts
should be aimed at creating infrastructure, conflict resolution (meeting places, transport, communications, technical support).
Genuine peacekeeping also involves providing assistance to the conflicting parties with personnel, financial resources,
supplies of food, medicine, personnel training, assistance in holding elections, referendums, ensuring control over compliance with agreements. All these peacekeeping procedures were
tested in UN operations in many “hot spots” on the planet.
Modern politicians and geopoliticians will have to develop a concept of peacekeeping with an emphasis not on the military-political side of the matter, but on the formulation of a set of measures to prevent and resolve conflicts.
An effective, adequate peacekeeping circumstance is intended to become one of the essential factors in the formation of a new
international system.
The experience of the war in Afghanistan and other local wars deserves the closest attention when solving problems of the development of the Armed Forces, training and education of personnel
It is important for a future officer to know military history, the history of the Armed Forces, because it develops the moral nature of a person by studying the past in order to educate the younger generation, in order to leave an undistorted history for the coming generation.
But military history is considered even more useful from the point of view of understanding the experience of armed struggle contained in it.
The famous military historian, professor at the General Staff Academy, General N.A. Orlov, wrote: “Military history is the richest and inexhaustible treasury of military experience of entire millennia, from which military sciences draw material for their conclusions. It compensates to some extent for the lack of personal experience. Military sciences differ from other sciences in that repetition of experience is not available to them, since the phenomenon of war is too complex and involves the loss of human lives. Peacetime experience can only reproduce the situation of action, the preparation for battle, but not the action itself.”
Thus, the importance of military historical knowledge for future officers is great and multifaceted.
47. USSR - RF: the fight against armed nationalist groups (1920-1956), as well as ethnic and regional conflicts in the territory of the former USSR (1988-1991) and Russia (1991-2000).
Ethnic and interregional armed conflicts:
Armenian-Azerbaijani (Karabakh) armed conflict (1988-1994);
Georgian-Ossetian (South Ossetian) conflict (1991-1992);
Armed conflict in Transnistria (1992);
Georgian-Abkhaz armed conflict (1992-1994);
Civil war in Tajikistan (1992-1996);
Armed conflicts in the North Caucasus (1920-2000);
Ossetian-Ingush conflict (October-November 1992);
Armed conflicts and anti-terrorist operations in Chechnya and Dagestan (1920-2000);
Anti-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus (August 1999-2000);
Operation on the territory of the Republic of Dagestan;
Operation on the territory of the Chechen Republic.
One of the features of the modern world is the constant increase in its aggressiveness. Militant forces wage a continuous struggle in various forms against states and countries that have liberated themselves from colonial oppression; they strive to hinder the economic growth of these states, disarm them ideologically, split them and isolate them politically. The most reactionary circles of terrorism are trying to rely on contradictions between developed and developing countries, between countries professing Islam and Christianity, on the constant aggravation of the international situation, on acts of direct aggression. All this forces the people of peace-loving countries to increase vigilance and intensify actions in defense of peace, democracy and social progress.
Increased aggressiveness and the creation of a tense international situation require the Armed Forces to be constantly ready to repel any aggression.
The use of new means and methods of armed struggle has raised the issue of training and education of personnel in a different way. Along with military training and the ability of the troops to skillfully use weapons and military equipment, they were required to have high moral and psychological preparation.
The experience of local wars has shown that the offensive is still the main type of combat operations. Such principles of its conduct as decisive massing of forces and means in the direction of the main attack, surprise of actions, reliable fire defeat of the defending enemy, conducting an offensive on a wide front and at a high pace, reliable command and control of troops and constant interaction of all forces and means remain important.
In offensive combat, tank tactical groups, reinforced by motorized infantry and helicopters, were widely used. They were used for independent actions deep behind enemy lines in order to capture important areas, facilities, and launch sites for anti-aircraft missiles and missile launchers. What is new in the combat use of tank units reinforced with ATGMs is their use as anti-tank barriers.
In local wars, helicopters were widely used, which successfully carried out combat missions in close cooperation with troops directly on the battlefield.
The experience of defensive operations testifies to the increased capabilities of defense, especially in the fight against tanks and aircraft of the attacking side. At the same time, the most important requirement for defense remains its activity, the highest form of manifestation of which was counterattacks and counterattacks. Local wars have shown increased confrontation between tanks and anti-tank weapons. ATGMs and fire support helicopters turned out to be the most effective means of combating tanks.
Aviation had a significant influence on the course and outcome of hostilities. The increased capabilities of aviation allow it to solve tasks much more successfully than before in gaining and maintaining air superiority, in directly supporting the combat operations of units and formations, in isolating the combat area from the influx of reserves, and in disrupting the supply of various material and technical means.
In local wars, there was a tendency towards closer interaction between ships and units and formations of ground forces. At the same time, the actions of the naval forces were often subordinated to the interests of the ground forces deploying battles in coastal areas. Amphibious assault vehicles, as well as the marine infantry, have received great development.
The experience of local wars testifies to the significantly increased role of logistical support for military operations of troops. For this purpose, in addition to motor transport, aviation was widely used, especially helicopters, as well as transport ships of the navy. The practice of local wars has confirmed the decisive role of man in war and the constant increase in his role, despite the presence of highly effective equipment, weapons and various automated means of controlling weapons and troops. In this regard, the requirements for individual training of military personnel of all specialties have increased, since the presence of group weapons requires high training of each crew member and crew.
