T. Kuhn and the theory of scientific revolutions. Thomas Kuhn. The structure of scientific revolutions Kuhn's main ideas

Biography

Thomas Kuhn was born in Cincinnati, Ohio to Samuel L. Kuhn, an industrial engineer, and Minette Struck Kuhn.

• - Graduated from Harvard University and received a bachelor's degree in physics.
• During World War II, he was assigned to civilian work in the Office of Scientific Research and Development.
• - Received a master's degree in physics at Harvard.
• - the beginning of the formation of the main theses: “structure of scientific revolutions” and “paradigm”.
• - - held various teaching positions at Harvard; taught history of science.
• - He defended his dissertation in physics at Harvard.
• - worked as a professor of the history of science at the department of the University of California at Berkeley.
• - - worked at the university department at Princeton, taught history and philosophy of science.
• - - Professor .
• - - Lawrence S. Rockefeller Professor of Philosophy at the same institute.
• - retired.
• - Kuhn was diagnosed with bronchial cancer.
• - Thomas Kuhn died.

Kuhn was married twice. First with Catherine Moose (with whom he had three children), and then with Jeanne Barton.

Scientific activity

The most famous work of Thomas Kuhn is considered to be “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” (1962), which discusses the theory that science should be perceived not as gradually developing and accumulating knowledge towards truth, but as a phenomenon passing through periodic periods. revolutions, called in his terminology “paradigm shifts” (eng. paradigm shift). "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" was originally published as an article for the International Encyclopedia for Unified Science, published by the Vienna Circle of Logical Positivists, or Neopositivists. The enormous influence that Kuhn's research had can be assessed by the revolution that it provoked even in the thesaurus of the history of science: in addition to the concept of “paradigm change,” Kuhn gave a broader meaning to the word “paradigm” used in linguistics, introduced the term “normal science” to define the relatively routine daily work of scientists operating within a paradigm, and largely influenced the use of the term "scientific revolutions" as periodic events occurring at different times in various scientific disciplines - as opposed to the single "Scientific Revolution" of the later Renaissance.

Stages of the scientific revolution

The progress of the scientific revolution according to Kuhn:

• normal science - every new discovery can be explained from the standpoint of the prevailing theory;
• extraordinary science. Crisis in science. The appearance of anomalies - inexplicable facts. An increase in the number of anomalies leads to the emergence of alternative theories. In science, many opposing scientific schools coexist;
• scientific revolution - the formation of a new paradigm.

Social activities and awards

Bibliography

In English

• Bird, Alexander. Thomas Kuhn Princeton and London: Princeton University Press and Acumen Press, 2000.
• Fuller, Steve. Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our Times(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.
• Kuhn, T.S. The Copernican Revolution. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957.
• Kuhn, T.S. The Function of Measurement in Modern Physical Science. Isis, 52(1961): 161-193.
• Kuhn, T.S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962) ISBN 0-226-45808-3
• Kuhn, T.S. "The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research". pp. 347-69 in A. C. Crombie (ed.). Scientific Change(Symposium on the History of Science, University of Oxford, 9-15 July 1961). New York and London: Basic Books and Heineman, 1963.
• Kuhn, T.S. The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change (1977)
• Kuhn, T.S. Black-Body Theory and the Quantum Discontinuity, 1894-1912. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. ISBN 0-226-45800-8
• Kuhn, T.S. The Road Since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. ISBN 0-226-45798-2

In Russian

• The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
• The Essential Tension
• Black-Body Theory and Quantum Discontinuity, 1894-1912.

see also

Links

• Biography of T. Kuhn, outline of the book “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” (English)
• Thomas Kuhn, 73; Devised Science Paradigm (Lawrence Van Gelder, New York Times, June 19, 1996) - obituary
• Thomas S. Kuhn (The Tech p9 vol 116 no 28, 26 June 1996) - obituary

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- (b. 1922), American philosopher and historian of science. He put forward the concept of scientific revolutions as a paradigm shift in the original conceptual schemes, ways of posing problems and research methods dominant in the science of a certain historical period... encyclopedic Dictionary

- (b. 1922) American philosopher and historian of science. He put forward the concept of scientific revolutions as a paradigm shift in the original conceptual schemes, ways of posing problems and research methods dominant in the science of a certain historical period.... ... Big Encyclopedic Dictionary

Kuhn, Thomas- Thomas Kuhn (born 1922), American philosopher and historian of science. In his widely acclaimed work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1963), the history of science is presented as an alternation of episodes of competitive struggle between different... ... Illustrated Encyclopedic Dictionary

Kuhn Thomas- The structure of scientific revolutions Paradigms, “normal” and “abnormal” science Together with Lakatos, Feyerabend and Lautsan, Thomas Kuhn is one of the galaxy of famous post-Popperian epistemologists who developed the concept of the history of science. In the famous... ... Western philosophy from its origins to the present day

- (Kuhn, Thomas Samuel) (1922 1996), American historian and philosopher of science. Born July 18, 1922 in Cincinnati (Ohio). He studied theoretical physics at Harvard University, where he defended his doctoral dissertation in 1949. He taught from 1949 in... ... Collier's Encyclopedia

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Philosophical viewsT.Kuna

Introduction

The progress of science and technology in the 20th century has confronted the methodology and history of science with the urgent problem of analyzing the nature and structure of those fundamental, qualitative changes in scientific knowledge, which are commonly called revolutions in science. In Western philosophy and the history of science, interest in this problem was caused by the appearance of Thomas Kuhn’s acclaimed work “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” in the 70s. T. Kuhn's book aroused great interest not only among historians of science, but also philosophers, sociologists, psychologists who study scientific creativity, and many natural scientists from around the world.

The book presents a rather controversial view of the development of science. At first glance, Kuhn does not discover anything new; many authors have spoken about the presence of normal and revolutionary periods in the development of science. But they could not find a reasoned answer to the questions: “What is the difference between small, gradual, quantitative changes and fundamental, qualitative changes, including revolutionary ones?”, “How do these fundamental shifts mature and are prepared in the previous period?” It is no coincidence that the history of science is often presented as a simple list of facts and discoveries. With this approach, progress in science is reduced to the simple accumulation and growth of scientific knowledge (cumulation), as a result of which the internal patterns of changes occurring in the process of cognition are not revealed. Kuhn criticizes this cumulative approach in his book, contrasting it with his concept of the development of science through periodically occurring revolutions.

Briefly, Kuhn's theory is as follows: periods of quiet development (periods of “normal science”) are replaced by a crisis, which can be resolved by a revolution that replaces the dominant paradigm. By paradigm, Kuhn understands a generally accepted set of concepts, theories and research methods that provides the scientific community with a model for posing problems and their solutions.

As an attempt to visualize the theory under consideration, the reader is offered a schematic diagram of the development of science according to Kuhn. Further presentation follows the path of revealing the concepts and processes depicted in the diagram.

1. Biography T. Kuon

kun scientific knowledge philosophical

Thomas Samuel Kuhn - July 18, 1922, Cincinnati, Ohio - June 17, 1996, Cambridge, Massachusetts) - American historian and philosopher of science who believed that scientific knowledge develops in leaps and bounds through scientific revolutions. Any criterion makes sense only within the framework of a certain paradigm, a historically established system of views. A scientific revolution is a change in psychological paradigms by the scientific community.

Thomas Kuhn was born in Cincinnati, Ohio to Samuel L. Kuhn, an industrial engineer, and Minette Struck Kuhn.

1943 - Graduated from Harvard University and received a bachelor's degree in physics.

During World War II, he was assigned to civilian work in the Bureau of Scientific Research and Development.

1946 - Received a master's degree in physics from Harvard.

1947 - the beginning of the formation of the main theses: “structure of scientific revolutions” and “paradigm”.

1948-1956 - held various teaching positions at Harvard; taught history of science.

1949 - defended his dissertation in physics at Harvard.

1957 - taught at Princeton.

1961 - worked as a professor of the history of science at the department of the University of California at Berkeley.

1964-1979 - worked at the university department at Princeton, teaching history and philosophy of science.

1979-1991 - Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

1983-1991 - Lawrence S. Rockefeller Professor of Philosophy at the same institute.

1991 - retired.

1994 - Kuhn was diagnosed with bronchial cancer.

1996 - Thomas Kuhn died.

Kuhn was married twice. First with Catherine Moose (with whom he had three children), and then with Jeanne Barton.

2. Scientific activities

Thomas Kuhn's most famous work is considered to be “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” (1962), which discusses the theory that science should be perceived not as gradually developing and accumulating knowledge towards truth, but as a phenomenon passing through periodic revolutions, called his terminology is “paradigm shifts.” The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was originally published as an article for the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. The enormous influence that Kuhn’s research had can be assessed by the revolution that it provoked even in the thesaurus of the history of science: in addition to the concept of “paradigm change,” Kuhn gave a broader meaning to the word “paradigm” used in linguistics and introduced the term “normal science” to define the relatively routine daily work of scientists operating within a paradigm, and largely influenced the use of the term "scientific revolutions" as periodic events occurring at different times in various scientific disciplines - as opposed to the single "Scientific Revolution" of the later Renaissance.

In France, Kuhn’s concept began to be correlated with the theories of Michel Foucault (the terms “paradigm” of Kuhn and “episteme” of Foucault) and Louis Althusser were correlated, although they were rather concerned with the historical “conditions of the possible” of scientific discourse. (In fact, Foucault's worldview was shaped by the theories of Gaston Bachelard, who independently developed a view of the history of science similar to Kunn's.) Unlike Kuhn, who views different paradigms as incomparable, according to Althusser, science has a cumulative nature, although this cumulative and discrete.

Kuhn's work is widely used in social sciences ah - for example, in the post-positivist-positivist discussion within the framework of the theory of international relations.

3. Stages of scientific roarresolutions

The progress of the scientific revolution according to Kuhn:

normal science- every new discovery can be explained from the standpoint of the prevailing theory;

extraordinary science. Crisis in science. The appearance of anomalies - inexplicable facts. An increase in the number of anomalies leads to the emergence of alternative theories. In science, many opposing scientific schools coexist;

scientific revolution- formation of a new paradigm.

4. Social activities and awards

Kuhn was a member of the National Academy of Sciences, the American Philosophical Society, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

In 1982, Professor Kuhn was awarded the George Sarton Medal for the History of Science.

He held honorary titles from many scientific and educational institutions, including the University of Notre Dame, Columbia and Chicago Universities, the University of Padua and the University of Athens.

5. Byconcept of paradigm

According to Thomas Kuhn's definition in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, a scientific revolution is an epistemological paradigm shift.