Brief conclusions
In the post-war construction of the Armed Forces, significant changes occurred in the development of states. The decisive factor in these changes was the emergence and continuous improvement of nuclear missile weapons and their transformation into the main means of armed struggle.
Nuclear missile weapons increased the combat capabilities of troops and placed new demands on them. The ground forces have become fully motorized, and their basis today is made up of armored forces.
The development of the Air Force followed the line of equipping them with supersonic jet aircraft with an increased range, armed with NURS and URS with conventional and nuclear warheads.
In the development of the Navy, the main direction was the transformation of the nuclear missile-carrying submarine fleet into the main striking force. As nuclear missile weapons developed, views on methods of combat and operations changed. Their development proceeded in the direction of increasing the scope of offensive actions, abandoning an offensive on a continuous front and moving to actions in separate directions, using armored units and formations in the first echelons, and turning the offensive on the move into the main method of action of troops. The development of methods of conducting defense was expressed in increasing the width of the bands and depth of defense, increasing its stability, abandoning the template positional formation and turning mobile defense into the main method of defensive operations of troops.
The experience of local wars shows that the main burden in solving combat missions and achieving the goals of wars fell on the ground forces. In the overwhelming majority, the successful completion of combat missions was achieved through the joint efforts of all branches of the ground forces. The main weapon of fire in attack and defense was artillery. The experience of wars, especially the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, confirmed the high combat effectiveness of self-propelled artillery. Combat practice has shown that ATGMs are very effective anti-tank weapons.
Despite the fact that in many local wars the fighting took place in difficult terrain, tank troops were widely used and played an important role. The range of their combat missions has expanded significantly. During the offensive, tanks gave troop groups high survivability and facilitated the conduct of highly maneuverable combat operations at great depths. In defense, tank units and units were used to increase its activity and stability.
Aviation, especially tactical and army aviation, played a large role in local wars. At the same time, strategic aviation was also widely used in Vietnam. Air Force units provided support and cover for ground forces, gained and maintained air superiority, and were also used to transport material and technical assets. Helicopters have received great development.
The use of the Navy was characterized by both independent combat operations of naval forces and actions to support ground forces. The fleet played a major role in the successful achievement of the goals of joint operations, striking important military and industrial facilities and ground forces, carrying out landings, blockading the coast from the sea, defending its sea coast, as well as providing sea transportation, regrouping and evacuation of troops.
After the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991, the Balkan Peninsula plunged into the abyss of internecine wars. The series of military conflicts began in June-July 1991 with the Slovenian War of Independence, followed by the Serbo-Croatian conflict of 1991-92. From 1992 to 1995, the war between the Serbs and Croats subsided somewhat, but in the spring of 1995 the Croats launched a series of offensive operations. In April 1992, a civil war began between the Serbs, Croats and Muslims who inhabited the once union republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. UN peacekeeping forces and NATO aircraft appeared in the Balkans in 1992, but their presence was little felt until the fall of 1995. The November 1995 Dayton peace accords provided a broad gateway for NATO's entry into the former Yugoslavia. Within the framework of the North Atlantic bloc, the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) were formed. The Dayton agreements did not address the Kosovo problem. This province of Serbia was inhabited mainly by Kosovars - ethnic Albanians. The storm in the Balkans reached Albania in 1997, and European peacekeeping forces were brought into the country under the auspices of Italy. After the events in Albania, the situation in Kosovo worsened even more, and in 1998, according to the West, it became simply critical. A real war began in the province, into which NATO did not fail to get involved.
An-2 biplanes from Yugoslav flying clubs and agricultural aviation enterprises were widely used by the Croats to solve a wide variety of tasks - from transporting people and cargo to striking ground targets.
Air power played a key role in all conflicts in the Balkans from 1991 to 2000. In the summer of 1992, NATO aircraft were directly involved in combat operations over Yugoslavia. Over the course of ten years, almost every air force squadron of the main European powers visited the skies of the Balkans. Planes and helicopters from the Air Force, carrier-based aircraft, and US Marine Corps aircraft were constantly present in the region. The pilots did not cloud their minds with discussions about the political component of their presence in the Balkans or the degree of involvement in the conflict - they simply professionally carried out their work in yet another “hot spot” of the world. The range of NATO and UN aviation use was extremely wide, both in terms of the type of aircraft and the nature of the missions performed: from striking with B-2 strategic bombers to dropping food aid from helicopters.
One of the European politicians, Carl Bild, called the former Yugoslavia “European Vietnam.” He was right - there is no end in sight to the wars in the Balkans. The last military conflict was the invasion of the Kosovars into the territory of Macedonia in the summer of 2001.
Many Croatian Air Force aircraft, like the An-32, had civilian registration and appropriate coloring. In this way, Zagreb circumvented the ban on military aircraft flying over the entire territory of the former Yugoslavia.
Unloading the wounded from an An-2 aircraft, Pleso airfield, July 1992.
The Croatian military industry was able to master the production of small reconnaissance drones, which were widely used during Operation Storm against Srpska Krajina in July-August 1995.