“By paradigms I mean universally recognized scientific achievements that, over time, provide a model for the formulation of problems and their solutions to the scientific community.” (T. Kuhn)

According to Kuhn, a scientific revolution occurs when scientists discover anomalies that cannot be explained by the universally accepted paradigm within which scientific progress has previously occurred. From Kuhn's point of view, a paradigm should be considered not just as a current theory, but as a whole worldview in which it exists along with all the conclusions made thanks to it.

At least three aspects of the paradigm can be distinguished:

Paradigm- this is the most general picture of the rational structure of nature, a worldview;

Paradigm is a disciplinary matrix that characterizes a set of beliefs, values, technical means etc., which unite specialists in a given scientific community;

Paradigm is a generally accepted example, a template for solving puzzle problems. (Later, due to the fact that this concept of a paradigm caused an interpretation that was inadequate to the one given to it by Kuhn, he replaced it with the term “disciplinary matrix” and thereby further alienated this concept in content from the concept of theory and more closely linked it with the mechanical the work of a scientist in accordance with certain rules.)

6 . Theory of scientific revolutionsT. Kuna

T. Kuhn's work “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”, this work examines sociocultural and psychological factors in the activities of both individual scientists and research teams.

T. Kuhn believes that the development of science is a process of alternating alternation between two periods - “normal science” and “scientific revolutions”. Moreover, the latter are much more rare in the history of the development of science compared to the former. The socio-psychological nature of T. Kuhn’s concept is determined by his understanding of the scientific community, whose members share a certain paradigm, adherence to which is determined by his position in a given social organization of science, the principles adopted during his training and development as a scientist, sympathies, aesthetic motives and tastes. It is these factors, according to T. Kuhn, that become the basis of the scientific community.

The central place in T. Kuhn's concept is occupied by the concept of a paradigm, or a set of the most general ideas and methodological guidelines in science, recognized by a given scientific community. The paradigm has two properties: 1) it is accepted by the scientific community as a basis for further work; 2) it contains variable questions, i.e. opens up space for researchers. A paradigm is the beginning of any science; it provides the possibility of targeted selection of facts and their interpretation. The paradigm, according to Kuhn, or the “disciplinary matrix”, as he proposed to call it later, includes four types of the most important components: 1) “symbolic generalizations” - those expressions that are used by members of a scientific group without doubts and disagreements, which can be put into logical form, 2) “metaphysical parts of paradigms” such as: “heat is the kinetic energy of the parts that make up the body,” 3) values, for example, concerning predictions, quantitative predictions should be preferred to qualitative ones, 4) generally accepted models.

All these components of the paradigm are perceived by members of the scientific community in the process of their training, the role of which in the formation of the scientific community is emphasized by Kuhn, and become the basis of their activities during periods of “normal science”. During the period of “normal science,” scientists deal with the accumulation of facts, which Kuhn divides into three types: 1) a clan of facts that are especially indicative of revealing the essence of things. Research in this case consists of clarifying the facts and recognizing them in a wider range of situations, 2) facts that, although not of great interest in themselves, can be directly compared with the predictions of the paradigmatic theory, 3) empirical work that is undertaken to develop paradigm theory.

However, scientific activity in general does not end there. The development of “normal science” within the framework of the accepted paradigm continues until the existing paradigm loses its ability to solve scientific problems. At one of the stages of development of “normal science,” a discrepancy between observations and predictions of the paradigm inevitably arises, and anomalies arise. When enough such anomalies accumulate, the normal flow of science stops and a state of crisis sets in, which is resolved by a scientific revolution, leading to the breaking of the old and the creation of a new scientific theory - paradigm.

Kuhn believes that choosing a theory to serve as a new paradigm is not a logical problem: “Neither with the help of logic nor with the help of probability theory is it possible to convince those who refuse to enter the circle. The logical premises and values ​​common to the two camps in debates about paradigms are not broad enough for this. Both in political revolutions and in the choice of paradigm, there is no higher authority than the consent of the relevant community.” As a paradigm, the scientific community chooses the theory that seems to ensure the “normal” functioning of science. A change in fundamental theories looks like an entry into a new world for a scientist, in which there are completely different objects, conceptual systems, and other problems and tasks are discovered: “Paradigms generally cannot be corrected within the framework of normal science. Instead...normal science ends up only leading to awareness of anomalies and crises. And the latter are resolved not as a result of reflection and interpretation, but due to some degree of unexpected and non-structural event, like a gestalt switch. After this event, scientists often speak of "the scales falling from our eyes" or of an "epiphany" that illuminates a previously perplexing puzzle, thereby adjusting its components to be seen from a new perspective, allowing the solution to be achieved for the first time." Thus, the scientific revolution as a change of paradigms cannot be explained rationally, because the essence of the matter is in the professional well-being of the scientific community: either the community has the means to solve the puzzle, or it does not - then the community creates them.

Kuhn considers the opinion that the new paradigm includes the old one as a special case to be erroneous. Kuhn puts forward the thesis about the incommensurability of paradigms. When a paradigm changes, the whole world of a scientist changes, since there is no objective language of scientific observation. The scientist's perception will always be influenced by the paradigm.

Apparently, T. Kuhn's greatest merit is that he found a new approach to revealing the nature of science and its progress. Unlike K. Popper, who believes that the development of science can be explained based only on logical rules, Kuhn introduces a “human” factor into this problem, attracting new, social and psychological motives to its solution.

T. Kuhn's book gave rise to many discussions, both in Soviet and Western literature. One of them is analyzed in detail in the article, which will be used for further discussion. According to the authors of the article, both the concept of “normal science” put forward by T. Kuhn and his interpretation of scientific revolutions were subjected to sharp criticism.

In criticism of T. Kuhn's understanding of “normal science,” three directions are distinguished. Firstly, this is a complete denial of the existence of such a phenomenon as “normal science” in scientific activity. This point of view is shared by J. Watkins. He believes that science would not have moved forward if the main form of activity of scientists was “normal science.” In his opinion, such a boring and unheroic activity as “normal science” does not exist at all, and revolution cannot grow from Kuhn’s “normal science”.

The second direction in the criticism of “normal science” is represented by Karl Popper. He, unlike Watkins, does not deny the existence of a period of “normal research” in science, but believes that between “normal science” and the scientific revolution there is no such significant difference as Kuhn points out. In his opinion, Kuhn's “normal science” is not only not normal, but also poses a danger to the very existence of science. The “normal” scientist in Kuhn’s view evokes a feeling of pity in Popper: he was poorly trained, he was not accustomed to critical thinking, he was made into a dogmatist, he is a victim of doctrinaire. Popper believes that although a scientist usually works within the framework of some theory, if he wishes, he can go beyond this framework. True, he will find himself within a different framework, but they will be better and wider.

Kuhn's third line of criticism of normal science assumes that normal research exists, that it is not fundamental to science as a whole, and that it also does not represent such an evil as Popper believes. In general, one should not attribute too much importance, either positive or negative, to normal science. Stephen Toulmin, for example, believes that scientific revolutions do not happen very rarely in science, and science generally does not develop only through the accumulation of knowledge. Scientific revolutions are not at all “dramatic” interruptions in the “normal” continuous functioning of science. Instead, it becomes a “unit of measurement” within the process of scientific development itself. For Toulmin, revolution is less revolutionary and “normal science” less cumulative than for Kuhn.

No less objection was raised by T. Kuhn's understanding of scientific revolutions. Criticism in this direction boils down primarily to accusations of irrationalism. The most active opponent of T. Kuhn in this direction is Karl Popper's follower I. Lakatos. He claims, for example, that T. Kuhn “excludes any possibility of rational reconstruction of knowledge”, that from the point of view of T. Kuhn there is a psychology of discovery, but not logic, that T. Kuhn drew “in highest degree an original picture of the irrational replacement of one rational authority by another.”

As can be seen from the above discussion, T. Kuhn’s critics focused mainly on his understanding of “normal science” and the problem of a rational, logical explanation of the transition from old ideas to new ones.

As a result of the discussion of T. Kuhn's concept, most of his opponents formed their models of scientific development and their understanding of scientific revolutions.

Conclusion

T. Kuhn's concept of scientific revolutions is a rather controversial view of the development of science. At first glance, T. Kuhn does not discover anything new; many authors have spoken about the presence of normal and revolutionary periods in the development of science. What is the peculiarity of T. Kuhn’s philosophical views on the development of scientific knowledge?

Firstly, T. Kuhn presents a holistic concept of the development of science, and is not limited to describing certain events from the history of science. This concept breaks decisively with a number of old traditions in the philosophy of science.

Secondly, in his concept, T. Kuhn decisively rejects positivism, the dominant trend in the philosophy of science since the end of the 19th century. In contrast to the positivist position, T. Kuhn’s focus is not on the analysis of ready-made structures of scientific knowledge, but on the disclosure of the mechanism of development of science, i.e., essentially, the study of the movement of scientific knowledge.

Thirdly, in contrast to the widespread cumulative view of science, T. Kuhn does not believe that science develops along the path of increasing knowledge. In his theory, the accumulation of knowledge is allowed only at the stage of normal science.

Fourthly, the scientific revolution, according to T. Kuhn, changing the view of nature, does not lead to progress associated with an increase in the objective truth of scientific knowledge. He omits the question of the qualitative relationship between the old and new paradigms: is the new paradigm that replaced the old one better in terms of progress in scientific knowledge? The new paradigm, from the point of view of T. Kuhn, is no better than the old one.

When presenting the concept of scientific revolutions, some interesting arguments by T. Kuhn about textbooks and scientific groups, which are not directly related to the topic of the essay, are omitted.

Bibliography

1. T. Kuhn. The structure of scientific revolutions. M., Progress, 1975.

2. G.I. Ruzavin. On the features of scientific revolutions in mathematics // In the book: Methodological analysis of the laws of development of mathematics, M., 1989, p. 180-193.

3. G.I. Ruzavin. Dialectics of mathematical knowledge and revolution in its development // In the book: Methodological analysis of mathematical theories, M., 1987, p. 6-22.

4. I.S. Kuznetsova. Epistemological problems of mathematical knowledge. L., 1984.

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My friends and colleagues sometimes ask me why I write about certain books. At first glance, this choice may seem random. Especially considering the very wide range of topics. However, there is still a pattern. Firstly, I have “favorite” topics on which I read a lot: theory of constraints, systems approach, management accounting, Austrian School of Economics, Nassim Taleb, Alpina Publisher... Secondly, in the books that I like, I pay attention to the authors’ links and the bibliography.

So it is with Thomas Kuhn’s book, which, in principle, is far from my topic. It was Stephen Covey who first gave a “tip” to her. Here is what he writes in: “The term paradigm shift was first coined by Thomas Kuhn in his famous book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.” Kuhn shows that almost every significant breakthrough in science begins with a break with tradition, old thinking, old paradigms."

The second time I came across a mention of Thomas Kuhn was from Mikael Krogerus in: “Models clearly demonstrate to us that everything in the world is interconnected, they advise how to act in a given situation, they suggest what it is better not to do. Adam Smith knew about this and warned against excessive enthusiasm for abstract systems. After all, models are, after all, a matter of faith. If you're lucky, you can get a Nobel Prize for your statement, like Albert Einstein. The historian and philosopher Thomas Kuhn concluded that science mostly works only to confirm existing models and is ignorant when the world once again does not fit into them.”

And finally, Thomas Corbett in his book, speaking about paradigm change in management accounting, writes: “Thomas Kuhn identifies two categories of “revolutionaries”: (1) young people who have just completed training, have studied the paradigm, but have not applied it in practice, and (2) older people moving from one sphere of activity to another. People from both of these categories, firstly, are characterized by operational naivety in the field into which they have just moved. They do not understand many of the delicate aspects of the paradigmatic community they want to join. Secondly, they don’t know what not to do.”

So, Thomas Kuhn. The structure of scientific revolutions. – M.: AST, 2009. – 310 p.

Download a short summary in Word2007 format

Thomas Kuhn is an outstanding historian and philosopher of science of the twentieth century. His theory of scientific revolutions as a paradigm shift became the foundation of modern methodology and philosophy of science, predetermining the very understanding of science and scientific knowledge in modern society.

Chapter 1. The role of history

If science is considered as a body of facts, theories and methods collected in textbooks in circulation, then scientists are people who more or less successfully contribute to the creation of this body. The development of science in this approach is a gradual process in which facts, theories and methods add up to an ever-increasing stock of achievements, which is scientific methodology and knowledge.

When a specialist can no longer avoid anomalies that destroy the existing tradition of scientific practice, unconventional research begins, which ultimately leads the entire given branch of science to a new system of prescriptions, to a new basis for the practice of scientific research. Exceptional situations in which this change in professional regulations occurs will be considered in this work as scientific revolutions. They are additions to tradition-bound activities during the period of normal science that destroy traditions. More than once we will encounter great turning points in the development of science associated with the names of Copernicus, Newton, Lavoisier and Einstein.

Chapter 2. On the way to normal science

In this essay, the term "normal science" means research that is firmly based on one or more past scientific achievements - achievements that have been accepted for some time by a particular scientific community as the basis for its future practice. Nowadays such achievements are presented, although rarely in their original form, in textbooks - elementary or advanced. These textbooks explain the essence of the accepted theory, illustrate many or all of its successful applications, and compare these applications with typical observations and experiments. Before such textbooks became widespread, which happened at the beginning of the 19th century (and even later for the newly emerging sciences), a similar function was performed by the famous classical works of scientists: Aristotle’s Physics, Ptolemy’s Almagest, Newton’s Principia and Optics , “Electricity” by Franklin, “Chemistry” by Lavoisier, “Geology” by Lyell and many others. For a long time, they implicitly determined the legitimacy of the problems and methods of research in each field of science for subsequent generations of scientists. This was possible thanks to two significant features of these works. Their creation was sufficiently unprecedented to attract a long-lasting group of supporters from competing areas of scientific research. At the same time, they were open enough that new generations of scientists could find unsolved problems of any kind within their framework.

Advances that have these two characteristics I will henceforth call “paradigms,” a term closely related to the concept of “normal science.” In introducing this term, I meant that certain generally accepted examples of the actual practice of scientific research - examples that include law, theory, their practical application and the necessary equipment - all together provide us with models from which specific traditions of scientific research arise.

The formation of a paradigm and the emergence on its basis of a more esoteric type of research is a sign of the maturity of the development of any scientific discipline. If the historian traces the development of scientific knowledge about any group of related phenomena back into the depths of time, he is likely to encounter a repetition in miniature of the model which is illustrated in this essay by examples from the history of physical optics. Modern physics textbooks tell students that light is a stream of photons, that is, quantum mechanical entities that exhibit some wave properties and at the same time some particle properties. The investigation proceeds in accordance with these ideas, or rather in accordance with a more elaborate and mathematical description from which this ordinary verbal description is derived. This understanding of light, however, has a history of no more than half a century. Before it was developed by Planck, Einstein and others at the beginning of this century, physics textbooks taught that light was the propagation of transverse waves. This concept was a derivation from a paradigm that ultimately goes back to the work of Jung and Fresnel on optics dating back to the early 19th century. At the same time, the wave theory was not the first, which was accepted by almost all optics researchers. During the 18th century, the paradigm in this field was based on Newton's “Optics,” which argued that light was a stream of material particles. At the time, physicists were looking for evidence of the pressure of light particles hitting solids; early adherents new theory did not strive for this at all.

These transformations of physical optics paradigms are scientific revolutions, and the sequential transition from one paradigm to another through revolution is the usual pattern of development of mature science.

When an individual scientist can accept a paradigm without proof, he does not have to rebuild the entire field from scratch in his work and justify the introduction of each new concept. This can be left to textbook authors. The results of his research will no longer be presented in books addressed, like Franklin's Experiments ... on Electricity or Darwin's Origin of Species, to anyone who is interested in the subject of their research. Instead, they tend to appear in short articles intended only for fellow professionals, only for those who presumably know the paradigm and happen to be able to read the articles addressed to it.

Since prehistoric times, one science after another has crossed the border between what a historian can call the prehistory of a given science as a science, and its history itself.

Chapter 3. The nature of normal science

If a paradigm is a job that is done once and for everyone, then the question is, what problems does it leave for a given group to solve later? The concept of paradigm means an accepted model or pattern. Like a decision made by a court within the framework of general law, it represents an object for further development and concretization in new or more difficult conditions.

Paradigms gain their status because their use is more likely to achieve success than competing approaches to solving some of the problems that the research team recognizes as most pressing. The success of a paradigm initially represents mainly the opening prospect of success in solving a number of problems of a special kind. Normal science consists of realizing this perspective as the knowledge of facts partially outlined within the paradigm expands.

Few who are not actually researchers in mature science realize how much routine work of this kind goes on within a paradigm, or how attractive such work can be. It is the establishment of order that most scientists are engaged in during their scientific activities. This is what I call normal science here. It seems as if they are trying to “squeeze” nature into a paradigm, as if into a pre-built and rather cramped box. The goal of normal science in no way requires the prediction of new kinds of phenomena: phenomena that do not fit into this box are often, in fact, completely overlooked. Scientists in the mainstream of normal science do not set themselves the goal of creating new theories; moreover, they are usually intolerant of the creation of such theories by others. On the contrary, research in normal science is aimed at developing those phenomena and theories whose existence the paradigm obviously assumes.

The paradigm forces scientists to study some fragment of nature in such detail and depth as would be unthinkable under other circumstances. And normal science has its own mechanism for relaxing these limitations, which make themselves felt in the process of research whenever the paradigm from which they stem ceases to serve effectively. From this moment on, scientists begin to change their tactics. The nature of the problems they study also changes. However, until this point, as long as the paradigm is functioning successfully, the professional community will be solving problems that its members could hardly imagine and, in any case, would never be able to solve if they did not have the paradigm.

There is a class of facts that, as evidenced by the paradigm, are especially indicative of revealing the essence of things. By using these facts to solve problems, the paradigm creates a tendency to refine them and to recognize them in an ever-widening range of situations. From Tycho Brahe to E. O. Lorenz, some scientists have earned their reputations as great not for the novelty of their discoveries, but for the accuracy, reliability, and breadth of methods they developed to clarify previously known categories of facts.

Enormous efforts and ingenuity aimed at bringing theory and nature into ever closer correspondence with each other. These attempts to prove such correspondence constitute the second type of normal experimental activity, and this type depends on the paradigm even more clearly than the first. The existence of a paradigm obviously presupposes that the problem is solvable.

For a comprehensive idea of ​​the activity of accumulating facts in normal science, one should point, as I think, to a third class of experiments and observations. It presents the empirical work that is being undertaken to develop a paradigmatic theory in order to resolve some remaining ambiguities and improve solutions to problems that have previously been only superficially addressed. This class is the most important of all the others.

Examples of work in this direction include the determination of the universal gravitational constant, Avogadro's number, the Joule coefficient, the charge of the electron, etc. Very few of these carefully prepared attempts could have been made, and none of them would have borne fruit without a paradigmatic a theory that formulated a problem and guaranteed the existence of a specific solution.

Efforts aimed at developing a paradigm may be aimed, for example, at the discovery of quantitative laws: Boyle's law, which relates the pressure of a gas to its volume, Coulomb's law of electrical attraction, and Joule's formula, which relates the heat emitted by a conductor carrying a current to the strength of the current and resistance. Quantitative laws arise through the development of a paradigm. In fact, there is such a general and close connection between the qualitative paradigm and the quantitative law that, after Galileo, such laws were often correctly guessed using the paradigm many years before the instruments for their experimental detection were created.

From Euler and Lagrange in the 18th century to Hamilton, Jacobi, and Hertz in the 19th century, many of the brightest European specialists in mathematical physics have repeatedly tried to reformulate theoretical mechanics so as to give it a form that is more satisfactory from a logical and aesthetic point of view, without changing its fundamental content. In other words, they wanted to present the explicit and implicit ideas of the Principia and the whole of continental mechanics in a logically more coherent version, one that was both more unified and less ambiguous in its applications to the newly developed problems of mechanics.

Or another example: the same researchers who, in order to mark the boundary between different theories of heating, carried out experiments by increasing pressure, were, as a rule, those who proposed various options for comparison. They worked with both facts and theories, and their work produced not just new information, but also a more accurate paradigm by removing the ambiguities hidden in the original form of the paradigm with which they worked. In many disciplines, much of the work that falls within the realm of normal science consists of just this.

These three classes of problems - the establishment of significant facts, the comparison of facts and theory, the development of theory - exhaust, as I think, the field of normal science, both empirical and theoretical. Work within the paradigm cannot proceed differently, and to abandon the paradigm would mean to stop the scientific research that it defines. We will soon show what causes scientists to abandon the paradigm. Such paradigm shifts represent the moments when scientific revolutions occur.

Chapter 4. Normal Science as Puzzle Solving

By mastering a paradigm, the scientific community has a criterion for selecting problems that can be considered in principle solvable as long as the paradigm is accepted without proof. To a large extent, these are only those problems that the community recognizes as scientific or worthy of attention by members of that community. Other problems, including many previously considered standard, are dismissed as metaphysical, as belonging to another discipline, or sometimes simply because they are too dubious to waste time on. The paradigm in this case may even isolate the community from those socially important problems that cannot be reduced to a type of puzzle, since they cannot be represented in terms of the conceptual and instrumental apparatus assumed by the paradigm. Such problems are seen only as distracting the researcher's attention from the real problems.

A problem classified as a puzzle must be characterized by more than just having a guaranteed solution. There must also be rules that limit both the nature of acceptable solutions and the steps by which those solutions are reached.

After about 1630, and especially after the appearance of the scientific works of Descartes, which had an unusually great influence, most physical scientists accepted that the universe consists of microscopic particles, corpuscles, and that all natural phenomena can be explained in terms of corpuscular forms, corpuscular dimensions, motion and interactions. This set of prescriptions turned out to be both metaphysical and methodological. As a metaphysical, he pointed out to physicists which types of entities actually exist in the Universe and which do not: there is only matter that has a form and is in motion. As a methodological set of prescriptions, he indicated to physicists what the final explanations and fundamental laws should be: the laws should determine the nature of corpuscular motion and interaction, and the explanations should reduce any given natural phenomenon to a corpuscular mechanism that obeys these laws.

The existence of such a tightly defined network of prescriptions—conceptual, instrumental, and methodological—provides the basis for the metaphor that likens normal science to puzzle solving. Since this network provides rules that indicate to the researcher in the field of mature science what the world and the science studying it are like, he can calmly concentrate his efforts on the esoteric problems determined for him by these rules and existing knowledge.

Chapter 5. Priority of paradigms

Paradigms can determine the character of normal science without the interference of discoverable rules. The first reason is the extreme difficulty of discovering the rules that guide scientists within particular traditions of normal research. These difficulties are reminiscent of the difficult situation that a philosopher faces when trying to figure out what all games have in common. The second reason is rooted in the nature of science education. For example, if a student studying Newtonian dynamics ever discovers the meaning of the terms “force,” “mass,” “space,” and “time,” he will be helped in this not so much by incomplete, although generally useful, definitions in textbooks, how much observation and application of these concepts in solving problems.

Normal science can develop without rules only as long as the corresponding scientific community accepts, without a doubt, the already achieved solutions to certain particular problems. Rules must therefore gradually become fundamental, and the characteristic indifference to them must disappear whenever confidence in paradigms or models is lost. It's interesting that this is exactly what happens. As long as paradigms remain in force, they can function without any rationalization and regardless of whether attempts are made to rationalize them.

Chapter 6. Anomaly and the emergence of scientific discoveries

In science, a discovery is always accompanied by difficulties, meets resistance, and is established contrary to the basic principles on which the expectation is based. At first, only what is expected and normal is perceived, even under circumstances in which an anomaly is later discovered. However, further familiarization leads to the awareness of some errors or to the discovery of a connection between the result and what preceded it led to the error. This awareness of the anomaly initiates a period in which conceptual categories are adjusted until the resulting anomaly becomes the expected outcome. Why can normal science, not directly striving for new discoveries and even intending at first to suppress them, nevertheless be a constantly effective instrument in generating these discoveries?

In the development of any science, the first generally accepted paradigm is usually considered quite acceptable for most of the observations and experiments available to specialists in the field. Therefore, further development, usually requiring the creation of a carefully developed technique, is the development of an esoteric vocabulary and skill and the clarification of concepts whose similarity with their prototypes taken from the field common sense, is continuously decreasing. Such professionalization leads, on the one hand, to a strong limitation of the scientist’s field of vision and to stubborn resistance to any changes in the paradigm. Science is becoming more rigorous. On the other hand, within those areas to which the paradigm directs the efforts of the group, normal science leads to the accumulation of detailed information and to a refinement of correspondence between observation and theory that could not be achieved otherwise. The more accurate and developed the paradigm, the more sensitive an indicator it is for detecting an anomaly, thereby leading to a change in the paradigm. In a normal discovery pattern, even resistance to change is beneficial. While ensuring that the paradigm is not thrown away too easily, resistance also ensures that the attention of scientists cannot be easily diverted and that only anomalies that permeate scientific knowledge to the core will lead to paradigm change.

Chapter 7. The crisis and the emergence of scientific theories

The emergence of new theories is usually preceded by a period of pronounced professional uncertainty. Perhaps such uncertainty arises from the persistent failure of normal science to solve its puzzles to the extent that it should. The failure of existing rules is a prelude to the search for new ones.

The new theory appears as a direct response to the crisis.

Philosophers of science have repeatedly shown that it is always possible to construct more than one theoretical construct from the same set of data. The history of science shows that, especially in the early stages of the development of a new paradigm, it is not very difficult to create such alternatives. But such invention of alternatives is precisely the kind of means that scientists rarely resort to. As long as the means presented by a paradigm allow one to successfully solve the problems generated by it, science advances most successfully and penetrates to the deepest level of phenomena, confidently using these means. The reason for this is clear. As in production, in science, changing tools is an extreme measure, which is resorted to only when truly necessary. The significance of crises lies precisely in the fact that they indicate the timeliness of changing tools.

Chapter 8. Response to the crisis

Crises are a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of new theories. Let's see how scientists react to their existence. A partial answer, as obvious as it is important, can be obtained by first considering what scientists never do when faced with even strong and long-lasting anomalies. Although they may gradually lose confidence in previous theories from that point on and then think about alternatives to overcome the crisis, they never easily give up the paradigm that plunged them into the crisis. In other words, they do not treat anomalies as counterexamples. Having once achieved the status of a paradigm, a scientific theory is declared invalid only if an alternative version is suitable to take its place. There is not yet a single process revealed by the study of the history of scientific development, which as a whole would resemble the methodological stereotype of refuting a theory through its direct comparison with nature. A judgment that leads a scientist to abandon a previously accepted theory is always based on something more than a comparison of the theory with the world around us. The decision to abandon a paradigm is always simultaneously a decision to accept another paradigm, and the judgment leading to such a decision involves both a comparison of both paradigms with nature and a comparison of the paradigms with each other.

Moreover, there is a second reason to doubt that a scientist abandons paradigms due to encountering anomalies or counterexamples. Defenders of the theory will invent countless ad hoc interpretations and modifications of their theories in order to eliminate the apparent contradiction.

Some scientists, although history will hardly remember their names, were no doubt forced to leave science because they could not cope with the crisis. Like artists, creative scientists must sometimes be able to survive difficult times in a world that is falling into disarray.

Any crisis begins with a doubt in the paradigm and the subsequent loosening of the rules of normal research. All crises end in one of three possible outcomes. Sometimes normal science eventually proves capable of solving the problem causing the crisis, despite the despair of those who saw it as the end of the existing paradigm. In other cases, even apparently radical new approaches do not improve the situation. Then scientists may come to the conclusion that, given the current state of affairs in their field of study, there is no solution to the problem in sight. The problem is labeled accordingly and left aside as a legacy for a future generation in the hope that it will be solved using better methods. Finally, there may be a case that will be of particular interest to us when the crisis is resolved with the emergence of a new contender for the place of the paradigm and the subsequent struggle for its acceptance.

The transition from a paradigm in a period of crisis to a new paradigm from which a new tradition of normal science can be born is a process far from cumulative and not one that could be achieved through a more precise elaboration or expansion of the old paradigm. This process is more like a reconstruction of a field on new grounds, a reconstruction that changes some of the field's most basic theoretical generalizations and many of the paradigm's methods and applications. During the transition period, there is a large, but never complete coincidence of problems that can be solved with the help of both the old paradigm and the new one. However, there is a striking difference in the solution methods. By the time the transition ends, the professional scientist will have already changed his point of view about the field of study, its methods and goals.

Almost always, the people who successfully carry out the fundamental development of a new paradigm were either very young or new to the field whose paradigm they transformed. And perhaps this point does not need clarification, since, obviously, they, being little connected by previous practice with the traditional rules of normal science, may most likely see that the rules are no longer suitable, and begin to select another system of rules that can replace the previous one .

When faced with an anomaly or crisis, scientists take different positions in relation to existing paradigms, and the nature of their research changes accordingly. The proliferation of competing options, the willingness to try something else, the expression of obvious dissatisfaction, the recourse to philosophy and the discussion of fundamental principles are all symptoms of the transition from normal to extraordinary research. It is on the existence of these symptoms, more than on revolutions, that the concept of normal science rests.

Chapter 9. The nature and necessity of scientific revolutions

Scientific revolutions are considered here as such Not cumulative episodes in the development of science during which the old paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by a new paradigm that is incompatible with the old one. Why should a paradigm change be called a revolution? Given the broad, essential difference between political and scientific development, what parallelism can justify a metaphor that finds revolution in both?

Political revolutions begin with a growing consciousness (often limited to some part of the political community) that existing institutions have ceased to adequately respond to the problems posed by the environment that they themselves partly created. Scientific revolutions, in much the same way, begin with a growing consciousness, again often limited to a narrow subdivision of the scientific community, that the existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately in the study of that aspect of nature to which that paradigm itself previously paved the way. In both political and scientific development, awareness of a dysfunction that can lead to a crisis constitutes a precondition for revolution.

Political revolutions aim to change political institutions in ways that those institutions themselves prohibit. Therefore, the success of revolutions forces us to partially abandon a number of institutions in favor of others. Society is divided into warring camps or parties; one party is trying to defend the old social institutions, others are trying to establish some new ones. When this polarization occurred, a political way out of this situation turns out to be impossible. Like the choice between competing political institutions, the choice between competing paradigms turns out to be a choice between incompatible models of community life. When paradigms, as they should, become involved in debates about the choice of paradigm, the question of their meaning is necessarily caught in a vicious circle: each group uses its own paradigm to argue in favor of that same paradigm.

Issues of choosing a paradigm can never be clearly resolved solely by logic and experiment.

The development of science could be truly cumulative. New kinds of phenomena might simply reveal order in some aspect of nature where no one had noticed it before. In the evolution of science, new knowledge would replace ignorance, and not knowledge of a different and incompatible type with the previous one. But if the emergence of new theories is driven by the need to resolve anomalies with respect to existing theories in their relation to nature, then a successful new theory must make predictions that differ from those derived from previous theories. Such a difference might not exist if both theories were logically compatible. Although the logical incorporation of one theory into another remains a valid option in the relationship between successive scientific theories, from the point of view historical research this is implausible.

The most famous and striking example associated with such a limited understanding of scientific theory is the analysis of the relationship between modern dynamics Einstein and the old equations of dynamics that followed from Newton's Principia. From the point of view of this work, these two theories are completely incompatible in the same sense in which the astronomy of Copernicus and Ptolemy was shown to be incompatible: Einstein's theory can only be accepted if it is recognized that Newton's theory is erroneous.

The transition from Newtonian to Einsteinian mechanics illustrates with complete clarity the scientific revolution as a change in the conceptual grid through which scientists viewed the world. Although an outdated theory can always be regarded as a special case of its modern successor, it must be transformed for this purpose. Transformation is something that can be accomplished by taking advantage of hindsight - a distinct application of more modern theory. Moreover, even if this transformation was intended to interpret an old theory, the result of its application must be a theory limited to the extent that it can only restate what is already known. Because of its parsimony, this reformulation of the theory is useful, but it may not be sufficient to guide research.

Chapter 10. Revolution as a change in view of the world

A change in paradigm forces scientists to see the world of their research problems in a different light. Since they see this world only through the prism of their views and deeds, we may want to say that after the revolution scientists are dealing with a different world. During a revolution, when the normal scientific tradition begins to change, the scientist must learn to perceive the world around him anew - in some well-known situations, he must learn to see a new gestalt. The prerequisite for perception itself is a certain stereotype, reminiscent of a paradigm. What a person sees depends on what he is looking at and on what prior visual-conceptual experience has taught him to see.

I am acutely aware of the difficulties raised by the statement that when Aristotle and Galileo looked at the vibrations of stones, the former saw a chain-restrained fall, and the latter a pendulum. Although the world does not change with a paradigm shift, the scientist works in a different world after this change. What happens during a scientific revolution cannot be reduced entirely to a new interpretation of isolated and unchangeable facts. A scientist who accepts a new paradigm acts less as an interpreter and more as a person looking through a lens that inverts the image. If a paradigm is given, then the interpretation of data is the main element of the scientific discipline that studies it. But interpretation can only develop a paradigm, not correct it. Paradigms generally cannot be corrected within the framework of normal science. Instead, as we have already seen, normal science ultimately leads only to awareness of anomalies and crises. And the latter are resolved not as a result of reflection and interpretation, but due to some degree of unexpected and non-structural event, like a gestalt switch. Following this event, scientists often speak of a “scale lifted from the eyes” or an “epiphany” that illuminates a previously perplexing puzzle, thereby adjusting its components to be seen from a new perspective, allowing the solution to be achieved for the first time.

The operations and measurements that the scientist undertakes in the laboratory are not the “ready data” of experience, but rather data “collected with great difficulty.” They are not what the scientist sees, at least not until his research bears fruit and his attention is focused on them. Rather, they are specific indications of the content of more elementary perceptions, and as such they are selected for careful analysis in the mainstream of normal research only because they promise rich possibilities for the successful development of the accepted paradigm. Operations and measurements are determined by the paradigm much more clearly than by the direct experience from which they partly derive. Science does not deal with all possible laboratory operations. Instead, it selects operations that are relevant from the point of view of matching the paradigm with the direct experience that that paradigm partially determines. As a result, scientists engage in specific laboratory operations using different paradigms. The measurements that must be made in the pendulum experiment do not correspond to the measurements in the case of a restrained fall.

No language that limits itself to describing a world known exhaustively and in advance can provide a neutral and objective description. Two people can see different things with the same retinal image. Psychology provides abundant evidence of a similar effect, and the doubts which follow from it are easily strengthened by the history of attempts to present the actual language of observation. No modern attempt to reach such an end has yet come even close to a universal language of pure perceptions. The same attempts that brought everyone closest to this goal have one general characteristics, which significantly reinforces the main theses of our essay. They assume from the very beginning the existence of a paradigm, taken either from a given scientific theory or from fragmentary reasoning from a common sense position, and then try to eliminate from the paradigm all non-logical and non-perceptual terms.

Neither the scientist nor the layman is accustomed to seeing the world in parts or point by point. Paradigms define large areas of experience simultaneously. The search for an operational definition or a pure language of observation can only begin after experience has been thus determined.

After the scientific revolution, many old measurements and operations become impractical and are replaced by others accordingly. The same test operations cannot be applied to both oxygen and dephlogisticated air. But changes of this kind are never universal. Whatever the scientist sees after the revolution, he is still looking at the same world. Moreover, much of the language apparatus, like most of the laboratory instruments, are still the same as they were before the scientific revolution, although the scientist may begin to use them in new ways. As a result, science after the revolutionary period always involves many of the same operations, carried out by the same instruments, and describes objects in the same terms as in the pre-revolutionary period.

Dalton was not a chemist and had no interest in chemistry. He was a meteorologist interested (himself) in the physical problems of absorption of gases in water and water in the atmosphere. Partly because his skills were acquired for another specialty, and partly because of his work in his specialty, he approached these problems from a paradigm that differed from that of the chemists of his day. In particular, he considered the mixture of gases or the absorption of gases in water as a physical process in which affinities played no role. For Dalton, therefore, the observed homogeneity of solutions was a problem, but a problem that he believed could be solved if it were possible to determine the relative volumes and weights of the various atomic particles in his experimental mixture. It was necessary to determine these dimensions and weights. But this problem finally forced Dalton to turn to chemistry, prompting him from the very beginning to assume that in some limited series of reactions considered as chemical, atoms could be combined only in a one-to-one ratio or in some other simple, whole-number proportion. This natural assumption helped him determine the sizes and weights of elementary particles, but it turned the law of constancy of relations into a tautology. For Dalton, any reaction whose components did not obey multiple ratios was not yet ipso facto a purely chemical process. The law, which could not be established experimentally before Dalton's work, with the recognition of this work becomes a constitutive principle by virtue of which no series of chemical measurements can be violated. After Dalton's work, the same chemical experiments as before became the basis for completely different generalizations. This event can serve for us as perhaps the best typical example of a scientific revolution.

Chapter 11. Indistinguishability of revolutions

I suppose there are extremely good reasons why revolutions are almost invisible. The purpose of textbooks is to teach the vocabulary and syntax of modern scientific language. Popular literature tends to describe the same applications in a language closer to the language of everyday life. And the philosophy of science, especially in the world speaking English language, analyzes the logical structure of the same complete knowledge. All three types of information describe the established achievements of past revolutions and thus reveal the basis of the modern tradition of normal science. To perform their function they do not require reliable information about the manner in which these foundations were first discovered and then accepted by professional scientists. Therefore, at the very least, textbooks are distinguished by features that will constantly disorient readers. Textbooks, being the pedagogical means for perpetuating normal science, must be rewritten in whole or in part whenever the language, problem structure, or standards of normal science change after each scientific revolution. And as soon as this procedure of reshaping textbooks is completed, it inevitably masks not only the role, but even the existence of the revolutions, thanks to which they saw the light.

Textbooks narrow scientists' sense of the history of a given discipline. Textbooks refer only to that part of the work of past scientists that can be easily perceived as a contribution to the formulation and solution of problems corresponding to the paradigm adopted in this textbook. Partly as a result of the selection of material, and partly as a result of its distortion, the scientists of the past are unreservedly portrayed as scientists who worked on the same range of constant problems and with the same set of canons to which the last revolution in scientific theory and method secured the prerogatives of scientism. It is not surprising that textbooks and the historical tradition they contain must be rewritten after each scientific revolution. And it is not surprising that as soon as they are rewritten, science in a new presentation each time acquires to a significant extent external signs cumulativeness.

Newton wrote that Galileo discovered the law according to which the constant force of gravity causes motion, the speed of which is proportional to the square of time. In fact, Galileo's kinematic theorem takes this form when it enters the matrix of Newton's dynamic concepts. But Galileo said nothing of the kind. His consideration of falling bodies rarely concerns forces, much less the constant gravitational force, which causes bodies to fall. By attributing to Galileo the answer to a question that Galileo's paradigm did not allow even to be asked, Newton's account obscured the impact of a small but revolutionary reformulation in the questions scientists posed about motion, as well as in the answers they thought they could accept. But this constitutes precisely the type of change in the formulation of questions and answers that explains (much better than new empirical discoveries) the transition from Aristotle to Galileo and from Galileo to Newtonian dynamics. By glossing over such changes and attempting to present the development of science in a linear manner, the textbook conceals the process that lies at the origins of most significant events in the development of science.

The preceding examples reveal, each in the context of a separate revolution, the sources of the reconstruction of history, which constantly culminates in the writing of textbooks reflecting the post-revolutionary state of science. But such “completion” leads to even more serious consequences than the false interpretations mentioned above. False interpretations make the revolution invisible: textbooks, in which the rearrangement of visible material is given, depict the development of science in the form of a process which, if it existed, would make all revolutions meaningless. Since they are designed to quickly familiarize the student with what the modern scientific community considers knowledge, textbooks interpret the various experiments, concepts, laws and theories of existing normal science as separate and following each other as continuously as possible. From a pedagogical point of view, this presentation technique is impeccable. But such a presentation, coupled with the spirit of complete unhistoricity that pervades science, and with the systematically repeated errors in the interpretation of historical facts discussed above, inevitably leads to the formation of a strong impression that science reaches its present level thanks to a series of isolated discoveries and inventions, which - when they collected together - form a system of modern concrete knowledge. At the very beginning of the development of science, as textbooks present, scientists strive for the goals that are embodied in current paradigms. One by one, in a process often compared to building a brick building, scientists are adding new facts, concepts, laws, or theories to the body of information contained in modern textbooks.

However, scientific knowledge does not develop along this path. Many of the puzzles of modern normal science did not exist until after the last scientific revolution. Very few of them can be traced back to the historical origins of the science within which they currently exist. Earlier generations explored their own problems by their own means and according to their own canons of solutions. But it's not just the problems that have changed. Rather, we can say that the entire network of facts and theories that the textbook paradigm brings into conformity with nature is undergoing replacement.

Chapter 12. Resolution of revolutions

Any new interpretation of nature, be it a discovery or a theory, arises first in the mind of one or more individuals. These are the ones who first learn to see science and the world differently, and their ability to make the transition to a new vision is facilitated by two circumstances that are not shared by most other members of the professional group. Their attention is constantly intensely focused on the problems causing the crisis; Moreover, they are usually scientists so young or new to a field in crisis that established research practice binds them less strongly to the world views and rules that are defined by the old paradigm than most of their contemporaries.

In the sciences, the operation of verification never consists, as it happens in solving puzzles, simply in comparing a particular paradigm with nature. Instead, verification is part of the competition between two rival paradigms to gain favor with the scientific community.

This formulation reveals unexpected and perhaps significant parallels with two of the most popular contemporary philosophical theories of verification. Very few philosophers of science still seek an absolute criterion for the verification of scientific theories. Noting that no theory can be subjected to all possible relevant tests, they ask not whether the theory has been verified, but rather its likelihood in light of the evidence that exists in reality, and to answer this question , one of the influential philosophical schools is forced to compare the capabilities of various theories in explaining the accumulated data.

A radically different approach to this entire set of problems was developed by K.R. Popper, who denies the existence of any verification procedures at all (see, for example,). Instead, he emphasizes the need for falsification, that is, testing that requires refuting an established theory because its result is negative. It is clear that the role thus assigned to falsification is in many ways similar to the role assigned in this work to anomalous experience, that is, experience which, by causing a crisis, prepares the way for a new theory. However, an anomalous experience cannot be identified with a falsifying experience. In fact, I even doubt whether the latter actually exists. As has been emphasized many times before, no theory ever solves all the puzzles it faces at a given time, nor has any solution ever been achieved that is completely flawless. On the contrary, it is precisely the incompleteness and imperfection of existing theoretical data that makes it possible at any time to identify many of the puzzles that characterize normal science. If every failure to establish the correspondence of a theory to nature were grounds for its refutation, then all theories could be refuted at any moment. On the other hand, if only a serious failure is sufficient to disprove a theory, then Popper's followers will require some criterion of “improbability” or “degree of falsifiability.” In developing such a criterion they will almost certainly encounter the same set of difficulties that arise among defenders of various theories of probabilistic verification.

The transition from the recognition of one paradigm to the recognition of another is an act of “conversion” in which there can be no place for coercion. Lifelong resistance, especially by those whose creative biographies are associated with a debt to the old tradition of normal science, does not constitute a violation of scientific standards, but is a characteristic feature of the nature of scientific research in itself. The source of resistance lies in the belief that the old paradigm will ultimately solve all problems, that nature can be squeezed into the framework provided by this paradigm.

How is the transition accomplished and how is resistance overcome? This question relates to the technique of persuasion or to arguments or counter-arguments in a situation where there cannot be evidence. The most common claim made by advocates of the new paradigm is the belief that they can solve the problems that brought the old paradigm into crisis. When this can be made convincingly enough, such a claim is most effective in arguing for proponents of a new paradigm. There are also other considerations that may lead scientists to abandon the old paradigm in favor of a new one. These are arguments that are rarely stated clearly, definitely, but appeal to the individual sense of convenience, to the aesthetic sense. It is believed that the new theory should be “clearer”, “more convenient” or “simpler” than the old one. The importance of aesthetic assessments can sometimes be decisive.

Chapter 13. Progress brought by revolutions

Why does progress remain constantly and almost exclusively an attribute of the type of activity that we call scientific? Note that in some sense this is a purely semantic question. To a large extent, the term “science” is precisely intended for those branches of human activity, the paths of progress of which are easily traced. Nowhere is this more evident than in the occasional debate about whether any given modern social science discipline is truly scientific. These debates have parallels in the pre-paradigm periods of those fields that today are unhesitatingly given the title “science.”

We have already noted that once a common paradigm is adopted, the scientific community is freed from the need to constantly revise its basic principles; members of such a community can concentrate exclusively on the subtlest and most esoteric phenomena that interest him. This inevitably increases both the efficiency and effectiveness with which the entire group solves new problems.

Some of these aspects are consequences of the unprecedented isolation of the mature scientific community from the demands of Not professionals and everyday life. If we touch on the question of the degree of isolation, this isolation is never complete. However, there is no other professional community where individual creative work is so directly addressed to and evaluated by other members of the professional group. It is precisely because he works only for an audience of colleagues, an audience that shares his own assessments and beliefs, that a scientist can accept a unified system of standards without proof. He doesn't have to worry about what any other groups or schools will think, and so he can put aside one problem and move on to the next faster, than those who work for a more diverse group. Unlike engineers, most doctors and most theologians, the scientist does not need to choose problems, since the latter themselves urgently demand their solution, even regardless of the means by which this solution is obtained. In this respect, thinking about the differences between natural scientists and many social scientists is quite instructive. The latter often resort (while the former almost never do) to justify their choice of research problem, be it the consequences of racial discrimination or the causes of economic cycles - mainly on the basis of the social significance of solving these problems. It is not difficult to understand when - in the first or second case - one can hope for a speedy solution to the problems.

The consequences of isolation from society are greatly amplified by another characteristic of the professional scientific community - the nature of its scientific education in preparation for participation in independent research. In music, the visual arts, and literature, one is educated by exposure to the work of other artists, especially earlier ones. Textbooks, excluding manuals and reference books on original works, play only a secondary role here. In history, philosophy and social sciences, educational literature is more important. But even in these fields, a basic university course involves parallel reading of original sources, some of which are classics of the field, others of which are modern research reports that scholars write for each other. As a result, the student studying any of these disciplines is constantly aware of the enormous variety of problems that the members of his future group intend to solve over time. More importantly, the student is constantly surrounded by multiple competing and incommensurable solutions to these problems, solutions that he must ultimately judge for himself.

In modern natural sciences, the student relies mainly on textbooks until - in the third or fourth year of an academic course - he begins his own research. If there is trust in the paradigms underlying the educational method, few scientists are eager to change it. Why, after all, should a student of physics, for example, read the works of Newton, Faraday, Einstein or Schrödinger, when everything he needs to know about these works is presented much more briefly, in a more precise and more systematic form in a variety of modern textbooks?

Every documented civilization had technology, art, religion, a political system, laws, and so on. In many cases, these aspects of civilizations were developed in the same way as in our civilization. But only a civilization that has its origins in the culture of the ancient Hellenes has a science that has truly emerged from its infancy. After all, the bulk of scientific knowledge is the result of the work of European scientists in the last four centuries. In no other place, at no other time, were special societies founded that were so scientifically productive.

When a new paradigm candidate comes along, scientists will resist accepting it until they are convinced that the two most important conditions are satisfied. First, the new candidate must appear to be solving some controversial and generally recognized problem that cannot be solved in any other way. Second, the new paradigm must promise to preserve much of the real problem-solving ability that science has accumulated through previous paradigms. Novelty for the sake of novelty is not the goal of science, as is the case in many other creative fields.

The process of development described in this essay is a process of evolution from primitive beginnings, a process whose successive stages are characterized by increasing detail and a more refined understanding of nature. But nothing that has been or will be said makes this process of evolution directed to anything. We are too accustomed to view science as an enterprise that is constantly moving closer and closer to some goal predetermined by nature.

But is such a goal necessary? If we can learn to replace "evolution toward what we hope to know" with "evolution from what we know," then many of the problems that irritate us may disappear. Perhaps the problem of induction is one of these problems.

When Darwin first published his book in 1859 outlining the theory of evolution explained by natural selection, most professionals were likely not concerned with the concept of species change or the possible descent of man from the ape. All the well-known pre-Darwinian evolutionary theories of Lamarck, Chambers, Spencer and the German natural philosophers presented evolution as goal-oriented process. The “idea” of man and of modern flora and fauna must have been present from the first creation of life, perhaps in the thoughts of God. This idea (or plan) provided the direction and guiding force for the entire evolutionary process. Each new stage evolutionary development was a more perfect implementation of a plan that had been in place from the beginning.

For many people, the refutation of this teleological type of evolution was the most significant and least pleasant of Darwin's proposals. The Origin of Species did not recognize any purpose established by God or nature. Instead, natural selection, which deals with the interaction of a given environment and the actual organisms that inhabit it, was responsible for the gradual but steady emergence of more organized, more advanced, and much more specialized organisms. Even such wonderfully adapted organs as the eyes and hands of man - organs whose creation in the first place provided powerful arguments in defense of the idea of ​​​​the existence of a supreme creator and a primordial plan - turned out to be the products of a process that steadily developed from primitive beginnings, but not in the direction towards some goal. The belief that natural selection, resulting from simple competition between organisms for survival, was able to create man, along with highly developed animals and plants, was the most difficult and troubling aspect of Darwin's theory. What could the concepts of “evolution”, “development” and “progress” mean in the absence of a specific goal? For many, such terms seemed self-contradictory.

An analogy that relates the evolution of organisms to the evolution of scientific ideas can easily go too far. But it is quite suitable for considering the questions of this final section. The process described in Section XII as the resolution of revolutions is the selection, through conflict within the scientific community, of the most suitable mode of future scientific activity. The net result of such revolutionary selection, determined by periods of normal research, is the wonderfully adapted set of instruments which we call modern scientific knowledge. Successive stages in this developmental process are marked by increasing specificity and specialization.

1969 addition

There are scientific schools, that is, communities that approach the same subject from incompatible points of view . But in science this happens much less often than in other areas of human activity.; such schools always compete with each other, but the competition usually ends quickly.

One of the fundamental aids by which members of a group, whether of a whole civilization or a community of specialists included in it, are trained to see the same things, given the same stimuli, is to be shown examples of situations which their predecessors in the group have already learned to see similar to one another and dissimilar to situations of a different kind.

When using the term vision interpretation begins where perception ends. The two processes are not identical, and what perception leaves to interpretation depends decisively on the nature and extent of previous experience and training.

I chose this edition for its compactness and soft cover (if you have to scan, then hardcover books are less suitable for this). But... the quality of the printing turned out to be quite low, which really made reading difficult. So I recommend choosing a different edition.

Another mention of operational definitions. This is a very important topic not only in science, but also in management. See, for example,

Phlogiston (from the Greek φλογιστός - combustible, flammable) - in the history of chemistry - a hypothetical “superfine matter” - a “fiery substance” that supposedly fills all flammable substances and is released from them during combustion.

Structure of scientific revolutions

T. Kuhn

Logic and methodology of science

STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS

PREFACE

The present work is the first fully published study written in accordance with a plan that began to emerge for me almost 15 years ago. At the time, I was a graduate student specializing in theoretical physics, and my dissertation was close to completion. The fortunate circumstance that I enthusiastically attended a trial university course in physics, given to non-specialists, gave me for the first time some idea of ​​the history of science. To my complete surprise, this exposure to old scientific theories and the very practice of scientific research fundamentally undermined some of my basic beliefs about the nature of science and the reasons for its achievements.

I mean those ideas that I previously developed both in the process of scientific education and due to a long-standing non-professional interest in the philosophy of science. Be that as it may, despite their possible usefulness from a pedagogical point of view and their general reliability, these ideas did not at all resemble the picture of science that emerges in the light of historical research. However, they have been and continue to be the basis for many discussions about science, and therefore the fact that in some cases they are not plausible seems to deserve close attention. The result of all this was a decisive turn in my plans regarding a scientific career, a turn from physics to the history of science, and then, gradually, from historical-scientific problems proper back to the more philosophical questions that originally led me to the history of science. Apart from a few articles, this essay is the first of my published works that are dominated by these very questions that occupied me in the early stages of my work. To some extent, it represents an attempt to explain to myself and my colleagues how it happened that my interests shifted from science as such to its history in the first place.

My first opportunity to delve deeper into some of the ideas outlined below came during a three-year internship at Harvard University. Without this period of freedom, the transition to a new field of scientific activity would have been much more difficult for me, and perhaps even impossible. During these years I devoted part of my time to studying the history of science. With particular interest I continued to study the works of A. Koyré and for the first time discovered the works of E. Meyerson, E. Metzger and A. Mayer 1 .

These authors showed more clearly than most other modern scientists what it meant to think scientifically in a period of time when the canons of scientific thinking were very different from modern ones. Although I increasingly question some of their particular historical interpretations, their work, along with A. Lovejoy's The Great Chain of Being, was one of the main stimuli for shaping my idea of ​​what the history of scientific ideas might be. In this regard, more important role Only the texts of the original sources themselves played.

During those years, however, I spent a lot of time developing areas that had no obvious relation to the history of science, but nevertheless, as it now turns out, contained a number of problems similar to the problems of the history of science that attracted my attention. A footnote that I came across by pure chance led me to the experiments of J. Piaget, with the help of which he explained both the different types of perception at different stages of child development, and the process of transition from one type to another 2. One of my colleagues suggested that I read articles on the psychology of perception, especially Gestalt psychology; another introduced me to B. L. Whorf's ideas about the influence of language on the world; W. Quine discovered for me the philosophical mysteries of the difference between analytic and synthetic sentences 3 . In the course of these casual studies, for which I had time left from my internship, I managed to come across an almost unknown monograph by L. Fleck, “The Emergence and Development of a Scientific Fact” (Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache. Basel, 1935), which anticipated many of my own ideas. L. Fleck's work, together with the comments of another trainee, Francis X. Sutton, made me realize that these ideas might need to be considered within the framework of the sociology of academia. Readers will find few further references to these works and conversations. But I owe them a lot, although now I often can no longer fully understand their influence.

During the last year of my internship, I received an offer to lecture at the Lowell Institute in Boston. Thus, for the first time, I had the opportunity to test my not yet fully formed ideas about science in a student audience. The result was a series of eight public lectures given in March 1951 under the general title “The Quest for Physical Theory.” The following year I began teaching the history of science itself. Almost 10 years of teaching a discipline that I had never systematically studied before left me little time to more accurately formulate the ideas that once brought me to the history of science. Fortunately, however, these ideas served as a latent source of orientation and a kind of problematic structure for much of my course. I must therefore thank my students for providing invaluable lessons both in the development of my own views and in the ability to communicate them clearly to others. The same problems and the same orientation gave unity to much of the largely historical and seemingly very different research that I published after my Harvard fellowship ended. Several of these works have focused on the important role that certain metaphysical ideas play in creative scientific inquiry. Other works explore the way in which the experimental basis of a new theory is accepted and assimilated by adherents of an old theory that is incompatible with the new one. At the same time, all studies describe that stage in the development of science, which below I call the “emergence” of a new theory or discovery. In addition, other similar issues are considered.

The final stage of the present study began with an invitation to spend one year (1958/59) at the Center for Advanced Research in the Behavioral Sciences. Here again I have the opportunity to focus all my attention on the issues discussed below. But perhaps more importantly, after spending one year in a community composed primarily of social scientists, I was suddenly confronted with the problem of the difference between their community and the community of natural scientists among whom I had trained. In particular, I was struck by the number and degree of open disagreement between sociologists about the legitimacy of posing certain scientific problems and methods for solving them. Both the history of science and personal acquaintances have led me to doubt that natural scientists can answer such questions more confidently and more consistently than their social scientist colleagues. However, be that as it may, the practice of scientific research in the fields of astronomy, physics, chemistry or biology usually does not provide any reason to challenge the very foundations of these sciences, whereas among psychologists or sociologists this occurs quite often. Trying to find the source of this difference led me to recognize the role in scientific research of what I later came to call “paradigms.” By paradigms I mean universally recognized scientific achievements that, over a period of time, provide the scientific community with a model for posing problems and their solutions. Once this part of my difficulties was resolved, the initial draft of this book quickly emerged.

It is not necessary to relate here the entire subsequent history of the work on this initial sketch. A few words should only be said about its shape, which it retained after all the modifications. Even before the first draft was completed and largely revised, I assumed that the manuscript would appear as a volume in the Unified Encyclopedia of Sciences series. The editors of this first work first stimulated my research, then monitored its implementation according to the program and, finally, waited with extraordinary tact and patience for the result. I am indebted to them, especially to C. Morris, for his constant encouragement to work on the manuscript and for his helpful advice. However, the scope of the Encyclopedia forced me to present my views in a very concise and schematic form. Although subsequent developments have to a certain extent relaxed these restrictions and the possibility of simultaneous self-publication has presented itself, this work remains more of an essay than the full-fledged book that the subject ultimately requires.

Since my main goal is to bring about a change in the perception and assessment of facts well known to everyone, the schematic nature of this first work should not be blamed. On the contrary, readers prepared by their own research for the kind of reorientation that I advocate in my work will probably find its form both more thought-provoking and easier to understand. But the short essay form also has its disadvantages, and these may justify my showing at the outset some possible routes to extending the scope and deepening the research which I hope to pursue in the future. Much more historical facts could be cited than those I mention in the book. In addition, no less factual data can be gleaned from the history of biology than from the history of the physical sciences. My decision to limit myself here exclusively to the latter is dictated partly by the desire to achieve the greatest coherence of the text, partly by the desire not to go beyond the scope of my competence. Moreover, the view of science to be developed here suggests the potential fruitfulness of many new kinds of both historical and sociological research. For example, the question of how anomalies in science and deviations from expected results increasingly attract the attention of the scientific community requires detailed study, as does the emergence of crises that can be caused by repeated unsuccessful attempts to overcome an anomaly. If I am correct that every scientific revolution changes the historical perspective for the community that experiences that revolution, then such a change in perspective should influence the structure of textbooks and research publications after that scientific revolution. One such consequence—namely, a change in the citation of specialist literature in scientific research publications—perhaps needs to be seen as a possible symptom of scientific revolutions.

The need for an extremely concise presentation also forced me to abandon the discussion of a number of important problems. For example, my distinction between pre-paradigm and post-paradigm periods in the development of science is too schematic. Each of the schools, the competition between which characterized the earlier period, is guided by something very reminiscent of a paradigm; There are circumstances (though, I think, quite rare) in which the two paradigms can coexist peacefully at a later period. Possession of a paradigm alone cannot be considered a completely sufficient criterion for that transitional period in development, which is discussed in Section II. More importantly, I have said nothing, except in brief and few asides, about the role of technological progress or external social, economic and intellectual conditions in the development of science. It is enough, however, to turn to Copernicus and to the methods of compiling calendars to be convinced that external conditions can contribute to the transformation of a simple anomaly into a source of acute crisis. Using the same example, one could show how conditions external to science can influence the range of alternatives that are available to a scientist seeking to overcome a crisis by proposing one or another revolutionary reconstruction of knowledge 4 . A detailed consideration of this kind of consequences of the scientific revolution would not, I think, change the main points developed in this work, but it would certainly add an analytical aspect that is of paramount importance for understanding the progress of science.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, space limitations have prevented us from revealing the philosophical significance of the historically oriented image of science that emerges in this essay. There is no doubt that this image has a hidden philosophical meaning, and I tried, if possible, to point out it and isolate its main aspects. It is true that in doing so I have generally refrained from considering in detail the various positions taken by modern philosophers in discussing the relevant problems. My skepticism, where it appears, relates more to the philosophical position in general than to any of the clearly developed trends in philosophy. Therefore, some of those who know and work well in one of these areas may feel that I have lost sight of their point of view. I think they will be wrong, but this work is not designed to convince them. To try to do this, it would be necessary to write a book of more impressive length and completely different.

I began this preface with some autobiographical information in order to show how much I owe most to both the work of scholars and the organizations that have helped shape my thinking. I will try to reflect the remaining points on which I also consider myself a debtor in this work by quoting. But all this can give only a faint idea of ​​the deep personal gratitude to the many people who have ever supported or guided my intellectual development with advice or criticism. Too much time has passed since the ideas in this book began to take more or less clear form. The list of all those who could detect the stamp of their influence in this work would almost coincide with the circle of my friends and acquaintances. Given these circumstances, I am forced to mention only those whose influence is so significant that it cannot be overlooked even with poor memory.

I must name James W. Conant, then president of Harvard University, who first introduced me to the history of science and thus began to reshape my ideas about the nature of scientific progress. From the very beginning, he generously shared ideas, criticism, and took the time to read the original draft of my manuscript and suggest important changes. An even more active interlocutor and critic during the years when my ideas began to take shape was Leonard K. Nash, with whom I co-taught the course on the history of science founded by Dr. Conant for 5 years. In the later stages of the development of my ideas I greatly missed the support of L. K. Nash. Fortunately, however, after I left Cambridge, my colleague at Berkeley, Stanley Cavell, took over his role as a creative stimulator. Cavell, a philosopher who was interested mainly in ethics and aesthetics and who came to conclusions much like my own, was a constant source of stimulation and encouragement to me. Moreover, he was the only person who understood me perfectly. This type of communication demonstrates an understanding that enabled Cavell to show me a path by which I could bypass or bypass many of the obstacles encountered in the preparation of the first draft of my manuscript.

After the initial text of the work was written, many of my other friends helped me in finalizing it. They will, I think, forgive me if I name only four of them whose participation was the most significant and decisive: P. Feyerabend of the University of California, E. Nagel of Columbia University, G. R. Noyes of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, and my student J. L. Heilbron, who often worked directly with me in preparing the final version for printing. I find all their comments and advice extremely helpful, but I have no reason to think (rather, there is some reason to doubt) that everyone I mentioned above fully approved of the manuscript in its final form.

Finally, my gratitude to my parents, wife and children is of a significantly different kind. In different ways, each of them also contributed a piece of their intelligence to my work (and in a way that is most difficult for me to appreciate). However, they also, to varying degrees, did something even more important. They not only approved of me when I started the work, but also constantly encouraged my passion for it. Everyone who has fought to implement a plan of this magnitude is aware of the effort it takes. I can't find words to express my gratitude to them.

Berkeley, California

T.S.K.

Topic 3. The concept of science by T. Kuhn

Thomas Samuel Kuhn (1922-1996), American historian and philosopher of science, leader of the so-called. postpositivist philosophy of science. Kuhn initially studied theoretical physics at Harvard University, but towards the end of his studies he became interested in the history of science. His first book was published in 1957 and was dedicated to the Copernican revolution. Published in 1962, “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” became a bestseller, it was translated into many languages ​​and reprinted several times, including three times, in 1975, 1977, and 2002 in Russian. In this book, Kuhn introduced concepts that were then widely included in the language of scientists: “paradigm”, “scientific community”, “normal science”. In subsequent years, he participated in numerous discussions related to his concept of science, and also studied the history of the emergence of quantum mechanics.

The difference between Kuhn's theory and the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle.

Difference from the methodology of the late Wittgenstein and linguistic philosophy.

"Copernican Revolution" (1957). Ptolemaic and Copernican traditions.

"The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" (1962).

According to Kuhn: The history of natural science is the only source of the philosophy of science.

Participation of social processes in the formation of scientific paradigms (παραδειγμα). Two aspects of the paradigm: epistemic(fundamental knowledge and values) and social(scientific community, stereotypes, norms, education). Subsequently, Kuhn introduced the concept of a disciplinary matrix (corresponding to the epistemic aspect of the paradigm)

The matrix structure includes:

1. Symbolic generalizations, formal apparatus and language of science.

2. Metaphysical components, general methodological principles.

3. Values ​​that set the prevailing ideals and norms for the construction and substantiation of scientific knowledge.

Stages of science development:

Pre-paradigmatic(competition of scientific communities, alternativeness, lack of authorities)

Paradigmatic(model theory, paradigm - disciplinary matrix - a set of theories, approaches, methods shared by the entire scientific community) - gradual accumulation of knowledge, but also anomalies, the emergence of scientific crises. The choice of solution is influenced by a lot of extra-scientific factors (psychological, social, cultural, political, etc.) - the role of education in continuity.

Extraordinary Science(state of scientific revolution) - the process of accepting a new paradigm, switching vision (gestalt) to a fundamentally different worldview system.

The lack of progress in science is rather evolution.

Kuhn's main achievements:

Historical-evolutionary approach

Anticumulativism

Sociocultural conditionality of scientific knowledge (externalism)

Introduction to the concept of paradigm

Criticism. He did not take into account non-social, logical factors in the development of science. He created a precedent for the social interpretation of science - science and its theories are socio-psychological constructs. (Popper K. The logic of scientific knowledge - if I knew - I would not have written).

Criticism of S. Kuhn's theory: Alain Sokal, Jean Bricmont. Intellectual tricks.

For Kuhn, a certain kind of dogmatism, a strong commitment to well-supported and fruitful belief systems, is a necessary condition for scientific work. One of his articles was called “The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research.”

The main progress in obtaining and expanding knowledge, from his point of view, occurs when a group of specialists, united by the unity of views and basic ideas (one might say, dogmas), is engaged in a systematic and persistent solution of specific scientific problems. Kuhn calls this form of research paradigmatic or “normal science” and considers it very important for understanding the essence of scientific activity.

For Kuhn, it is essential that science is not done alone; a young man turns into a scientist after a long study of his field of knowledge - at the student's bench, in graduate school, in the laboratory under the supervision of an experienced scientist. At this time, he studies approximately the same classical works and textbooks as his colleagues in the scientific discipline, and masters the same research methods as them. Actually, it is here that he acquires that basic set of “dogmas”, with which he then begins independent scientific research, becoming a full-fledged member of the “scientific community”.

NAscientific community– one of the basic concepts of modern philosophy and sociology of science; denotes a collection of researchers with specialized and similar scientific training, who share a common understanding of the goals of science and adhere to similar normative and value attitudes (the ethos of science). The concept captures the collective nature of knowledge production, which necessarily includes communication between scientists, the achievement of an agreed assessment of knowledge by scientists, and the acceptance by community members of intersubjective norms and ideals of cognitive activity. Such aspects of scientific knowledge were described earlier using the concepts of “republic of scientists”, “scientific school”, “invisible college”, etc., however, behind the interpretation of the collective subject of knowledge as a scientific community there is not a simple terminological clarification, but a synthesis of the cognitive and social aspects of science , involving in its analysis methods developed in sociology for analyzing various social groups and communities.

The concept of “Scientific Community” was introduced into use by M. Polanyi in his studies of the conditions of free scientific communications and the preservation of scientific traditions. With the advent of Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), which directly linked the development of science with the structure and dynamics of the scientific community, this concept became firmly established in the arsenal of various disciplines studying science and its history. The scientific community can be considered at different levels: as a community of all scientists, a national scientific community, a community of specialists in a certain scientific discipline, a group of scientists studying one problem and included in an informal communication system. Within the scientific community, there is also a division of scientists into groups engaged in direct activities in the production of new knowledge, the organization of the collective cognitive process, the systematization of knowledge and its transfer to the younger generation of researchers. In the sociology of knowledge, along with the scientific community, “epistemic (cognitive) communities” are studied that develop in non-scientific specialized areas of knowledge, for example. communities of parapsychologists, alchemists, astrologers.

The scientific community is characterized by the fact that its members mature science adhere to one paradigm. A paradigm in Kuhn's concept is a set of basic theoretical views, classical models of research, and methodological tools that are recognized and accepted as a guide to action by all members of the “scientific community.” It is easy to see that all these concepts are closely related: science community consists of those people who recognize a certain scientific paradigm and are engaged normal science.

Paradigm is one of the key concepts of modern philosophy of science . Refers to the set of beliefs, values, methods and technical means adopted by scientific community and ensuring the existence of a scientific tradition. The concept of a paradigm is correlative to the concept of a scientific community: it unites members of the scientific community, and, conversely, the scientific community consists of people who recognize the paradigm. As a rule, a paradigm is embodied in textbooks or in the classical works of scientists and for many years sets the range of problems and methods for solving them in a particular field of science. Kuhn classifies, for example, Aristotelian dynamics, Ptolemaic astronomy, and Newtonian mechanics as paradigms. In connection with criticism of the vagueness and indeterminacy of this term, Kuhn further explicated its meaning through the concept disciplinary matrix, taking into account, firstly, the belonging of scientists to a particular discipline and, secondly, the system of rules of scientific activity. Sets of prescriptions consist of symbolic generalizations (laws and definitions of the basic concepts of the theory); metaphysical provisions that define the way of seeing the universe and its ontology; value systems influencing the choice of areas of research; “generally accepted models” - schemes for solving specific problems (“puzzles”), which give scientists methods for solving problems in their everyday scientific work. In general, the concept of a paradigm is broader than the concept of a separate theory; a paradigm forms the structure of a scientific discipline at a certain time. The formation of a generally accepted paradigm is a sign of the maturity of science. A paradigm shift leads to a scientific revolution, i.e. complete or partial change in the elements of the disciplinary matrix. The transition to a new paradigm is dictated not so much by logical considerations as by value and psychological considerations.

In mature scientific disciplines - physics, chemistry, biology, etc. – during the period of their sustainable, normal development there can only be one paradigm. So, in physics, an example of this is the Newtonian paradigm, in the language of which scientists spoke and thought from the end of the 17th to the end of the 19th century.

What about the paradigm in the social and human sciences?

Sociology - Merton: there is no single paradigm, sociologists study not only from textbooks, but also from classical texts, and they have different approaches, different paradigms. For example, Durkheim and Weber took opposing positions on many issues.

Psychology – behaviorism, psychoanalysis, cognitive psychology

Economics – mainstream and alternatives (neo-Keynesianism, neo-Marxism, Austrian school, etc.)

Linguistics – dominant and marginal theories.

Normal Science : Most scientists are freed from thinking about the most fundamental questions of their discipline: they have already been “solved” by the paradigm. Their main focus is on solving small specific problems, in Kuhn’s terminology – “puzzles”. It is curious that when approaching such problems, scientists are confident that with due persistence they will be able to solve the “puzzle.” Why? Because based on the accepted paradigm, many similar problems have already been solved. The paradigm sets the general outline of the solution, and the scientist remains to show his skill and ingenuity in important and difficult, but private moments.

Normal Science– a concept introduced into the philosophy of science by Kuhn. Refers to the activities of the scientific community in accordance with a certain norm - paradigm. The nature of normal science consists in the formulation and solution of all kinds of conceptual, instrumental and mathematical “puzzle” problems. The paradigm strictly regulates both the choice of problems and methods for solving them. For Kuhn, the creative aspect during normal scientific activity is limited to expanding the scope and increasing the accuracy of the paradigm. The conceptual foundations of the paradigm are not affected, which leads only to a quantitative increase in knowledge, but not to a qualitative transformation of its content. Kuhn therefore characterizes normal science as “a highly cumulative enterprise.”

Scientific revolutions. If Kuhn’s book had only contained this description of “normal science,” he would have been recognized as a realistic, but very boring and devoid of romance, writer of the everyday life of science. But the long stages of normal science in his concept are interrupted by brief but dramatic periods of turmoil and revolutions in science - periods paradigm shifts.

These times are approaching unnoticed: scientists fail to solve one puzzle, then another, etc. At first, this does not cause much concern; no one shouts that the paradigm is falsified. Scientists are putting these aside anomalies- this is what Kuhn calls unsolved puzzles and phenomena that do not fit into the paradigm - for the future, they hope to improve their methods, etc. However, when the number of anomalies becomes too large, scientists - especially young ones, who have not yet fully fused with the paradigm in their thinking - begin to lose confidence in the old paradigm and try to find the contours of a new one.

The period begins crisis in science, heated discussions, discussions of fundamental problems. The scientific community is often stratified during this period; innovators are opposed by conservatives trying to save the old paradigm. During this period, many scientists cease to be “dogmatists”; they are sensitive to new, even immature, ideas. They are ready to believe and follow those who, in their opinion, put forward hypotheses and theories that can gradually develop into a new paradigm. Finally, such theories are actually found, the majority of scientists again consolidate around them and begin to enthusiastically engage in “normal science,” especially since the new paradigm immediately opens up a huge field of new unsolved problems.

Thus, the final picture of the development of science, according to Kuhn, takes on the following form: long periods of progressive development and accumulation of knowledge within the framework of one paradigm are replaced by short periods of crisis, breaking the old one and searching for a new paradigm. Kuhn compares the transition from one paradigm to another with the conversion of people to a new religious faith, firstly, because this transition cannot be explained logically and, secondly, because scientists who have accepted the new paradigm perceive the world significantly differently than before - even They see old, familiar phenomena as if with new eyes.

During and after the revolution, there is a change of generations of scientists, rewriting the history of the development of the discipline in the light of a new paradigm.